AKHTAR HASSAN (CHAIRMAN):--The appellant Ehsan-ul-Haq was a Sub-Accountant (Siaha Navis) in the Sub-Treasury Khanpur, District Rahimyar Khan. He and five others were proceeded against on charges of withdrawing Rs.16,64,847.64 from the Sub-Treasury by putting up bogus claims of commutation of pensions and gratuity. An Enquiry Committee found all of them guilty. He and the other Siaha Navis, Tehzib Hussain Shah, were dismissed the Sub-Treasury Officers (Tehsildars) Mushtaq Ahmad Anjum and Ali Ahmad Faridi were administered "Censure", while the District Accounts Officers I and 11 Muhammad Shafi Chishti and Ali Ahmad were compulsorily retired. Besides the present appellant only Muhammad Shafi Chishti, D.A.O. I assailed the penalty in Appeal No. 493/1165 of 1986 while others did not impugn their own.
2.The precise charge against the present appellant was that he--
(i) arranged fraudulent withdrawal of Rs.10,55,268.51 by bogus vouchers against fictitious authorities, and Rs.85,637.83 by doubly commuting pension in violation of the Treasury Rules;
(ii) arranged to get bogus authorities of commutation amounting to Rs2,74,403.30 with the assistance of his co-accused Tehzib Hussain duly endorsed by the District Accounts Officers;
(iii) sent bogus vouchers along the drawing schedules to the National; and
(iv) misused the Special Seal to emboss those bills.
3. Mr. Mushtaq Masood, Advocate for the appellant laid stress primarily on two points namely (i) that obtaining answers of the appellant to a questionnaire was not permissible under the law and
(ii) that leaving off the Tehsildars (Sub-Treasury Officers) by merely administering them "Censure" was quite discriminatory vis-a-vis their complicity in making payments without ascertaining identities of the various claimants. He placed reliance on 1983 PLC (C.S.) 17 for the view that examining a witness through a questionnaire was not permissible in that such answers did not constitute evidence as held in the case of Syed Abid Hussain v. Government of Pakistan, Secretary, Establishment Division etc. 1987 PLC (C.S.) 266. Likewise he referred to 1991 PLC (C.S.) 162 to bear out the other point namely that when various accused were at par vis-a-vis the charges. The penalty could not be discriminatory. Additionally he referred to the Treasury Rules and instructions contained in the Treasury Manual urging vehemently that the primary responsibility to make sure as to the identity of a claimant/pensioner always lay on the Treasury Officer and that the same could not be shifted to member of clerical staff like the appellant who had not much role to play in making payment of pensions, gratuities or the commutated amounts. Lastly he emphasised that while it was a joint inquiry held against all the six accused facing the same charges, it was not disposed of by a single judgment which instead was written in separate pieces relating almost to each accused differently. He submitted that this mode was not envisaged by the rules and therefore, its adoption smacked discrimination against the weaker accused like the appellant as compared to the Accounts Officers and the Tehsildars.
4. The contention that there was no evidence on the record to sustain the charge against the appellant did not appear to be true. Indeed he confessed his involvement and tried in vain to throw the entire burden either on the D.A.O., or the S.T.O. Or the Bank on the plea that it was their duty to have ascertained the identity of the claimants. In his reply dated 5-5-1985 to the show-cause notice, he made a plain confession of his involvement. In para. 11 thereof (page 44 of the present file) he quite unambiguously observed:-- ---..Because the vouchers were to be sealed and signed by the Sub-Treasury Officer to his entire satisfaction and who also managed a statement from me under coercion and undue influence."
Likewise he repeated this stance in his appeal (pp. 47 - 56) preferred to the Chief Secretary where his plea was as under:-- "Only a few questions were put to the appellant and on the basis of the reply to the said questions, the charges were said to be proved (page 48-49) . .....In no way the responsibility of identification could be shifter towards the appellant and who managed a statement from the appellant under coercion and undue influence (page 53)."
A criminal case too was set up against the appellant during investigation whereof he made a confessional statement under section 164, Cr.P.C. Before Magistrate. Though he tried to get rid of it by stating before the Enquiry Committee that the Sub-Treasury Officer "managed it ---------from the appellant (him) under coercion and undue influence ------------." yet he did not lead and evidence in the course of proceedings as to how he was coerced or unduly influenced to make it.
Section 164, Cr.P.C. Itself postulates considerable precautions before recording a confession. The presumption was that all those were meticulously observed particularly when no infringement thereof was brought to light. It was not shown if the Criminal Court ultimately discarded it. In fact retraction from such a statement by itself would not suffice to throw away. It could still be proved for the purposes of criminal trial and at best mat need corroboration. But on the civil side, and so on the disciplinary side, remains to be an admission ordinarily binding upon the person making it.
What to say of a statement made before a Court, an admission of liability made by an accused before a Police Officer during investigation is admissible in evidence on the civil side though it is totally excluded in a criminal trial. Section 21 of the Evidence Act (Article 34 ofQanun-e-Shahadat is on the point. Looking at it from this angle, the appellant's confessional statement was rightly relied upon.
5. The contention that answers to a questionnaire did not constitute evidence, was not all that correct. The precedent cases of Niaz Ahmad Akhtar v. Executive Engineer, Burala Division, Faisalabad 1983 PLC (C.S.) 17 and Syed Abid Hussain v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Establishment Division etc. Reported as 1987 PLC (C.S.) 266 did not prohibit putting questions to the accused official. Those were indeed the cases of putting questionnaire to witnesses who were supposed to make testimony in the narrative form after making oath to be administered by the Court or a local Commissioner. The Rules themselves did not prescribe any specific mode of recording evidence. By virtue of section 5 of the Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1974 as interpreted in 1989 PLC (C.S.) 398, C.P.C. Would apply and the mode of recording evidence is prescribed in Order 18, Rule 5 thereof, it provides:-- " ---------.The evidence of each witness shall be taken down in writing not ordinarily in the form of question and answer, but in that of narrative ------.--- If we keep in view this statutory provision, it would be difficult to- agree with the contention that taking down evidence in the form of question and answer was totally prohibited. On the contrary, rule 5 ibid permits taking it in the form of question and answer though it should not be the ordinary practice. In other words, the rule visualises exception to the ordinary mode whereby the testimony of a witness could be taken in the form of question and answer. For this simple reason the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant can be distinguished. In fact those did not consider the aforesaid provision of law at all and proceeded to lay down a broad based dictum that taking evidence in the form of question and answer was totally forbidden. The further reason to differ from those judgments in that the statement in the present case had to be taken in the form of questions and answers as contemplated by sections 164 and 364, Cr.P.C. The appellant on his own showing had made such a confessional statement, which essentially had to be recorded in the form of questions and answers. No objection, therefore, could be taken to its form. The only reason to discard it away could possibly be that it was either retracted or was the result of inducement threat or coercion. In any such event the confessional statement could be excluded but only in a criminal trial. On the other hand it shall remain an admissible piece of evidence in civil matters as also the disciplinary proceedings which being governed by the C.P.C. Partook shape of civil proceedings. Article 34 read with Article 42 of the "Qanun-e---Shahadat", 1984 would make the entire statement of the appellant admissible for the purpose of the present proceedings. The latter Article permits putting questions and taking answers of the witness and this mode would not render such a statement inadmissible. For all these reasons the appellant himself confessed liability and there was nothing wrong in placing implicit reliance upon his own admission.
6. The main thrust of argument canvassed before us was that the order of the Authority was discriminatory against the appellant in that the Accounts Officers and the Tehsildars were left almost free whereas the appellant being comparatively a smaller fry was hooked up. Besides, it was claimed that passing a separate order against him though it was a joint inquiry arising out the same charges, was not called for. We do not find much substance in this contention too. The inquiry report (pp. 18-38) reveals that separate charges against each of the six accused were framed although those arose out of the same series of acts. Determining them by separate orders was therefore not in any way objectionable. Indeed, the plea was misplaced inasmuch as the report of the Inquiry Committee, pages 18-38 was one compendious document rather than in pieces. All that it did was that individual charges against each of the six accused were separately determined. Such an arrangement was, truly speaking, unavoidable.
7. Next comes the appellant's exculpatory statement throwing the entire burden on the Accounts Officers and the Tehsildar (S.T.O.) for satisfying themselves as to genuineness of documents and the identification of the claimants. Their plea on the contrary, was that the rules cast a heavy duty on the Siaha Navis to see that the documents were in order and that the claimants were not importers. They stressed that if this caution was not observed at the initial stage meticulously, there was every likelihood that the omission might subsequently lead to the preparation of fraud.
Treasury Rules relating to this subject and the Instructions in the Treasury Manual would help us see how far the appellant was responsible for their infringement.
8. Para. 31, Chapter 1, Part VII, and also paras. 231 to 255 and 265 of Chapter IV of the Sub-Treasury Manual, Third Edition, 1934 deal with the subject. Paragraph 31 reads as under:-- "The document (voucher) on which a claim for payment of money is made will be received and examined by the Siaha Navis who, if the form of the document be in order and the claim admissible, will enter the amount in his Day Book or separate subsidiary register concerned, endorse the order for payment on the document and lay it with the Day Book or register before the Sub-Treasury Officer."
Exactly this was the requirement of Rule 4.147 of the Subsidiary Treasury Rules, which was to the effect:-- "The bill or other voucher presented as a claim for money will be received and examined by the Accountant and if it is deficient in any of the following respects it should not be cashed---------..- -- Obviously in the case under consideration, these requirements were not observed by the appellant who was none else that the Accountant or Siaha Navis. It was true that paragraphs 237, 240, 247, 249, 253 and 255 laid special emphasis on noting the pensioner's personal marks, marks of identification, their continued existence and the Tehsildar's personal acquaintance with them in order to prevent imposition or risks of fraud, yet their turn comes at the second space. The initial duty was explicitly cast upon the Siaha Navis to see that the documents etc. Were in order and that there was no attempt at imposition etc. It was here that the appellant admittedly failed to discharge his duty carefully and helped withdrawal of huge amounts of Rs.16 lacs odd from the Treasury. It was again true that the Accounts Officer and the Sub-Treasury Officers should have been dealt with more severely for their own negligence but the State has not chosen to hold them responsible for any dishonest intent. This Tribunal has no authority to re-open the case vis-a-vis them and has to confine itself to the appeal brought by the appellant. There was ample evidence of his misconduct proving him to be the initiator of the trouble which culminated in a colossal loss to the State. His attempt to exculpate himself and inculpate others was completely idle.
9. There is no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed.