ABDUL RAZZAQ A. THAHIM (CHAIRMAN).---The relevant facts for the purpose of disposal of this appeal are that the appellant was appointed as Inspector, Central Excise and Sales Tax on 11-12- 1965 and presently he is working as Deputy Superintendent in the Customs Department. His case for promotion as Deputy Superintendent was considered in the year 1983 alongwith others, but according to the appellant, his case was deferred and his juniors were promoted. Subsequently, he was promoted as Deputy Superintendent in the year 1984. In the year 1991, a provisional seniority list of Deputy Superintendents was issued wherein the name of the appellant appeared at S. No. 90 whereas the names of the respondents herein were placed above the appellant. He filed departmental appeal on 1-10-1991 against the provisional seniority list but the same was rejected vide CBR letter dated 4--10-1993 and the appellant was accordingly informed vide endorsement dated 24-10-1993. He then filed this appeal before this Tribunal on 7-12-1993.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. It is argued that the appellant was senior to the respondents in the cadre of Inspector, and that his promotion was deferred in 1983 on account of non-availability of ACR, which was beyond his control, therefore, he is senior to Respondents as Deputy Superintendent on the ground that he was senior as Inspector.
3. Mr. Niaz Ahmed Khan, the learned Standing Counsel for the Government has taken legal point and submitted that the appeal is barred by limitation and the appellant cannot be granted relief as he did not challenge the promotions of the respondents as Deputy Superintendents in 1983, and at this stage the appeal is liable to be dismissed on the point of limitation.
4. It is an admitted fact that the respondents were promoted as Deputy Superintendents in the year 1983 and the appellant was promoted as such in the year 1984. A provisional seniority list of Deputy Superintendents was issued in the year 1991 and the respondents who were promoted earlier than the appellant as Deputy Superintendents were rightly shown senior to him, as under the rules seniority is to be reckoned from the date of regular promotion to a post. The only contention of the appellant is that since he was senior in the cadre of Inspector, therefore, after his promotion as Deputy Superintendent in 1984, he should rank senior to the respondents, but this contention is without substance, as the appellant had not challenged the promotions of the respondents from 1983 till 1991 and without getting his promotion as Deputy Superintendent ante-dated, he cannot get the benefit of his seniority in the cadre of Deputy Superintendent. The appellant has very tactfully through this appeal, challenged the seniority of the respondents as Deputy Superintendents which started flowing from 1983 on the basis of their promotion and also wants to get his promotion ante-dated from 1983, and both these prayers are not maintainable firstly for the reason that appeal before the Tribunal is not competent against a provisional seniority list in view of the decision of the Supreme Court reported in PLD 1981 SC 612; and as regards the claim for ante-dation of his promotion, it is hopelessly time-barred, as the cause of action had actually accrued t0 the appellant in 1983 when the respondents had been promoted as Deputy Superintendents, but he only challenged that grievance only in the year 1991, by way of challenging seniority and the appeal filed before this Tribunal on 7-12-1993 is hopelessly time-barred. The appellant has treated the CBR letter, dated 4th October, 1993, as final order whereby his representation/appeal against the provisional seniority list issued in 1991 was rejected; but the fact remains that Member (ACE), CBR also observed to know why the official did not represent against his non-promotion to the rank of Deputy Superintendent in 1983, and the learned counsel for the appellant categorically stated before us that the appellant did not agitate this particular grievance before the departmental authorities at any stage before 1991. Therefore, the appeal is clearly barred by time and there is no application for condonation of delay on the record.
5. Both on merits as well as on the point of limitation, the appeal fails and is dismissed.