' The revision petition is directed against an order, dated 25-11-1989, passed by Ch. Muhammad Ali, Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh, dismissing an application made by the plaintiff/pre- emptor in order to have regularized a deposit of ancillary expenses, incurred by the purchasers of the property, in the amount of Rs,3,797, having been made after the due date, on 14-2-1985.
2. Usman Khan and Ashiq Hussain sons of Ahmad had purchased a piece of land, situate in Mauza Grey-wine, Tehsil and District Muzaffargarh, on 30-1-1982, and the sale had successfully been pre- empted by Waryam, claiming to be collateral of the vendor and a co-sharer in the 'Bata'.
Consideration money was held to be Rs,50,000, which amount the pre-emptor paid in time. The vendors came up in appeal, but on point of preferential pre emptive right they could not succeed.
Malik Allah Bakhsh, Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh, in his judgment dated 16-9-1984, however burdened the pre-emptor with an additional amount of Rs,3,797, being charges ancillary to the sale, which the vendees had spent in addition to the sale-price. Plaintiff was directed to deposit the money by 16-10-1984, failing which the suit was held to be liable to dismissal. The plaintiff pre-emptor could not do the needful; and this resulted in dismissal of his claim. He came up in revision to the High Court. My brother, Ehsan-ul-Haq Chaudhry, J., on 19-12-1988, dismissed the revision petition, but advised the pre-emptor to make an application for extension of time for making deposit or for regularization of the deposit (made after the due date) to the first appellate Court. An application accordingly was made on 12-1-1989. It was dismissed on 25-11-1989 by the Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh, Ch. Muhammad Ali.
3. Plea of the petitioner is that the judgment dated 16-9-1984 had been announced by the A.D.J., Muzaffargarh, in such a manner that he could not follow its true import, as he was made to understand that the appeal preferred by his adversaries, Usman and Ashiq had been dismissed.
This made him complacent, as he was satisfied that the judgment and decree delivered by the trial Court had been endorsed by the first appellate Court, and his pre-emptive right had been affirmed. However, when he got a certified copy of the judgment dated 16-9-1984, on 20-10-1984 on having applied for it on 17-9-1984, he came to know that he was required to make payment of an additional sum of Rs,3,797. He did make the deposit, but on 14-2-1985. He was not at fault, it is urged, for the delay caused in the deposit, or in the apparent lapse on his part.
4. The learned Additional District Judge, in his judgment, dated 25-11-1989, has observed that in the grounds of revision, filed by Waryam, he had, himself taken up the plea that he had orally been asked by the learned Additional District Judge, Muzaffargarh (Malik Ahmad Bakhsh) to make deposit of Rs,3,797 as ancillary charges, till 16-10-1984, and that this would show that he had the knowledge. I would agree with the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that this may not be the correct state of affairs. It had been mentioned, by way of narration of facts, that the judgment containing the aforesaid direction had been announced orally and it did not necessarily mean that this direction had specifically been communicated to the party.
5. I would however not concur with the contention put forth by the learned counsel that Waryam plaintiff-pre-emptor had in fact not been made aware of the Court direction, requiring him to make payment of Rs,3,797 in addition. Waryam does not concede having been conveyed this part of the judgment in specific terms. It has however to be seen whether he is being truthful in saying so and whether this plea of the pre-emptor may be permitted to prevail. The answer is in the negative. It has strangely been urged by the learned counsel that the judgment had orally been announced. I failed to follow, what else is the mode of announcement of judgment. In writing, the judgment, or a part of it, in summarized form, is not delivered to the parties, on the occasion of announcement of judgment, especially in civil matters; but it has to be assumed that the parties to the litigation have been made aware of the material or the operative part of the pronouncement.
The plaintiff, who was respondent before the A.D.J., had applied for a copy of the judgment dated 16-9-1984. The Judge or the Reader would be presumed to have conveyed to him the direction contained in the last para. of the judgment dated 16-9-1984.
6. It is submitted that it is a matter of common sense that the successful pre-emptor was not expected to have defaulted in paying the paltry amount of Rs,3,797, when earlier he had made payment of a huge sum of Rs,50,000 as consideration money. It is additionally urged that when Waryam came to know that he had to pay Rs,3,797 in addition, he did not hesitate to do so, and made the deposit on 14-2-1985. It is to be pointed out that he did not act promptly in that regard.
According to his own claim, he got the certified copy of the judgment dated 16-9-1984 on 20-10- 1984, when the time set down for making the deposit had already expired. He appears to have considerably been indolent or idle in that regard, as he cared to deposit the amount a few months afterwards, on 14-2-1985.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners has referred to 1982 SCM R 824, Khurshid Akbar v. Mian Manzoor Ahmad and another, in urging that oral announcement of a judgment is no announcement. I am afraid, the contention does not find support from the cited judgment. It has, on the contrary, been held that slightest indolence or lethargy displayed by a pre-emptor would be fatal to his cause. If a person is present in Court, at the time of announcement of judgment---and Waryam does not deny his presence---it will be presumed that he is aware of result of the case before the Court. In the cited case the appellant had taken no tangible steps and had wasted nearly 18 days in depositing the pre-emption money, and had confined his activity to consulting lawyers and had afterwards moved an application for extension of time to deposit the price of sale, and 'rule of reasonableness' thus could not be invoked in his aid by the indolent litigant, according to the august Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the instant case almost similar is the position; and I do not think, there was any justification to extend indulgence to the pre-emptor, when an important right had accrued to the other side, the defendants-vendees. This was particularly true in a pre- emption case, as the pre-emptor was expected to have exhibited utmost vigilance. The plaintiff- petitioner, however, failed to act in that manner, and has to blame none but himself for the consequences he has been made to suffer for the lapse on his part.
8. Rcvisional jurisdiction has a limited scope, and I do not think that interference with the impugned judgment by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is justified. Revision petition has no merit and is hereby dismissed in limine.