JUDGMENT This is an appeal against the order dated 31-12-1974 of Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore dismissing the petition of Sultan Masud Tiwana, appel- llant, filed under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, against his dismissal.
2. The appellant was employed as a Purchase Assistant in Messrs Dawood Hercules Chemicals Ltd., respondent, on 24-8-1970. He used to work under a Supervisor. His duties were to collect quotations from the market about the stores to be purchased. After a quotation was approved by the Supervisor, he actually purchased and collected the stores. An enquiry was held against him on charges of misconduct in so far as he in disregard of Company's established practice, did not obtain competitive quotations prior to the purchase of stores, that he connived with sellers and fraudulently indicated sellers who were not actually in existence and that he purchased items at much higher rates than those prevailing in the market and thereby wilfully caused loss to the Company. He was found guilty and, as a result thereof, he was dismissed from service on 1-8-1972. Thereafter he filed a petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 seeking his re-instatement with past benefits. He challenged his order of dismissal from service mainly on the ground that he was not afforded an opportunity to defend himself, inasmuch as, the documents relied upon were not supplied to him in,order to enable him to produce his defence and that no second show-cause notice was served on him before the impugned order of his dismissal was made.
3. The respondent resisted the petition and pleaded inter alia that the petitioner was not a workman within the meanings of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and, therefore, his petition in its present form was not competent. On merits it was alleged by the respondent that the appellant was given full opportunity to produce his defence, that the documents demanded by him were shown to him and that service of second show-cause notice was not necessary according to the relevant law.
4. The learned Court held that the appellant was a workman within the meanings of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968 and, therefore, his service could not have been terminated without the procedure laid down under Standing Order 15 of the aforementioned Ordinance.
5. On merits, however, the learned Labour Court held that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K-109/1097 (In re: Muhammad Shamim v. Messrs Pakistan Tobacco Company Limited and another) and the decision of the Sind and Baluchistan High Court in the case. The United Distributors Limited v. Zahid Hossain Khan and others (1) no second show-cause notice was necessary and dismissed the petition.
6. Aggrieved by the above order the appellant has preferred this appeal as already mentioned above.
7. The respondent filed cross-objection challenging the decision of the Labour Court that the appellant was a workman within the meanings of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
8. From the statement of the appellant I find that his duties were to collect quotations from the market about the stores to be purchased and subsequent to the approval of the quotations by the Supervisor to purchase and collect the stores from the sellers. Since in his petition under section 25-A he was claiming a right guaranted to him under Standing Order 15 of the WesLPakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, he has first to establish that he is a workman under the said Ordinance. He was dismissed from service on 1-8-1972. At that time section 2(/) of the said Ordinance read as follows: "A workman means any person empl :>yed in any Industrial or Commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or reward." The learned counsel for the respondent contended that since the appellant did not do any manual labour in the discharge of his duties, he was not a workman within the meanings of the aforementioned definition of workman. According to the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary labour is defined as manual labour and not manual work. The true meaning of the labour is that which tests a man's muscles and sinews. Since the appellant's duty was merely to collect quotations from the market about the stores to be purchased and after approval of the Supervisor to go and purchase the said stores, he clearly does B not come within the definition of manual labour. He is, therefore, not a workman under the said Ordinance.
9. The learned Representative of the appellant, however, contended that since the appellant was charge- sheeted and an enquiry was held against him under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, he was treated as a workman by the respondent and as such the respondent was estopped from raising an objection that he was not a workman.
10. The mere fact that the respondent had charge-sheeted him and dismissed him from service under the aforementioned Ordinance, he will not be estopped from raising the plea that the appellant was not a workman within the meanings of the said Ordinance because there could be no estoppel on point of law. lt is a well established principle of law that the representation on question of law does not create an estoppel. The question as to whether the order is illegal or invalid is a question of law and there can be no estoppel on such a question. Further no estoppel can be pleaded against the directions and prohibitions enacted by statute law. Thus where the Legislature declares a contract, a transfer, or any other transaction, to be void, it cannot be validated by resorting to the doctrine of estoppel. In view of the above the respondent cannot be estopped from raising this plea that the appellant was not a workman within the meanings of the said Ordinance.
11. Lastly the Representative of the appellant contended that Islamic law was in force in Pakistan and that the existing laws which are repugnant to it, stand repealed. In support of his contention he relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case, Miss Asma Jillani v. The Govemment of the Punjab and another (1)
12. The learned Representative could not point out in what way the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was repugnant. In any case the appellant in his petition had claimed a right guaranted to him under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and, therefore. it does not lie in his mouth to say that the said Ordinance stands repealed. In lieu of the above I find no force in this contention.
13. In the result I find no merit in this appeal, which is hereby dismissed.