Pakistan Case Law← Search
1994 PLC (C.S.) 1097

AMANULLAH N. GOLO vs GOVERNMENT OF SINDH Through Chief Secretary

Citation1994 PLC (C.S.) 1097
CourtSindh Service Tribunal
Judge(s)Munawar Ali Khan, Ghulam Abbas Soomro
ResultS.

1. JUSTICE (RETD.) MUNAWARALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN): --The appellant, Amanullah Golo, was working as Assistant in the Office of Assistant Commissioner, Kashmore when he was dismissed from service vide order of the Commissioner, Larkana dated 18-3-1993. The appellant's dismissal arose from his conviction in one Anti-Corruption case. He had allegedly accepted illegal gratification of Rs.400, for which he was caught in a trap arranged for the purpose. After due investigation, the appellant was sent up in the Court of Special Judge, Anti-Corruption, Sukkur. He was convicted by said Court and sentence of fine of Rs.5,000 was awarded to him. The appeal filed by the appellant against his conviction and sentence was dismissed by the High Court, Sukkur Bench vide its judgment dated 26-10-1988.

2. Two show-cause notices, one dated 23-11-1992 and another dated 17-12-1992 were issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Jacobabad to the appellant. The first show-cause notice was serviced on him after his conviction by the Special Judge, Anti-Corruption and the second and final show- cause notice was given to him following the dismissal of his appeal by the High Court. He submitted replies to both the said notices. The appellant was ultimately awarded major punishment of dismissal from service under Rule 8(a) of the Sindh Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred as said rules) vide order dated 18-3-1993 of the Commissioner, Larkana. He preferred departmental appeal from the above order to the Chief Secretary and after waiting for decision of the said appeal for statutory period of ninety days, he filed the present appeal on 8th August, 1993.

3. We heard Mr. M.L. Shahani for the appellant and learned AA.-G. For official respondents at great length. We also carefully perused all the relevant documents.

4. It is an admitted position that the appellant's dismissal from service was solely based on his conviction in the Anti-Corruption case. No separate departmental proceedings were taken out against the appellant apart from the Anti-Corruption case challenged in the Court of Special Judge, Anti-- Corruption, Sukkur. It was appellant's own admission that he was convicted in that case and sentenced to pay fine of Rs.5,000. In his reply dated 28-11-1992 to the first show-cause notice, he frankly conceded that his appeal against his conviction was dismissed by the High Court. A copy of the judgment of the High Court dated 26-10-1988 whereby appellant's conviction and sentence were upheld is available in the case file and we have gone through the same.

5. In the above circumstances rule 8(a) of the said rules was invokable and consequently it was not necessary to follow the detailed procedure as contained in rule 5 of the said rules. In other words in the case of the conviction for the offence involving moral turpitude, as soon as the conviction was brought to the notice of the competent authority, accused official had to be departmentally punished without taking out fresh independent proceedings against him under the said rules. In the instant case also the major punishment of dismissal from service was awarded to the appellant on receipt of the information about his conviction and the dismissal of his appeal against the conviction by the High Court.

6. The conviction of the appellant was recorded on 22-9-1982 whereas his appeal against the conviction was dismissed by High Court on 17-10-1988. Strangely enough the departmental authorities took nearly another five years to award punishment to the appellant on the basis of his conviction, the date of the order of his dismissal being 18-3-1993. So, right from the institution of the Anti-Corruption case against the appellant on 13-1-1979 until he was dismissed from service by order dated 18-3-1993, he continued to do his official duties. Thus he remained untouched for 14 long years despite the fact that he was caught red-handed while accepting the bribe. This by itself served as a sort of concession to the appellant: His learned counsel's plea for curtailment of the appellant's punishment was far from impressive not only for above reason but also because he was found guilty of the offence of corruption which in our opinion was so serious that not only the offender was to be visited with punishment but the doors for his future employment in Government should also be permanently closed. There should be no place for such undesirable people in Government service and under no circumstances they should be allowed to re-enter Government service. On the contrary the permanent ouster of such people from Government service should serve as eye-opener for others. Therefore, the appellant's length of service (i.e. 31 years) did not appear to us as mitigating circumstance calling for curtailment of the appellant's penalty. The next argument of the appellant's learned counsel that the appellant was not given personal hearing was also without force. Firstly because personal hearing was not a mandatory requirement and secondly because the final show-cause notice dated 17-12-1992 afforded the chance of personal hearing to appellant. In his reply dated 28-2-1993, to the said notice there was no indication that the appellant had not availed the said opportunity or that he was refused personal hearing offered to him by the said show-sauce notice. Even the final argument of the appellant's learned counsel that the appellant had been victimized due to enmity with one Muhammad Saleh, was not helpful to him. Such argument was to be advanced and proved in the Court of Special Judge Anti- Corruption where detailed proceedings took place. We cannot enter into truth or otherwise of that argument. As pointed out above, as per rule 8(a) of the said rules all that the departmental authorities had to do, on receipt of information about conviction of the appellant for the" offence involving moral turpitude was to inflict punishment on him. The necessary compliance of the said rule was obviously made by the said authority. For the above reasons the appeal being without force is-dismissed with no order as to costs.

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
Disclaimer·Privacy·Terms·Search