' At the crucial juncture of acquisition of entire property of village Dari, Tehsil Haripur, the proprietary body of the village formed a Committee comprising of the four petitioners herein to receive the compensation for Shamilat and other property thereof. The principal objects of forming the Committee were "to pursue the cases of acquisition of joint and common property in the interest of the proprietary body" with authority to incur genuine expenses out of the compensation for the aforementioned land and for construction of mosques and Hujras and wells etc. For the displaced persons in the village where they would settle themselves. The compensation for the Shamilat land and other common property duly awarded by the Collector Land Acquisition had been admittedly received by the petitioners in their representative capacity as members of the aforesaid Committee. It is claimed by the petitioners that out of the compensation they had incurred some amount "on the construction of mosque and other common interest enterprises of the villagers". It has been conceded on behalf of the petitioners "that the amount of compensation for Shamilat land which had since been enhanced by the Referee Judge at the first instance had been received by the petitioners (on furnishing) Bank Guarantees in pursuance of the orders of this Court".
According to the petitioners in consequence of the latest judgment of the Supreme Court they were under a legal obligation to refund the amount received by them in excess of the amount ultimately determined by the Supreme Court.
2. It appears that the petitioners, on the pretext of aforesaid refund of some amount, were not inclined to pay the compensation money to the members of the village proprietary body. They were, therefore, obliged to file a suit through Muhammad Nawaz Khan, the representative and attorney of the petitioners for rendition of accounts qua the amount of compensation that had been received by the latter after their objection petition under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) was accepted and amount of compensation was enhanced. The petitioners veciforously contested the suit, pleading, inter alia, the non-maintainability thereof on the ground that the dispute could be only legally adjudicated upon by the Executing Court.
3. The learned trial Judge, sustaining the objection to the competency of the suit by his judgment, dated 23-11-1991, returned the plaint under Order VII, Rule 10 of the C.P.C.
4. Feeling aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Haripur. The learned Appellate Court while accepting the appeal and setting aside the impugned order of return of the plaint had observed that the finding of the learned trial Judge that "the points involved in the present suit can be agitated in execution and no separate suit on the same point is maintainable is not correct, because the previous litigations were references under the Land Acquisition Act (and) it was not a question for determination that respondents 1 to 4 (petitioners herein) should not be paid compensation of Shamilat Deh". In the same context, it was observed that the petitioners had admittedly received the compensation on behalf of the respondents and are, therefore, legally bound to account for it. It was, therefore, held that "the suit for rendition of accounts was maintainable and in no way it is beyond the jurisdiction of the Civil Court".
Resultantly the suit was remanded under section 151, C.P.C. To the learned trial Judge "for deciding it according to law after framing the issues and recording the evidence of both the parties". Hence this petition under section 115 of the C.P.C.
5. The only proposition that has been agitated for determination is: whether the suit for rendition of accounts by the respondents qua the amount received Hy the petitioners as members of the Committee under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) is barred under the provisions of section 47, C.P.C.
6. Mr. Haider Zaman Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners, maintained that the Executing Court has been given exclusive jurisdiction over all questions and a separate suit is barred and it includes the relief of rendition of accounts. He further argues that the object of the provision of section 47 ibid is to afford speedy relief to the parties in matters arising out of execution of a decree thus obviating a new suit for resolution of such issues, and, therefore, these provisions must be liberally construed to bar separate suits which involve questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree.
7. Section 47 does not bar the remedy but only regulates the forum for the enforcement of rights in so far as "it channelizes all matters relating to the execution, discharge of satisfaction of the decree to the executing Court" and "leaves unimpaired the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain suits in relation to matters other than the aforesaid". See: `Ghulam Muhammad v. Sultan Mahmud and others PLD 1963 SC 265.
8. Two conditions which are sine qua non for application of section 47 are:---
(1) The question should have arisen between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives.
(2) The question should relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree.
9. Applying these two conditions to the instant case, it is obvious that the question of rendition of accounts between the petitioners and the respondents has neither arisen in the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act in which the amount of compensation was enhanced nor in final judgment of the Supreme Court nor does it relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. On the contrary the question of rendition of accounts between the parties clearly falls outside the scope of the Referee Judge which has since merged into the judgment of the Supreme.
Court determining the compensation under section 23 of the. Land Acquisition Act for the Shamilat land. The rendition of accounts between the Committee and the respondents has got no nexus with rights and liabilities of parties herein which had arisen under the contractual liability conferred on the petitioners by the respondents. The question of rendition of accounts between the parties, in my considered view, is not the one that arises between the parties "in the suit in which the decree was passed under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act",
10. In view of what has been discussed above, the learned Additional District Judge does not appear to have committed any illegality or triMeriol irregularity in upsetting the impugned order of the learned trial Judge and in arriving at a correct decision. I, therefore, see no merit in this civil revision and dismiss the same in limine.