1. Facts of the revision case lie within a narrow' compass and only legal point raised on them was about acquisition of respective title to a small bit of property at Mauza Naroki Mahja, urban area, Pattoki of District Kasur, upon which, the petitioner was shown to have constructed a "Katcha house". The trial. Court decreed possession of the disputed property to the plaintiff, on 11-12-1984.
2. Appeal filed against the decision by the petitioner was dismissed on merits on 8-6-1985, by Additional District Judge, Kasur. Thereupon, a civil revision from the impugned judgment and decree was preferred to this Court.
3. An area of land measuring 6 Kanals, 2 Marlas comprised in Khasra No.2491/536 at Mauza Naroki Mahja was allotted to and settled upon Noor Elahi at Serial No. 21 of Register RL-11 of Mauza Naroki Mahja. Subsequently, the allotted area was reduced to 5 Kanals 1 Marla. On 26-5-1969, Noor Elahi sold 4 Marlas, 84 sq.ft. from his land to Muhammad Hussain. Prior to it, Fazal Din was shown to have occupied this piece of land, in the year 1952 and constructed one or two rooms on it, in accordance with the sanctioned plan from the Municipal Committee, Pattoki. Since the property in possession of Fazal Din was transferred by Noor Elhai to Muhammad Hussain, latter brought a petition for his .eviction on 16-9-1970, in the Court of Rent Controller. On 27-5-1976, ejectment petition was withdrawn from the Court of Rent Controller, for a wish to file civil suit for possession based on title to the property. On 18-6-1976, the present suit for possession was instituted by Muhammad Hussain against Fazal Din. Latter resisted the suit. The trial Court settled issues and took evidence from the parties on them. Upon its review, it found the plaintiff and decreed possession of the disputed property in his favour. In appeal, the decision of the trial Court was affirmed.
4. In revision, learned counsel urged a solitary point respecting acquisition of adverse title to the property in possession of the petitioner. There was no dispute about identity of the property or its ownership by Noor Elahi and its purchase by the plaintiff from him. Plea of adverse possession was primarily based on the basis of an agreement to sell between Noor Elahi and Fazal Din concluded on 19-6-1962. It was asserted that 3 Marlas, 84 s.ft. of land was agreed to be sold by Noor Elahi to Fazal Din at the rate of Rs.200 per Marla as on site. Date fixed for the Finalization of the sale was 14- 6-1963. It was common ground that sale of the above land was not finalized in terms of agreement to sell executed on 19-6-1962. Nor was it perfected through a suit for specific performance instituted by Fazal Din. The matter rested where it was at the time of execution of agreement to sell.
5. Time fixed in the agreement for completion of the sale had since expired. Similarly, the period of limitation prescribed in Article 113 for enforcement of the agreement to sell through Court had run out. Article 113 prescribed a period of three years, when there was a date or time fixed in the agreement to sell for finalization of the transaction. It is agreed that date/time was fixed in the agreement to sell. Upon proper computation, the limitation period in terms of Article 113 expire op 14-6-1966.
6. Agreement to sell did not per se create a right in the property in favour of the petitioner. It simply gave him a right to enforce sale agreementfor the finalization and completion of the sale-deed.
7. Suit for possession based on title was filed on 18-6-1976. It was within twelve years of the period reckoned from the date of expiry of the limitation period prescribed for a suit for specific performance. On his own showing, the petitioner was in permissive possession of the property, since the date of sale-agreement in his favour. At the hearing, learned counsel candidly stated that the petitioner shall claim adverse possession from 14-6-1966 and not prior thereto. He relied upon Article 136 of the Limitation Act and referred to cases reported in Mir Laik Ali v. Standard Vacuum Oil Company (ESSO) and another (PLD 1964 Supreme Court 220), Ahmed Khan v. Rasul Shah and others (PLD 1975 Supreme Court 311), Pir Muhammad Yunus Shah and 10 others v.
8. Abdullah and 2 others (1992 CLC 15), Ch. Muhammad Aslam Khan v. Malik Sher and 2 others 1992 CLC 196 for urging that possession of the property under a defective or invalid sale was clearly adverse and hostile to the true owner. Neither, the Article of Limitation Act nor the cases relied upon were much helpful to the case of the petitioner. Till the period fixed in the agreement and the time for specific performance prescribed in Article 113 ran out, the owner of the property could not turn out the petitioner from the property in dispute in his possession. Expiry of the relevant period gave cause to the plaintiff to sue him for possession of the disputed property. Suit was clearly instituted within twelve years of the time fixed for the suit for specific performance in Article 113 of the Limitation Act. There was no complete sale of the disputed property in favour of the petitioner. Only an agreement to sell existed which protected his possession under it for a limited period. Thereafer, he had no warrant to stay on against the true owner of the property. His C possession was permissive and could not turn hostile unilaterally. Respondent as purchaser from Noor Elahi was owner of the property. He had twelve years for him to sue the petitioner for possession of the disputed property. His suit was clearly in time and the petitioner neither held the property adversely nor had the adverse possession ripened into his ownership rights. In taking the above view, I am guided by the decision of the Supreme Court in Mirza Ghulam Hussain and another v. Ch. Iqbal Ahmad (PLD 1991 SC 290). In my view, elements of adverse possession were not existing in the case.
9. Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was already struck down as `un-Islamic' by Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court. Plea of adverse possession, in the circumstances, was devoid of moral content and could not be countenanced.
10. In the aforesaid view of the matter, I could not favour the contention urged on behalf of the petitioner for upholding his title on basis of adverse possession and would dismisss the petition by leaving the parties to bear their own costs in this Court. Records be returned.