AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is an appeal with the leaves of this Court against the judgment dated 6-2- 1993 of the N.-W.F.P. Service Tribunal, Peshawar hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, passed in Appeal No.159 of 1992 filed by the appellant against the following adverse remarks recorded in his A.C.R. For the period from 29-5-1991 to 31-12-1991 by the countersigning officer:--- "Not yet fit for promotion. He enjoys a stinking reputation. There are complaints of corruption by the people/elders/members of the Bar against the officer. He was summoned twice by the undersigned and was warned to improve his performance/integrity." dismissing the same
2. Leave to appeal was granted to consider, whether.The adverse remarks in the A.C.R. Of the appellant by the countersigning officer for the period from 29-5-1991 to 31-12-1991, when the Reporting Officer had adjudged the performance of the appellant for the same period as good and he was allowed move-over to BPS-19 on 1-12-1989 shortly before the adverse remarks by the countersing officer, could be described as an objective assessment of the performance of the appellant in terms of the instructions of N.-W.F.P. Government for writing Performance Evaluation Report of the Government Servants.
3. The brief facts are that the appellant joined service in 1965 and was promoted as EA.C. In 1979. He was allowed move-over from BPS-18 to BPS-19 with effect from 1-12-1989 by the Governor N.-W.F.P.
The appellant was posted in the District Bannu prior to his promotion and two times after his promotion as EA.C. And spent about 1 1/2 years from end of 1977 to February, 1979, as Special Traffic Magistrate, Bannu. Then, he again was posted at Bannu on 25-9-1991, where he served till 5-3-1992.
While he was posted at Bannu during the above period, the countersigning officer recorded the above adverse remarks. Against the above adverse remarks, the appellant filed the above service appeal. Before the Tribunal, the appellant also produced a certificate of the President of the Bar about his integrity. However, the Tribunal dismissed the above appeal for the following reasons:-- "The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the President of the Bar has given him a certificate of integrity and honesty. The Tribunal has to weigh the assessment of the Commissioner and not the certificate of the President of the Bar and some elders of the Ilaqa.
The Countersigning Officer has warned the appellant twice to improve his performance and integrity and that the Countersigning Officer has followed the instructions contained in Part VII of the ACR while recording the adverse entry. The appellant has not mentioned any animosity of the Countersigning Officer against him which may have led the Countersigning Officer to record the adverse entry. It is apparent that the Countersigning Officer while recording the adverse remarks followed the instructions contained in the circular letter wherein the guidelines have been given to the officers while recording the ACRs.
Therefore in the light of the above discussion, the Tribunal finds no force in the appeal which is hereby dismissed. Parties are left to bear their own costs and rile be consigned to the record."
Thereupon, the appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted to consider the above, question.
4. In support of the above appeal, Mr. Abdul Hakeem Khan, learned Sr. Advocate Supreme Court appearing for the appellant, has taken us through the extract from the Instructions appended to N.-W.F.P. Government Performance Evaluation Report and Extract from Guide to Performance Evaluation by O & M Division, 1981 Edition, hereinafter referred to as the Guide, and has contended that the above adverse remarks recorded by the countersigning officer run counter to the relevant clauses of the extract from the Guide, inasmuch as the same are not objective and circumspect as provided under para. 2.8 of the Guide nor the same are based on absolutely detached and objective point of view as provided in para. 2.13 of the Guide. To reinforce the above submission he has referred to the meanings of the words "circumspect" and "objective" given in the Legal Thesaurus by William C. Burton, which provide as follows:-- "circumspect" "alert, assiduous, astute, attending, attentive, careful, cautious, cautious, chary, circumspective, congnizant, conscientious, conscious, considerate, contemplative, deliberate, deliberative, diligent, discerning, discreet, discretionary, discriminating, discriminative, exacting, guarded, heedful, intent, introspective, judicious, meditative, meticulous, mindful, observant, observing, on guard, painstaking, particular, percipient, perspicacious, precautionary, precautious, precise, premeditative, prepared, provides, prudents, prudent, reflecting, reflective, regardful, scrutinizing, sensitive, thinking, thorough, thoroughgoing, thoughtful, vigilant, wary, watchful, well- considered." "objective" actual, broad-minded, candid, concrete, corporeal, desired, detached, disinterested, dispassionate, equitable, factual, fair, fair- minded, impartial impersonal, judicial, just, material, neutral, nonpartisan, non subjective, open-minded, real, reasonable. Scientific, sober, unbiased, unbigoted, uncolored, uninfluenced, unjaundiced, unprejudiced, unslanted, unswayed, unwarped".
5. A perusal of the above quoted definition of the word "circumspect" indicates that it inter alia connotes considerate, diligent, discerning, discreet, exacting, judicious, meticulous, mindful, on guard, precise, sensitive and thorough etc. Whereas, the word "objective" inter alia carries the meaning of detached, disinterested, dispassionate, equitable, factual, fair, fair-minded, impartial, impersonal, judicious and just etc.
6. It is true that in terms of the above instructions contained in the Guide, the Reporting Officer and the Countersigning Officer while recording remarks in the A.C.Rs. Should be discreet, judicious, precise, detached, disinterested, dispassionate, equitable and fair-minded without being partial.
However, we are unable to conclude that the countersigning officer while recording the above quoted adverse remarks has violated any of the above principles. The appellant has not alleged any mala fide against the countersigning officer i.e. The Commissioner therefore, it cannot be urged that he was not impartial or not dispassionate in evaluating the performance of the appellant as reflected in the above adverse remarks. He had disclosed the source on the basis of which he formed his opinion about the performance of the appellant.
7. Then it was urged by Mr. Abdul Hakeem Khan that just .a few months prior to the recording of the above adverse remarks by the countersigning officer, the appellant was allowed move-over by an order dated 10-6-1991 with effect from 1-12-1989 from BPS-18 to BPS-19 by the Governor of N.-W.F.P.
And a copy whereof was inter alia endorsed to the Commissioner, why did not object to it and, therefore, the adverse remarks were not warranted by the above countersigning officer. His further submission was that the appellant would not have been allowed move-over if his performance would not have been up to the mark.
8. It will suffice to observe that the matter was not referred to the Commissioner before allowing the above move-over to the appellant. The Commissioner has nothing to do with the grant of the move-over as the move---over is allowed on the principles inter alia enumerated at Serial No.59 in Estacode of 1989 Edition at page 654, which inter alia provides that for move---over from B-17 to B- 18 and B-18 to B-19 at least two good reports without any adverse entry during the last five years inclusive of the year of move-over should be available. He has also referred to the order of this Court in the case of Government of Punjab through Additional Chief Secretary, Services General Administration and Information Department and another v. Abdul Matloob Khan, Extra Assistant Commissioner/Magistrate 1st Class, Gujranwala (1990 SCM R 1431), in which this Court, while declining leave to appeal against the judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal, whereby the adverse remarks recorded in the respondent's A.C.R. Were struck off, observed as follows:-- "(3)The performance of a magistrate is not so much a matter of reputation as of expert assessm ent by a superior from record and performance relatable to individual cases and situations. By resorting to the reputation as the source and not to the actual performance the Commissioner has justified his remarks by reference to a somewhat extraneous consideration. It is true that ordinarily, in recording remarks or 'opinions, full reasons need not be given but the conclusions have to be based on facts and when in contest, as in this case the concerned officer should have plausible explanation to justify his conclusion. In this case that was not adequately done and the Tribunal was justified in interfering with it."
9. In our view, the above adverse remarks recorded by the countersigning officer do not run counter to the above quoted observations. The countersigning officer before recording the above adverse remarks had twice summoned the appellant and warned him to improve his performance f and integrity. The above adverse remarks are not founded solely on the reputation but also are based on the performance of the appellant.
10. Then it was urged by Mr. Abdul Hakeem Khan that the countersigning officer was obliged to prove the allegation reflected in the above adverse remarks particularly when he was arrayed as one of the respondents, but he did not care to even appear to defend. In support of his above submission he has inter alia relied upon the above order rendered in the case of Government of Punjab (supra) and has also referred to some judgments rendered by the Provincial Service Tribunals.
11. We are unable to accept the above contention. In a case of the nature in hand it will not be possible to prove factually that the officer concerned is corrupt. If the Reporting Officer or the Countersigning Officer has no personal motive or bias and they have evaluated the performance on the basis of their personal observation/information, the same cannot be struck down merely on the ground that they are not in a position to prove that the adverse remarks recorded in the A.C.R.
Are true, nor the factum that they have not appeared before the Tribunal or before this Court though arrayed as respondents would adversely reflect on their bona fides. On the contrary, this will show that they have no personal interest in the subject-matter. In the present case neither the Tribunal nor this Court directed the Commissioner concerned to appear in person to explain the above adverse remarks. In the absence of such direction, no adverse inference can be drawn. We may observe that a tendency has lately developed among the Reporting and Countersigning Officers not to record adverse remarks even against the known corrupt and inefficient officers in order to avoid personal involvement, as some times they are asked by their superiors to substantiate their adverse remarks. In our view, the approach should be that if no allegation is made against the Reporting or Countersigning Officer about mala fide and their own reputation is not clouded, their evaluation as to the performance of their subordinates is to be accepted.
However, if mala fide on the part of the Reporting or Countersigning Officer can be ascertained or his or their reputation is questionable, the approach of the department or the Tribunal should be different and adverse remarks recorded in the A.C.Rs. By such officers should be scrutinized with care and caution. In such matters the interference by the Tribunal will be justified and warranted.
12. The upshot of the above discussion is that we do not find any infirmity in the judgment under appeal. The appeal is therefore dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.