1. ' SAEEDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, J.---This judgment will govern the disposal of above-noted two petitions for leave to appeal as they arise from a consolidated order of the High Court and the questions of law and facts arising therein are also common.
2. ' C.P.LA. No. 147 of 1993 arises out of Civil Suit No. 420/226 instituted by respondents Muhammad Aslam and Sher Khan, sons of Baz Khan before Civil Judge III on 16-12-1961 claiming possession of 84 Kanals and 12 Marlas of land being their 2/3rd share out of 126 Kanals and 17 Marlas of land situated in village Surag, Tehsil Pindigheb, from the petitioners. The land was originally owned by the respondents jointly with Sher Ali, son of Ghulam Muhammad and one Fateh Sher. The admitted share of Fateh Sher in the joint Khata was only to the extent of 1/10. However, Fateh Sher through an oral agreement created rights of occupancy tenancy in respect of entire land in favour of Yar Muhammad father/predecessor of petitioners. Mutation No. 271 of 1932 was effected in the Revenue Record on 25-6-1932 showing rights of occupancy tenancy of Yar Muhammad in respect of entire suit land. On 16-1-1953 Mutation No. 1623 was made in the Revenue Record showing the petitioners, who were successors of Yar Muhammad, as owners of the entire suit land measuring 84 Kanals and 12 Marlas, on the basis of their occupancy right over the land. On coming to know about the above entries in the Revenue Record, respondents filed Civil Suit No. 420/226 challenging the entries in the Revenue Record in favour of petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest Yar Muhammad. The trial Court decreed the suit filed by respondents by judgment and decree dated 8-12-1964, but on appeal the District Judge Campbellpur, by judgment dated 21-10-1965 reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit filed by the respondents holding it time-barred. On a second appeal filed by respondents the learned Judge in chambers set aside the judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court and restored the judgment and decree of trial Court.
3. ' In C.P.LA. 148 of 1993 respondents Muhammad Aslam Khan, Sher Khan son of Baz Khan and Sher Ali Khan, son of Ghulam Muhammad Khan jointly filed Suit No. 331 before Civil Judge III, Pindigheb claiming possession and ownership right in respect of land measuring 29 Kanals and 14 Marlas being their joint 2/5th share out of land measuring 74 Kanals 4 Marlas situated in village Suragh, Tehsil Pindigheb. The joint share of respondents 1 and 2 in the above land was 1/2 while that of respondent No.3 1/10th. In respect of this land also Fateh Sher, Muhammad Khan and mother of respondents 1 and 2 entered into an oral agreement with Sher Baz and Nawab creating occupancy right in respect of the suit land in their favour. On the basis of this oral agreement Mutation No. 53 dated 9-4-1928 was effected in the Revenue Record showing occupancy tenancy in favour of Nawab, son of Allah Yar and Sher Baz, husband of Mst. Noor Bano (predecessor of the present petitioners) on 8-2-1953. Another mutation was made in the Revenue Record showing the suit land in the ownership of Petitioner No.1 and Nawab son of Allah Yar. The respondents having come to know about the above entries in the Revenue Record, which adversely affected their title filed Civil Suit No. 331 of 1963 before the Civil Judge Pindigheb claiming right of possession and ownership in respect of the suit land. On contest' the suit was decreed in favour of the petitioners but on the 1st appeal filed by the petitioners and Nawab, son of Allah Yar the judgment and decree of the trial Court was reversed and the suit instituted by the respondent was dismissed as time-barred. On further appeal filed before the High Court by the respondents, the judgment and decree of the 1st appellate Court was reversed and that of the trial Court was restored.
4. ' In both the above petitions, the petitioners have sought leave to appeal against the judgment of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, dated 18-1-1993. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as caveator. The learned Judge in chambers while reversing the judgment and decree of the 1st Appellate Court and restoring judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in the abovementioned suits observed as follows:-- "I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. In the judgments rendered by the learned Courts below, it has been concurrently held that the mutation of creation of occupancy rights as well as right of ownership are void and non-existence in the eyes of law. Case of respondents throughout is that they have been in possession of the land in their own rights. It is now settled law that a person who claims possession of the land in his own rights cannot take the plea of adverse possession. Consequently, it cannot be said that the respondents possession over the land in question has been adverse and that they have acquired any rights on the basis of such a possession. The appellants are co- sharers in the land in question and the title suit filed by the co-sharers against the respondents who are also co-sharers in the land in question, the bar of limitation does not apply unless and until there is an evidence of complete ouster. The respondents have failed to lead evidence of ouster and, therefore, even on this account, it cannot be said that the suit is not within time.
5. Admittedly, the suit has been filed within a period of 12 years w.e.f. The date when the adverse entry in the Revenue Record came to the notice of the appellant and when their ownership and possessary rights were denied by the respondents. Consequently, the suit is well within time and was rightly held so by the learned trial Court. Finding of the learned first appellate Court, therefore, is erroneous in law and is not maintainable. The same is, therefore, set aside and restoring the findings of the learned trial Court on issue of limitation, it is held that the suit is within time."
6. The above findings were arrived at by the learned Judge in chambers in correct appreciation of law applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and the learned counsel for the petitioners is unable to point out any infirmity in the above reasoning's. We, accordingly, find no merit in the above petitions which are dismissed and leave to appeal is refused.