1. ' NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, J.---This High Court Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19th October, 1992 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, in Constitution Petition No,S-40 of 1992, directing respondent No,2 to move cancellation proceedings before the Labour Court under diction 10 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter called the Ordinance of the 1969.
2. The facts relevant for decision of this appeal are as follows:-- ' Respondent No,1 Fida Muhammad Khan is Principal Secretary of the P.IA. Institute of Planetaria, which has been registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, XXI of 1860, having the status of an autonomous organisation set up to promote the education and advancement of the knowledge of Astronomy, Upper Space, and Cosmos among the people of Pakistan and particularly the students to further the cause of Science in the country. It is the case of respondent No,1 that the Institute is carrying on its aims and objects on no-loss-no-profit basis and is not an industry within the meaning of the provisions of Ordinance, 1969. Further, it is said that the Institute is exempted from payment of customs duty of import of machinery and also from payment of excise duty on planetaria tickets. The land for its site has been provided free of cost by the Provincial Government. The Institute charges only a token fee for providing the educational services and to meet its day to day expenses it depends upon P.IA., Government of Pakistan, Provincial Government, and on various Associations. On 11-3-1990, the respondent No,2 granted a certificate of registration to the appellant-Union, under the Ordinance of 1969. The respondent No,2, thereafter, directed the respondent No,1 to furnish list of the employees of the Institute, which was supplied on 9-5-1990, wherein it was specifically mentioned that said Institute was not an Industry under the Ordinance of 1969, and in spite of that the respondent No,2 granted a certificate of Collective Bargaining Agent under section 22(1) of the Ordinance, 1969 to the appellant-Union on 27-6-1990. Thereafter, the appellant-Union, on 8-7-1990, put up a charter of demands and on 18-7- 1990 served a notice of strike upon the respondent No,1. On 28-8-1991, the respondent No,1 filed an application before the respondent No,2, requesting him to file a complaint before the Labour Court for cancellation of registration of appellant-Union, but no action was taken. Under these circumstances, the respondent No,1 filed Constitution Petition No,S-74/1990 before this Court, which was partly allowed on 19-9-1990 with a direction to respondent No,2 to deal with the matter according to law. Thereafter, the respondent No,1 filed an application under section 10 of the Ordinance, 1969 before the respondent No,2, which was rejected. The respondent No,1 being dissatisfied filed Constitution Petition No,S-40 of 1992, which was allowed by the judgment, which has been impugned in this appeal.
3. ' Mr. SA. Sarwana, learned counsel for the respondent No,1 raised a preliminary objection about the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that, in view of subsection (2) of section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972., hereinafter called the Ordinance of 1972, the appeal is not maintainable as the matter has arisen out of the proceedings in which a right of appeal is provided under the law applicable to these proceedings against the original order. As against this, Mr. M.L. Shahani, learned counsel for the appellant argued that no appeal is provided against the original order, as such, subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1972 is not attracted and the appeal is maintainable.
4. ' In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties it may be advantageous to reproduce section 3 of the Ordinance, 1972. It is as follows:--- "Section 3. Appeal to High Court in certain cases. ---(1) An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of that Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under clause (1) of Article 199 of the Constitution, of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan not being an order made under sub-paragraph (i) of paragraph (b) of that clause: ' Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 199 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal or one revision or one review to any Court, Tribunal or authority against the original order.
(3) No appeal shall lie under subsection (1) of section 2 from an interlocutory order or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court.
(4) Nothing contained in this Ordinance, shall be construed as affecting:-
(a) any appeal under the provisions of the Letters Patent applicable to a High Court or under section 102 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) which was pending immediately before the commencement of this Ordinance; or
(b) any appeal or petition for leave to appeal from a decree, judgment or order of a Single Judge of a High Court made to the Supreme Court before the commencement of the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972."
5. ' It is pointed out here that section 3 has further been amended by Ordinance X of 1980 to provide right of appeal against an interlocutory order passed by a Single Judge of High Court exercising original jurisdiction to D.B. Above amendment, however, is not relevant for the purpose of this matter.
6. The proposition that if the matter brought before the High Court, under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, arises out of any proceedings in which law applicable provided at least one appeal or one revision, or one review against the original order, no A appeal shall lie to a Bench of more Judges, is not disputed, and nor it could be disputed for the reason that so it is provided in the proviso of subsection (2) of the Ordinance, 1972. The controversy however, remains about the scope of expressions 'Original Order' which expression was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case reported in PLD 1984 SC 344 Mst. Karim Bibi and others v. Hussain Bux and another and it was observed that apparently the meaning of 'Original Order' is the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced. In this reported case the expression 'proceedings' was also interpreted. Therefore, keeping in view the tangible guidelines provided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is to be seen that whether in this case an appeal, revision, or review has or has not been provided against the Original Order. For this, we could have to refer the section 8 of the Ordinance of 1969 which is as follows:- SECTION 8 REGISTRATION
(1) The Registrar, on being satisfied that the trade union has complied with all the requirements of this Ordinance, shall register the trade union in a prescribed register and issue a registration certificate in the prescribed form within a period of (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of the application. In case the application is found by the Registrar to be deficient in a material respect or respects he shall communicate in writing his objections to the trade union within a period of 15 days from the receipt of the application and the trade union shall reply thereto within a period of fifteen days from the receipt of the objections.
(2) When the objections raised by the Registrar have been satisfactorily met, the Registrar shall register the trade union as provided in subsection (1) (and issue a certificate of registration in the prescribed form within three days of the date of the objections having been so met). In case the objections are not satisfactorily met, the Registrar may reject the application.
(3) In case the application has been rejected or the Registrar has (delayed disposal of the application beyond the period of fifteen days provided in subsection (1) or has not issued a certificate of registration within a period of three days as provided in subsection (2), as the case may be) the trade union may appeal to the Labour Court who for reasons to be stated in (its) judgment, may pass an order directing the Registrar to register the trade union and to issue a certificate of registration or may dismiss the appeal.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Ordinance, every alteration made in the constitution of a registered trade union and every change of its officers shall be notified by registered post by the trade union to the Registrar within fifteen days of such change.
(5) The Registrar may refuse to register such change or alteration if it is in contravention of any of the provisions of this Ordinance, or if it is in violation of the constitution of the trade union.
(6) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3) every inclusion or exclusion of any constituent unit of a federation of trade unions shall be notified by registered post by the federation to the Registrar within fifteen days of such inclusion or exclusion.
(7) In case there is a dispute in relation to the change of officers of a trade union, or any trade union is aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar under subsection (5), any officer or member of the trade union may appeal to the Labour Court, who shall within seven days of receipt of the application or appeal, as the case may be, pass an order either directing the Registrar to register the change or alteration in the constitution or in the officers of the trade union or may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the Registrar to hold fresh elections of the union under his supervision."
7. A plain reading of aforesaid section shows that subsection (3) of section 8 of Ordinance, 1969 provides a right of appeal to the Trade Union if the registration is not done by the Registrar in violation of the provisions of this section. No right of appeal has been provided to employer under section 8, but under section 10 registration of a Trade Union can be cancelled by the Labour Court upon a complaint if it is made iri writing by the Registrar of Trade Union. Thus, it would be seen that the crucial point is about registration of Trade Union and for that a right of appeal is provided under subsection (3) of section 8. It is immaterial if the right of appeal is provided to one party or to both or whether the right of appeal has been availed or not. Subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1972 only speaks about one appeal, one revision or one review to any Court, Tribunal or Authority against the Original Order. It does not impose any condition on said appeal, revision or review. The conclusion, therefore, would be that in the instant case right of appeal has been provided under the relevant law.
8. ' Mr. SA. Sarwana, learned counsel for respondent No,1 in support of his contentions cited (1) 1982 CLC 1884 Bata Shoe Company v. Registrar of Trade Unions and others, (2) 1986 CLC 154 Syed Naseer Hussain v. Settlement Commissioner (Land), Larkana and 3 others. (3) 1986 CLC 842 The Government of Punjab v. Mushtaq Ahmad, (4) PLD 1985 SC 107 Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner Centre I, Lahore. In Bata Shoe Company case, like the instant case, almost similar contentions were raised. In this reported case also section 8 (3) (4) (7) of the Ordinance, 1969 came under discussion and a D.B. Of this Court, after taking into consideration the case-law reported in 1975 SCM R 275 and PLD 1975 Lah. 1339 came to the conclusion that 'competency of an appeal is to be judged on the basis as to whether the law under which the impugned order was passed and which was inpugned before the learned Single Judge provided one appeal or one revision or one review. If the answer of above question is in the affirmative no intra-Court appeal will be competent'. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed on preliminary objection. In Syed Naseer Hussain's case, it was held that 'Original Order' was that by which proceedings under relevant law commenced. In the case of Government of Punjab, it was held that Ordinance, 1972 only provided availability of appeal aid not whether appeal was available to one or to both parties, and it was therefore, of no consequence that Government had no right to appeal under law applicable to civil servants. In the instant case also, the right of appeal has not been provided to the employer, but it would make no difference. In Muhammad Abdullah's case, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that expression 'Original Order' occurring in section 3(2) of Ordinance, 1972, means order with which proceedings under ( relevant statute commenced. It was also held that since in said case relevant law provided an appeal against Original Order Intra-Court appeal was not competent.
9. ' Mr. M.L. Shahani, learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance upon the following cases to show that appeal is maintainable. (1) 1982 PLC 543 National Book Foundation Employees' Union and another v. National Book Foundation and another. (2) 1983 PLC 411 M. Maroof v. Muhammad Akram and 2 others. (3) 1983 PLC 1220 Sindh Alkalis Ltd. v. Fourth Sindh Labour Court and others. (4) 1987 PLC 274 Messrs Jang Publication Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and another. (5) NLR 1988 AC 84 National Bank of Pakistan Liberal Workers Front (Sindh) v. Registrar of Trade Unions (Sindh) etc.
(6) 1990 CLC 1086 Muhammad Ramzan v. Trustees of Port of Karachi. (7) 1993 PLC 83 Abasin International Workers' Union, Thatta v. The Manager, M/s. Abasin International Dhabeji, Distt. And 2 others. National Book Foundation Employees' Union case is not applicable to the circumstances of this case as in this reported case there is no discussion on subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1972 and the impugned order by consent was set aside. In M. Maroof s case, it was observed that 'it would seem clear that the scheme of sections 35, 36 and 37 of the IRO not only by implication but even specifically bars appeal, revision or review against an order of taking congnizance'. Since under relevant law appeal, revision and review were not provided as such this case in also of no help to the appellant. In Sindh Alkalis Ltd.'s case, there is no discussion on subsection (2) of section 3 of the Ordinance, 1972. This case therefore, is distinguishable. In Messrs Jang Publications Ltd.'s case, also there is no discussion about the point involved in this matter. So it is also distinguishable. In National Bank of Pakistan Liberal Workers Front (Sindh)'s case also, there is no discussion on the point involved in this matter. It is simply an admission order. Muhammad Ramzan's case, is strictly in accordance with the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in PLD 1984 SC 344. The impugned order of this reported case was of interlocutory nature for which no appeal, revision or review was provided. So it does not support the appellant. In Abasin International Workers' Union case, it has been held by a D.B. Of this Court that there is no provision in the IRO for filing an appeal to the Tribunal against an order of the Registrar, Trade Unions registering a Trade Union. There is no dispute about this proposition, but the fact is that appeal is provided under subsection (3) of section 8 of IRO against the rejection of application for the registration of Trade Union.
10. Accordingly, we hold that present appeal is not competent for the reason that the order before learned Single Judge was an order passed in proceedings in which the right of appeal was provided. We, therefore, dismiss this appeal in limine on above preliminary objection with no order as to costs.