MIAN ALLAH NAWAZ, J.- The only point calling for decision in this constitution petition is "whether Federal Investigation Agency constituted under Section 3 of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 (Act VIII of 1975) (herein described as the Act) has the power to register and investigate the case for commission of offences scheduled in the Act by the employees of Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation Limited (shortly stated as PASCO).
2. The essential facts in the background of this petition are not in dispute. These are; that petitioners No. 1, 2 and 3 are the employees of PASCO. Petitioner No. 1 is the Assistant Purchase Inspector PASCO Tehsil Dunyapur District Lodhran while Malik Munir Ahmad-petitioner No. 2 and Sultan Ahmad Zafar-petitioner No. 3 are Purchase Officer and Purchase Inspector, Tehsil Dunyapur District Lodhran respectively. On 25.6.1991 an F.I.R, bearing No. 18/91 was registered at Police Station F.IA. Multan on the direction of Deputy Director, F.I.A, under Section 420/468/471 P.P.C, read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 against the petitioners. Pursuant to this, respondent No. 2 started investigation against the petitioners. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners approached this Court in constitutional jurisdiction for granting declaration to the effect that petitioners were employees of PASCO; were not public servants and as such F.IA. Had no jurisdiction to register the case and investigate the same against the petitioners.
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the PASCO was a public limited company registered under the Companies Act, 1913. It was governed by its Memorandum and Article of Association and was therefore, a distinct corporate body. Is employees were also governed under the rules framed under Memorandum of Association by Board of Directors who wield Executive Authority of this Corporation. According to the learned counsel, the petitioners are not public servants within the meaning of Section 2 of the Act, and as such the F.IA. Had no legal authority whatsoever to register the case and investigate the same against the petitioners.
According to the learned counsel the proceedings from commencement were totally devoid of lawful authority. Reliance was placed upon Ikram Ali Vs. The State and another (PLD 19. Lahore 597), Moosa Karim Vs. The State (PLD 1985 Karachi 7201. The State Vs. Hazar Khan (1987 P.Cr.L.J. 586), Project Director Vs. Residing Officer (PLD 1989 S.C. 152).
4. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 took up the position that PASCO was a public limited company which was founded and controlled by the Federal Government, as such the petitioners were the employees of a Corporation set up by the Federal Government and fell within the jurisdiction of F.IA. Under Section 2 of the Act. Reliance was placed on The State Vs. Muhammad Irshad Malik and another (PLD 1984 Peshawar 139).
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of PASCO maintained that PASCO was a public limited company; was incorporated as such under the Companies Act, 1913 vide a certificate of incorporation C-147/LR of 1972-75, issued by the Assistant Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. He placed on record the synopsis dealing with the status of PASCO. According to his view F.I.R, has no authority to register/investigate the case against the employees of PASCO.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length. Answer to point for determination turns upon the interpretation of clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act which reads as under: " 'Public Servant' means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860) and includes an employee of any corporation or other body or organisation set up, controlled or administered by the Federal Government."
Before I proceed to examine this clause, it seems appropriate to note a few principles of interpretation of the Statute. It is well settled principle of construction of statutes, that words and phrases used in a statute are to be given , their ordinary meaning according to the rule of grammar. This principle is stated in a celebrated treatise of interpretation of Statute by Maxwell in Chapter 2. It reads as under: ' 'The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, and otherwise in their ordinary meaning and the second is that the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. The length and detail of modern legislation, "wrote Lord Evers hed M.R., "has undoubtedly reinforced the claim of literal construction as the only safe rule." If there is nothing to modify, alter or qualify the language which the statute contains, it must be construed in the ordinary and natural meaning of the words and sentences. The safer and more correct course of dealing with a question of construction is to take the words themselves and arrive if possible at their meaning without, in the first instance, reference to I cases."
Equally well settled are canons of constructions of Statute that acts are to be regarded as a whole.
One of the safest way to construe the words is that they are to be examined in the context of the Sections in which they occur and by examination of whole statute. Previous legislation may be relevant to interpretation of latter statute in two ways. The statement on this rule given in Maxwell is worth in quoting:-- "(i) The course which legislation on a particular point has followed often provides an indication as to how the Act at present in force should be interpreted.
(ii) Light may be thrown on the meaning of a phrase in a statute by reference to a specific phrase in an earlier statute dealing with the same subject matter.
Statutes are said to be in pari materia when they deal with the same person or thing or class: it is not enough that they deal with a similar subject matter. Section 1 of the Foreign Tribunals Evidence Act 1865, is in pari material' with section 5 of the Evidence by Commission Act 1843, for both deal with the obtaining of testimony, one for course in the United Kingdom and the other for foreign Courts..."
These principles of interpretation were noted with approval in Haji Mian Muhammad and another Vs. Ghulam Mustafa (PLD 1973 SC 394). In this case Ghulam Mustafa had instituted a suit to pre- empt a sale of property described as Sarsi situated on Cinema Road outside Kabuli Gate, Peshawar City. It was stated in the plaint that the property was Sarsi but was a residential house and therefore subject to pre-emption. The suit was resisted by the vendees mainly on the ground that the property in dispute was Sarsi and hence exempt from pre-emption in terms of Section 5 of the NWFP Pre-emption Act, 1950. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit by holding that the property although described as Sarsi, was in fact, a business premises and as such it was shop and was not pre-emptiable. On appeal the Division Bench of the Erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, at Peshawar, accepted the appeal, reversed the decision of the trial Court and decreed the suit for pre-emption by holding that the defendant had pleaded the exemption from pre- emption on the ground that the property was Sarsi and, therefore, he could not subsequently plead that the property was exempt from pre-emption on account of being a shop. On merits it was held that the property was not business premises. On appeal, the Supreme Court, dismissed the appeal by coming to the conclusion that the word 'Sarsi' used in NWFP Pre-emption Act, 1950 did not mean business premises. The Court relied upon the dictionary meaning of word 'Sarsi' as well as the interpretation of word 'Sarsi' by the High Court in Regulations of Public Sardis and Paraus Act (Act XXII of 1867). It will be advantageous to quote in extension the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the case Supra as under:- "The Act does not define the terms used in the two exemption clauses and, therefore, the question is what meaning should be attached to the term 'Sarsi' as used in clause (a) of this section. In the absence of an interpretation clause embodied in the statute itself, the general rule would appeal to be, as observed by Lord Esher M.R., in Clerical, etc., Assurance Co. V. Carrier (1889) 22 QBD 444, that the words are presumed to have been used in their popular sense. The same rule was stated by Lord Tentered in Attorney General V. Win stanley (1831) 2 D & Cl. 402, namely, that "the words of an Act of Parliament which are not applied to any particular science or are to be construed as they are understood in common language. Critical refinements and subtle distinctions are to be avoided, and the obvious and popular meaning of the language should, as a general rule, be followed.
Understood in the popular sense, as used in common language, the word 'Sarsi' has always been regarded as meaning a building or premises used for the temporary accommodation of travellers, where the general public has access to the interior. This meaning flows from the etymology of the word which is of Persian origin and in its strictly correct literal form should be called Sar-e-rah, i.e. On the road-side. It seems to us that the nearest equivalent in the English language to the word 'Sarsi' would be the word 'inn'."
The learned Judges went on to hold:-- "In view of the interpretation we have already placed on the term 'Serai' as appearing in the relevant clause of section 5 of the Act, it is hardly necessary to dilate upon its meaning with reference to the definitions as appearing in other statutes. However, as this particular matter was also argued at some length by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is necessary to state that the rule applicable in such cases, as enunciated by Cases on Statute Law at PP. 132-133, is that in each case it is necessary to ascertain "as to what assistance may be derived, firstly, from statutes which are in pari materia, with the statutes under consideration; and secondly, from earlier statutes not precisely in pari material, but in some way relating to or affecting the same subject-matter".
While dealing with a similar question, this court has laid down in Abdul Bari Vs. West Pakistan Soil Reclamation Board (PLD 1966 SC 451), that:-- "Where certain words have been given a statutory definition in one statute and the same words are used in a similar connection in a later statute, it may be presumed that the same meaning attached to the said words."
In that case the Court was dealing with the question of the meaning to be attached to certain words appearing in the Punjab Soil Reclamation Act, 1952, and assistance was sought to be derived from the meaning given to these words in the earlier statute entitled the Canal and Drainage Act, 1873. Keeping these principles in view, it appears to us that although the objects underlying the three enactments under consideration, namely, the Regulation of Public Sardis and Paraus Act, 1867, N.W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1950, and the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, are different from each other, yet they do seek to regulate, inter alia, certain matters connected with Sardis, and to that extent it would be permissible to seek assistance from the earlier and the subsequent statutes for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning to be given to the term 'serai' as used in the Pre-emption Act. It is significant that the meaning appearing from these two enactments are in line with the interpretation placed on this term by the judicial authorities to which we have already referred."
7. Guided by the a forenoted principles of interpretation of statutes I n w turn to examination of clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act. From the bare , lamination of this clause it is clear that it has two parts. The first part relates to public servant of Federal Govt, as defined in Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code Idle second part pertains to employees of any corporation or other body or organisation set up, controlled or administered by the Federal Govt. Very clearly clause (e) is not wholly confined to public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code but is of wider amplitude and is inclusive of the employees of Corporation or other body or organisation which are set up, controlled and administered by the Federal Govt. The Dictionary meaning of these words given in the Chambers 20th Dictionary are as follows:- "Set-up" means- "to erect: to put up: to exalt; to arrange: to begin: to enable to begin: to place in view: to put in type: to begin a career to make pretensions: to arrange matters so that another person is blamed"
"Controlled" means-" restraint: authority: command: regulation: a check: a means of controlling or testing: a station for doing so: an experiment performed to afford, to provide, or (any of) the subject providing a standard of comparison for other experiment."
"Administer" means- "Govern: to manage as a steward, substitute, or executor; to dispense (justice, rites): to tender (an oath, medicine), to minister."
8. From the. Examination of the meaning of a forenoted described words, it is amply clear that the employees of the Corporation/Bodies/Organisations, established at the initiative of Federal Government, or which are controlled or managed by the Federal Government, are included within the ambit of clause (e) of Section 2 ibid.
9. The words "set-up", 'Controlled' and 'administered' used in the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act (XL of 1958), came into consideration in State through the Advocate General. N.W.F.P. Peshawar Vs. Muhammad Irshad Malik Lodhi and another (PLD 1984 Peshawar 139). In this case an F.I.R, was registered against Muhammad Irshad Malik Lodhi and Shafi Ahmad, under Sections 468, 471 and 420 of Pakistan Penal Code, read with Section 5 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The learned Special Judge discharged the accused on the sole ground that the accused were employees of the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan, which was a public limited Company registered under the provisions of Companies Act and was governed by its memorandum of association and Articles of Association Feeling aggrieved the State preferred an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C, before the High. Court. The accused reiterated the pleas taken before the Special Judge. A Division Bench of Peshawar High Court, accepted the appeal of the State by holding that Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan was set up and controlled by the Federal Government. As such its employees fell within the meaning of Section 2-B of Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958, Paras 8,9 and 10 of the judgment deal with the interpretation of word 'Control', 'set-up' and 'administer' used in Section 2-B of Pakistan Criminal Law (Amend mental) Act, 1958. These paras are being reproduced in extension as under: "8. Now reverting to the impugned orders on merit we may point out that the only ground on which these orders were passed was that the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan was a private Limited Company registered under the Companies Act, was not a Corporation set up by the Central Govt, and its employees could not be deemed at public servant. Section 2(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act pertains to the definition of the term public servant and is as under: "Public Servant' means a public servant as defined in Section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, an employee of any Corporation or other body or organisation set up by General Government."
This definition was amended by Prevention of Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 (Act XIII of 1977) published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extra-ordinary, dated 9th May, 1977 and the amendment was "set-up by" the words and commas "set up, controlled of administered by, or under the authority of," shall be substitutd. Similarly in section 2 of the Prevention of Corruption Act the word" "by" "was substituted by the words "controlled, or administered by, or under the authority of. Section 161 of the Pakistan Penal Code, basides section 612 to 619 and 409, was amended and "public servant" was to include an employee of any corporation or other body or organisation set up, controlled, or administered by, or under the authority of the Federal Government".
9. The Criminal Law Amendment Act is comprehensive and self- contained Act and lays down both the powers of the Special Judge as well the procedure under which the cases are to be tried by him. It is observed in R.R. Chari and another V. The State (AIR 1959 All. 149) that barring that part of the Criminal Law Amendment Act which amends the Penal Code the rest of the Act is procedural and therefore, retrospective. The retrospectivity of a procedural statutes will not, however, affect the substantive right which had already vested in a citizen. One such right is the right to continue the proceedings in the Tribunal before which the same had already commenced according to the state of law as it stood at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. The Prevention of Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 came in force during the pendency of the cases against the respondents in the Courts of the Special Judge. Their learned counsel conter Jed that the amendment shall not be applicable to these proceedings as these were not retrospective in character. Notwithstanding this amendment the definition of Public servant in section 2(b) of the Act shows that it meant a public servant as defined in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, an employee of any corporation of other body or organisation set up by the Central Government. It is evident that, besides the definition of public servant as given in section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code, an employee of any corporation or other body or organisation set up by the Central Government was also to be treated as a public servant. The Amending Act of 1977 did to amend the first portion section 2(b) with regard to section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code but amended the latter portion of it which did not form a part and parcel of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code. It can, therefore, be said that the provisions of Pakistan Penal Code stood intact and the latter portion only was amended.
10. The Memorandum and Articles of Association of Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited are before us. The certificate of incorporation shows that the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan Limited had been registered as a private Company limited by shares. It is in Article 3 that the corporation is to be a private Company and any invitation to the public to subscribe for any share or debentures or debenture stock of the Company is prohibited. It is manifest that the Corporation was exclusively finance by the Central Government to the exclusion of the public. It can, therefore, be said that this Corporation was set up. By the Central Government. The words set up underlined by us are significant and we are of the view that its employees shall fall within the ambit of the definition of public servant as contained in section 2(b) of the Act. The mere fact that the Corporation was set up by the Central Government and incorporated under the Companies Act would not take it out of the four corners of section 2(b). It is pertinent to note that Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan has been duly incorporated under the Companies Act. According to the Black's Law Dictionary the word "incorporate" means to create a Corporation and, according to Wharton's Law Lexicon, it means united in a legal body whereas "incorporation" means formation of a legal body with the quality of perpetual existence of succession except as limited by the Royal Charter or Act of Parliament affecting the Corporation. Generally there are two kinds of companies, namely, those which are conferred the status and attributes of Corporation on satisfaction of certain pre-requisites and registration under the Companies Act and those which own their origin and life to a statute or an Act of Legislature. The Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan falls within the first kind of Companies and not the second as it is not a creature of statute, it follows that the reasons given in the impugned orders are fallacious and the respondent I being an employee of the Utility Stores Corporation of Pakistan was a public servant as the same had been set up by the Central Government."
11. In the light of foregoing discussion and the inter prestation of the words 'Administer', 'control' and 'set-up' in PLD 1984 Peshawar.
139. I have no doubt in my mind that the clause 2(e) of the Act is of wider amplitude and is inclusive of employees of Corporation/Organisation/Body set up, controlled and administered by the Federal Govt. Applying this principle to the facts and the circumstances of this case, it is clear from the Articles of Association of PASCO that it was registered by the Asstt.
Registrar, Joint Stock Companies at the initiative of the Federal Govt. From the list of subscribers it is apparent that Mr. A. Jam51 Nishtal M.D. N. B.P., Mr. Hamid D. Habib, Advisor, H.B.L, Mr. Abdus Sami Joint President, U.B.L. Mr. MAK. Yousuf, M.D. Allid Bank Ltd., Mr. Siraj Yousuf Khan, Jain. Secretary, Govt, of Pakistan, Finance, Mian Riaz-ud-Din Chairman, A.D.B.P, Mr. EA. Garda, M.D. Muslim Commercial Bank and Mr. Humayun Sadiq, Ex.-Director, N.B.P, were the first subscribers as ex-officio Chairman of the National Bank of Pakistan, Habib Bank Ltd., U.B.L, Allied Bank Ltd., A.D.B.P, Muslim Commercial Bank. The paid-up share of the Federal Govt, was 25%. These facts are completely owned by Synopsis furnished by the Legal Advisor PASCO which was brought on the record with the consent of the parties. The Synopsis further indicates that the PASCO Purchases wheat from the procurement area in various provinces with the concurrence of these provinces. This venture is carried out to distribute the wheat in deficit areas of Pakistan as well as Army in consonance with the mandate of the Federal Govt. This synopsis further shows that any other venture business/activity can be taken by the PASCO only in accordance with the mandate of the Federal Govt. From the examination of synopsis as well as memorandum of association and Articles of Association, it is crystal clear that the PASCO was registered by the Registrar, Joint Stock Companies at the instance of Federal Govt, in order to supply wheat to deficit areas in Pakistan.
This Corporation was financed by the Federal Govt, is controlled by the Federal Govt and carries its commercial activities within the mandate of the Federal Govt.
12. The result of whatever has been stated above, is that the employees of the PASCO are employees of the Organisation/Corporation set up/administerd/controlled by the Federal Govt.
Therefore, they are employees within the meaning of clause 2(e) of the Act and the Federal Investigation Agency had the authority to register and investigate the scheduled offences against them within the frame work of the Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974.
In the light of foregoing discussion this petition is found to be without any merit and is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.