1. JUDGMENT This is a petition for review of my order dated 27-11-73 on the ground that no decision was given on other points urged in the appeal. The following are the grounds mentioned in the review petition:-- (a) That no notice was given to the appellant (petitioner) by the respondent under section 25-A of the Ordinance. (b) That the statutory and mandatory provision of section 25- A of the Ordinance was violated by the respondent by filing the application to the Labour Court before the expiry of 15 days' notice to the petitioner. The application of the respondent should have been dismissed on this very ground by the Labour Court. (c) That the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and West Pakistan (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 do not apply to the petitioner. Therefore, the question of violation of the Standing Orders Nos. l2 and 13 do not arise. The Labour Court wrongly held so. (d) That the appeal was not decided on merits even after it was shown to this Hon'ble Court that the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the Standing Orders Ordinance do not apply to the petitioner-firm. The case may be remanded to the Labour Court for fresh decision after giving opportunity to both the parties to put their case according to law. From the perusal of the grounds of appeal I find that the only ground taken was that the ex parte order passed by the learned Chairman of the Labour Court was unjustified and the respondent Yaqoobullah never gave any notice to the petitioner, nor the petitioner ever received any notice from the Court, and that the petitioner was condemned unheard. In the order passed in appeal the point regarding the notice issued by the Court to the appellant was discussed, but the point regarding the notice issued by the petitioner to the appellant was not discussed because it was never taken up during the arguments, though it was mentioned in the grounds of appeal. Be that as it may the point now for determination is as to whether this Court has power to review its previous order. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that under section 36(2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 a Labour Court for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute is deemed to be a civil Court and has the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore this Tribunal has power to review its previous order. This contention has no force because the provisions of the Code of Civil, Procedure are applicable only to regulate the procedure of a Labour Court and cannot be pressed into service to say that where the code has created! certain substantive rights like the right of an appeal or review, the same also} became applicable. The right of review is like a right of appeal--a substantive right and it is not available unless it is expressly conferred by a statute. Thus it is clear that no Court has inherent power of review. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of High Court in the case Mst. Maqsoodan Bibi v. Mst. Bhano (1). In the present case the right of review has not been conferred by the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 under which the order sought to be reviewed was passed. In view of the above this review petition is not maintainable, and is, accordingly, dismissed in limine. (1) PLD 1965 Lah. 183