This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, calls in question the order dated 19-6-1976 passed by the Punjab Labour Court No. 3, Lyallpur now Faisalabad), whereby the appeal was accepted against the order dated 4-3-1976 passed by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, dismissing the application of respondent No.2 for the payment of wages amounting to Rs. 40,977 for the period 15-9-1949 to 2-4-1958 as time-barred and directing the petitioner to deposit the said amount with the Authority.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the order dated 4-3-1976 of the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act refusing to entertain the application of respondent No.2 under section 15(2) of the Act on the ground of its being barred by time was not open to appeal under section 17 therefore, the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction. The plea raised by learned counsel for the petitioner finds support from the cases of Indian jurisdiction in Prem Narayan v. Divisional Traffic Manager (AIR 1954 Bom. 78); Madras Provisional Type Foundry Workers' Union v. Ramalinga Mudaliar (AIR 1957 Mad. 68); and Khema Nand v. East India Railway (AIR 1943 All. 243), which were also quoted with approval in the case of Divisional Superintendent, PWR. Multan v. Abdul Khaliq (1984 SCM R 1311). In the precedent case one of the question which came up for consideration was whether an order dismissing the claim under section 15 (2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, as time-barred was appeal-able under section 17 of the Act. After examining the scope of subsections
(2) and (3) of section 15 and section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, it was held:-- "The first proviso to subsection (2) of section 15 lays down the limitation within which the application was to be filed whereas the second proviso authorises the condonation of delay for sufficient cause. Subsection (3) provides the procedure to be followed where an application under subsection (2) is entertained. Section 17 provides for an appeal against the direction made under subsection (3) or subsection (4) of section 15. Here what is omitted is an appeal against an order refusing to entertain an application on the ground that it is barred by time or for sufficient cause the delay is condoned. The intention of the Legislature seems to be in that case where the application is beyond time and the authority fails to condone the delay under the second proviso to subsection (2), no appeal shall lie against that order under section 17. On the same footing where the delay is condoned still no appeal would lie on that ground and the matter would be liable to be adjudicated upon in the manner laid down by subsection (3) . If this would not have been the intention a provision would have been made in section 17 as in the case of directions made under subsections (3) and (4). Clearly, therefore, an order dismissing the application as being barred by time or condoning the delay for sufficient cause does not qualify as direction to make it appeal-able under section 17."
3. In the instant case, the application of respondent No. 2 claiming the disputed wages was clearly barred by time. The Authority refused to condone the delay and dismissed the application as time barred, therefore, the Punjab Labour Court No. 2 fell into error in entertaining the appeal and deciding it on merits by condoning the delay. Respectfully following the law laid down in the case of Abdul Khaliq (supra), I hold that the impugned order dated 19-6-1976 of the Punjab Labour Court No. 3 Lyallpur, is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The writ petition is accepted but there shall be no order as to costs.