1. ' In this application for interim injunction, the prayer made by the plaintiffs is as under:-- "This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to restrain the defendants and/or its servants, agents, officers, employees, workers, successors, representatives, managers, assigns working under its control or guidance from committing breach (in any manner) of the Contract dated 22-3-1990 pending disposal of the suit. In the alternate and without prejudice to the above, further prayer is to restrain the defendants from assigning, granting, allowing or in any manner purchasing drums as defined in the contract to or from any third party pending diposal of the suit."
2. ' This application is resisted by the defendants, who have filed counter-affidavit, whereafter the plaintiffs filed affidavit-in-rejoinder. The defendants have further filed surrejoinder.
3. ' In order to properly appreciate the contentions of the learned Advocates, it would be appropriate to state in brief the plaintiffs' case as in the plaint, the averments in the written statement, the counter-affidavit and the affidavit-in-rejoinder etc. ' The plaintiffs have filed a suit for specific performance, perpetual injunction and damages against the defendants. It is the case of the plaintiffs that plaintiff No,1 owned the proprietorship concern known as "Mehran Metal Container" with plant and machinery for production of drums. The plaintiff No,2 is a private limited company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984. In March, 1990 defendants issued invitation to tender for supply of steel drums for filling asphalt at high temperature. Plaintiff No,1 had, by then decided to convert his proprietorship concern into a private limited company under the Companies Ordinance. As such he submitted the tender bid describing his concern as M/s. Mehran Container (Pvt.) Ltd. (Proposed).
4. ' The defendants accepted the offer of plaintiff No,1 made and an agreement dated 22-3-1990 was entered into between the plaintiff No,1 as the seller of stool drums and defendants as buyer thereof.
5. The said agreement Annexure 'A' is entitled as "Drums Supply Agreement". It is further the case of the plaintiff No,1 that before signing of agreement, the defendants were informed that he was in the process of converting his proprietary concern into a private limited company and the entire shareholding in the proposed company was intended to be held by the plaintiff No,1 and his immediate family members, the benefits, rights and liabilities following from the Contract and the due performance thereof would be taken over by the new Company if and when it was formed and incorporated. This position was understood and accepted by the defendants and, therefore, in the Agreement Annexure 'A' plaintiff No,1 described himself as Mehran Metal Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd.
6. (Proposed) and executed agreement.
7. ' The plaintiffs applied to the Registrar of Companies, Karachi, for Certificate of Availability of name which was duly issued by the Deputy Registrar on 1-4-1990 (Annexure 'B'). On 5-6-1990 plaintiff No,1 was duly incorporated and Certificate of Incorporation and Memorandum and Articles of Association were issued (Annexures C-1 and C-2)
8. ' It is further the case of the plaintiffs that after signing of agreement, defendants desired certain changes in the Schedule of Supply and Price of Drums inasmuch as, defendants wanted supplied to commence immediately and for supplies up to 30-9-1991 with reduction in me price of drums. It was orally agreed between the plaintiff No,1 and defendants that the supplies of drums would commence immediately and at the reduced rate of Rs,224 per drum as against the Original Contract rate of Rs,246 per drum. After 30-9-1991 the supplies were to be made at the rate settled in the Agreement.
9. ' On its incorporation, the plaintiff No,2 resolved to take over the rights and obligations under the Agreement Annexure 'A' and proceeded with the performance thereof. Copy of Resolution of Board of Directors dated 16-6-1990 is filed as Annexure 'D' with the plaint. This decision was conveyed by the plaintiff No,2 to defendants through letter Annexure `E'. It is further stated in the plaint that in a subsequent meeting between plaintiff No,1 acting for himself as well as Chief Executive of plaintiff No,2, it was orally agreed that plaintiff No,2 shall be the seller of drums subject to all terms and conditions of Annexure 'A'.
10. ' Pursuant to the Agreement, the plaintiff No,1 made supplies up to 5-6-1990 and thereafter the performance of the contract was taken over by plaintiff No,2, who supplied drums to defendants from 12-6-1990 up to 21-4-1991. Payments to the extent of Rs,98,17,920 were made to plaintiff No,2 after deduction of an amount of Rs,161.280 towards the advance income-tax.
11. ' According to the terms of the Agreement, the seller was required to submit to the defendants/buyer a performance guarantee in the sum of Rs,2.3 million by 31st January, 1991 and by his letter dated 30th January, 1991 the plaintiff No,2 under the signature of plaintiff No,1 forwarded the required guarantee to defendants, which was received and accepted by the latter.
12. ' In order to fulfil its obligations to supply 1 million drums per year for a period of 10 years at the rate of 3,500 drums per day, the plaintiffs established a new plant to meet the said requirement at a cost of Rs,35 million and completed the same. Estimates in this behalf received from M/s. Ghani Corporation are filed Annexure 'A'. On 29-6-1991 the plaintiff No,2 informed the defendants of the completion of all arrangements and their readiness to discharge their obligations under the contract. The defendants were further informed about the advance payments made by plaintiff No,2 for steel sheets. A further request was made to defendants for return of Pay Order of Rs,10,000 submitted with tender offer as performance guarantee. Copy of such letter of plaintiffs is Annexure 'I'.
13. ' It is further the case of the plaintiffs that they received a letter dated 15-7-1991 from defendants by which plaintiffs were informed that agreement dated 22-3-1990 created no "legal contractual" relationship between the parties as the same was void and of no legal effect. Alongwith the letter, a Pay Order of Rs,10,000 in favour of the plaintiff No,2 was enclosed by defendants in repayment of the Pay Order submitted with tender offer. Performance Guarantee of Rs,2.5 million was stated to be returned to the Insurance Company which had executed the same. The letter dated 22-3-1990 of the defendants is marked `J'.
14. ' The plaintiffs further stated that such action of defendants could not be justified as the parties have had performance of agreement and commitments therein for full 16 months and plaintiffs had supplied considerable quantity of drums to defendants in pursuance of the Agreement. Such letter of the defendants was answered through a legal notice of the Advocate, a reply to which was received but as the defendants did not listen to reason, the above suit was filed with a prayer for specific performance of the agreement, for injunction restraining defendants from committing breach of contract, award of damages in the sum'of Rs,4 million and interest on decretal amount.
15. Alongwith the plaint application for interim injunction is filed (CMA 5340/91) which is now under consideration.
16. ' The defendapts filed written statement on 27-2-1992. The case of the defendants is that the plaintiff No,2 was incorporated as a private limited company after the execution of agreement Annexure 'A'. Further, that during the subsistence of previous contract of supply of drums by Patroleum Packages Ltd. (PPL) the plaintiff No,1 represented to the Chairman, PERAC that he was representative of Mr. Hakim All Zardari, who desired that the defendants enter into a long term contract for the supply of drums with plaintiff No,2. The plaintiff No,1 was introduced by the Chairman PERAC to the Managing Director of defendants for this purpose. Although, the Managing Director of defendants opposed fmalisation of contract with the plaintiff No,1 during the subsistence of earlier contract with PPL, but the plaintiff No,1 wanted the contract to be fmalised as per the desire of Mr. Zardari. It is also stated that the plaintiff No,1 mentioned about the possible displeasure of Mr. Zardari in case the contract was not finalised immediately with plaintiff No,2. In order to circumvent the manual 'procedure, the plaintiff No,1 suggested arranging of 3 or 4 high quotations and thereafter the plaintiff No,2 could be awarded contract being the lowest bidder.
17. Some deliberations between Chairman PERAC and the Managing Director of defendants went on whereafter it was suggested that press advertisement be issued which, according to the defendants, was opposed by plaintiff No,2. The sum total of the averments of the defendants in the written statement is that agreement Annexure 'A' was executed under duress, coercion, undue influence and intimidation of plaintiff No,1 and Hakim All Zardari.
18. ' It is further stated that since the agreement was executed under aformentioned circumstances, the previous contractor/supplier (PPL) was excluded from tender invitation, although the said suppliers were supplying the drums for the last 25 years and the defendants were satisfied with their performance.
19. ' According to the defendants, the contract with plaintiff No,2 was void and there was no contract with plaintiff No,1. It is denied that plaintiff No,1 had any proprietary concern or that he submitted his tender as Mehran Metal Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. (Proposed) or in his personal capacity. It is the case of the defendants that plaintiff No,1 misrepresented that plaintiff No,2 was an existing company incorporated under the Ordinance of 1984 and it is on record that plaintiff No,2 was incorporated on 5-6-1990. The defendants also denied supply of drums by plaintiffs in pursuance of the Agreement.
20. Their case is that the supply of drums, if any, by the plaintiff No,2 was not in pursuance of the Agreement, but it was a separate deal with him for which payments were also made but plaintiff cannot take advantage ,of such supplies on assumption that the supplies were pursuant to the Agreement.
21. ' Further case of the defendants is that supply of drums made by plaintiffs was not of the standard quality and this fact was brought to the notice of plaintiff No,1 through various communications.
22. ' It is lastly pleaded that the defendants were within their legal rights to notify the plaintiffs that there was no contractual relationship between the parties on the basis of agreement. The claim of specific performance of agreement and so also the claim of damages is denied. The counter- affidavit filed to the injunction application contains almost the same facts, which are pleaded in the written statement.
23. ' It is contended by Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, learned Advocate for the plaintiffs, that the Agreement Annexure 'A' was signed by the plaintiff No,1 for and on behalf of Mehran Metal Containers (Pvt.) Ltd.
24. (Proposed) while as many as 4 officials signed the said Agreement on behalf of the defendants. At the time of signing of this Agreement, plaintiff No,1 had made it clear to defendants that the firm M/s. Mehran Metal Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. Was in the process of being incorporated and the plaintiff No,1 S. Waqar Hussain was to be the Chief Executive of the said Firm. It was therefore, that in the agreement Annexure 'A' Mehran Metal Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. (Proposed) was mentioned and nowhere it was stated that the said Firm was already registereu. Even otherwise, plaintiff No,1 previously owned a proprietorship concern known as "Mehran Metal Containers" which firm was subsequently converted into a private limited company with plaintiff No,2 as its Chief Executive. The certificate of incorporation was issued by the Joint Registrar of Companies on 5th June, 1990 i,e, soon after the Agreement Annexure 'A'. Such certificate of incorporated and the Memorandum and Articles of Association are placed on record. In any case, plaintiff No,1, who has signed Agreement Annexure 'A', could sign the same in his personal capacity if he is not accepted as Chief Executive of M/s. Mehran Metal Containers (Pvt.) Ltd. The execution of Agreement is not denied although a fallacious claim is taken by defendants that the said Agreement was executed under duress, coercion or undue influence of someone at the helm of affaiRs, ' It is next contended that pursuant to Agreement, the plaintiffs set up a plant at the cost of about Rs,4 crores as delivery of huge quantity of 1 million drums per year was involved. The total value of Contract involved a sum of Rs,246 million and it spread over a period of 10 yeaRs, It is also contended that it was at the instance of defendants that supplies were started even before the incorporation of the Company and after that but before the period of commencement of the Contract. For the supplies made, the plaintiffs have already been paid a sum of nearly Rs,1 crore. It is further contended that even if the plea taken by the defendants that the Agreement was a void agreement signed by the defendants under duress due to pressure of Mr. Zardari, the said regime ended in August, 1990 but till 15th July, 1991 no steps were taken by the defendants for its revocation and this would clearly manifest that the defendants had no objection whatsoever to either the execution of Agreement or supplies made by plaintiffs pursuant to that Agreement for which payments were also made. The impugned letter dated 15th July, 1991 is not only arbitrary and capricious, but is based on mala fides inasmuch as the defendants wanted to oblige some of their own men, whom the contract could be awarded so as to deprive the plaintiffs of the huge investment made by them for the purpose of carrying out the obligations undertaken by them through the Agreement. It is also contended that the Contract may, at the most, be a voidable Contract and for that the defendants had to approach the Court and not that they could unilaterally decide that the Contract was void ab initio and of no legal effect. It is also contended that the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case and the balance of convenience it in their favour and if this Court, by an order of injunction, does not restrain the defendants from acting on the letter dated 15th July, 1991 the plaintiffs shall suffer irreparable loss, which cannot be measured in terms of money. In support of his such contentions, the learned Advocate has referred to Muhammad Aref Effendi v. Egypt Air (1980 SCMR 588). In this case, the petitioner was a General Sales Agent of respondents Airlines and his agency was terminated which action the petitioner challenged in a suit before this Court and his application for injunction was rejected. Before the Supreme Court, the case came up in appeal and it was held that the questions whether petitioner was entitled to continue agency and/or claim damages from the principal and whether the petitioner failed to submit his accounts to his principal in terms of the Contract etc. Were questions of law and facts which involved careful study and scrutiny after leading of appropriate evidence. It was held that in these circumstances, the High Court was not justified to refuse grant of temporary injunction as prayed for and the Hon'ble Supreme Court granted temporary injunction on certain terms calculated to meet ends of justice. He then referred to Muhammad Mateen v. Dino Manekji Chinoy and others (PLD 1983 Kar. 387) where it was held by this Court that at the interlocutory stage of suit, plaintiff had only to show that he has prima facie case, that balance of convenience between the parties as well as avoidance of complication lie in favour of the party seeking injunction and that plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm by refusal of injunction. It was observed in the said judgment as under:- "In cases of specific performance of the contracts, relating to immovable properties, it cannot but be held that it is best to keep the property intact, so that any party, found entitled to the same, may be able to gain the reward of the decree. For such purpose, the Courts very often grant injunctions, so that the property is maintained in its shape and form, and complications and litigations are avoided."
25. ' Mr. Khalid Anwar, learned Advocate for the defendants, has contended that the Contract was to come in force from 1-10-1991 and the cost per drum shown in the Agreement Annexure 'A' was Rs,246. The very fact that the plaintiffs agreed to supply at a lower rate than the one shown in the Agreement would mean that there was some factor working underneath which, according to him, was the political pressure being exercised as stated in the written statement and counter-affidavit.
26. According to him, the Contract was signed by the defendants under coercion and threats and such an agreement would not be enforceable in law.
27. ' The learned Advocate has pointed out to the prayer clause in the plaint, in which specific performance of the agreement is sought by the plaintiffs, and, they have also claimed damages to the tune of Rs,400 million. Since damages have been calculated specific performance of the agreement would not be granted. Likewise, when a specified sum of damages has been claimed, one of the necessary ingredients for grant of interim injunction vis-a-vis irreparable loss likely to be suffered by the plaintiff is missing, the injunction could not be granted.
28. ' It is also contended that the plaintiffs set up a plant for manufacture of drums is falsified by their own document Annexure 'M', which is a letter addressed by Ghani Corporation to the plaintiff showing that some correspondence till that date (20th December, 1990) was going on for setting up a plant and nothing was finalised till that date. It is also contended that even with regard to supplies made by the plaintiff No,2, certain defects were pointed out, as the supplies were not in accordance with the specifications. In case, an injunction is granted and plaintiffs continue supplies, there would be nothing left with this Court after grant of injunction to prevent plaintiffs from supplying defective drums. In such a case the injunction can be refused. The learned Advocate has referred to certain letters dated 24th July, 1990 and 26th July, 1990 pointing the defects in the supplies.
29. ' It is also contended that in the previous contract with M/s. P.P.L, the material for fabrication of drums was supplied by the defendants and the Contractor only fabricated the drums and received payments. While in the instant case, the entire exercise was to be carried out by the plaintiffs including purchase of material, the fabrication and supplies etc. ' It is also contended that invitation of tenders from other firms was all an arranged affair to give a colour of lowest bid by the plaintiffs, when in fact no such bidder actually existed. He has pointed out to certain addresses and telephone numbers on the bid sheets of other contractors, suggesting thereby that it was all arranged by defendants. It is also contended that the contract itself is not enforceable under section 21(a) of Specific Relief Act, which, inter alia, provided that the following contracts cannot be specifically enforced:--
(a) A contract for non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief.
(b) A contract which runs into such minute or numerous details, or which is so dependent on the personal qualifications or volition of the parties, or otherwise from its nature is such, that the Court cannot enforce specific performance of its material terms."
30. ' He then argued that under section 22 of the Specific Relief Act also, no discretionary relief of specific performance could be granted. He referred to the cases provided in the said section, which are to the effect:-- "(i) Where the circumstances under which the contract is made are such as to give the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant, though there may be no fraud or misrepresentation on the plaintiffs part, and ' where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non- performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff."
31. ' He also referred to section 56 of the Specific Relief Act and in particular referred to sub-clauses (f) and (j) and argued that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced and when the conduct of the applicant has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the Court. He reiterated the facts as given by him in the written statement as well as counter-affidavit and surrejoinder. The learned Advocate has referred to the following judgments in support of his various contentions:--(1) Government of West Pakistan v. Ahmed Safdar Khan and 2 others (1970 SCMR 552). In this case, the lease deed between respondents 1 and 3 was still to be executed and possession of the property in dispute had not been delivered to respondent No,1. Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless this dispute is resolved by a competent authority or Court, prima facie it cannot be said that respondent No,1 was entitled to the possession of the property in dispute. It was also held that the balance of convenience was also in favour of the appellants. The order of grant of injunction by the High Court was held as not justified and it was set aside. (2) MA. Naser v. Chairman, Pakistan Eastern Railways and others (PLD 1965 SC 83) where it was held that a contract between Railway Administration and a contractor giving licence to contractor to supply refreshments in Refreshment Rooms and run buffet cars terminable at 6 months' notice, was not an irrevocable licence, breach of which cannot specifically be enforced as money compensation was held to be adequate relief and breach could not be prevented by injunction. (3) Shahzada Muhammad Umer Bagi v. Sultan Mehmood Khan (PLD 1970 SC 139). In this case the, question that came for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether a prayer for temporary injunction to stay hands of Government from reverting a Government servant during the pendency of the suit and the factors to be borne in mind in granting or refusing such injunction would be whether it would be right to issue injunction to public department and disturbing thereby its working. (4) Abdul Shakoor and 2 others v. A.S. Tasneem and 2 others (1974 SCMR 463) where it was held that sub-lessee of the lease of the Government land granted to a lessee for 20 years in contravention of the provisions of section 19 of the Colonization of Government Land (Punjab) Act, 1912 was not entitled to injunction merely on the ground of having been in possession and having spent a huge sum of money on development of land. (5) M/s. Malik & Haq and another v. Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhry (PLD 1961 SC 531).
32. Where it was held that in a contract of personal service specific performance cannot be granted and only remedy was by way of suit for damages as the relationship between the parties was that of master and servant. (6) Sher Muhammad v. Government of Sindh and others (1988 CLC 485).
33. Where it was held that where any remedy was available to petitioner which could afford him pecuniary compensation for wrong done to him by Government functionary, temporary injunction could not have been granted. (7) Chowdhry Construction Company Ltd. v. Pakistan and others (1990 CLC 394), where it was held that building or engineering contract for executing work upon land of another, are mere licence to enter upon the site or land necessary to execute the work and are revocable by the employer at any time and no injunction could be issued against the owner at the instance of building contractor whose proper remedy was suit for damages. (8) M/s. Quality Builders Ltd., Karachi v. M/s. J.P. Brockhoven V.V. Dredging Contractors, Karachi and others (PLD 1979 Kar. 668) where it was held that a breach of contract for rendering services cannot be prevented by an injunction. (9) Mst. Sughra Bai v. Rabia (1992 CLC 344) where it was held that general allegations by applicant were not sufficient to establish a prima facie case and where no case of irreparable loss was made out and where loss is assessable in terms of money, no injunction could be granted. (10) Muhammad Raza v. Haji Abdul 3haffar and others (PLD 1992 Kar. 17) where it was held that plaintiff having already claimed damages in his suit as mentioned in prayer clauses such fact would show that loss, if any sustained by him could be ascertained in terms of money, thus disentitling him to grant of injunction. This was a case of breach of contract and the plaintiff sought temporary injunction in respect of alleged breach of contract. The injunction was in the said case refused.
34. ' Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, learned Advocate for plaintiff, in rebuttal contended that in para. 11 of the plaint it is specifically mentioned about the supply of drums and the payment made to plaintiff No,2. Whether the supplies were under the contract Annexure 'A' or were on account of some other contract would be a matter to be decided at the trial and no finding at this stage could be given.
35. He has also contended that as submitted by him earlier, the defendants have failed to show that the contract is void and therefore in this case, it could, at the most, be said that it is a voidable contract. He has also referred to the following judgments in addition to the case-law already referred, (a) Pakistan Automobile Corporation Ltd. And another v. General Motors Overseas Distribution Corporation and others (PLD 1982 Kar. 796) where it was held that where a party seeks specific performance of an Agency Agreement, Court can grant ad interim injunction for keeping intact contract till such time as it may consider just and proper or till disposal of the suit. (b) Mst.
36. Khursheed Begum and 7 others v. Iram Rabbani and another (1979 CLC 570) where it was held as under:-- "It is established that in order to prove a prima facie case it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that there is no possibility of dismissal of the suit. He has only to make out a good and strong arguable case. Similarly it is not the function of the Court while deciding the application for temporary injunction to decide the whole suit."
(a) PLD 1982 Lahore 558 (Malik Muhammad Akbar and 6 others v. Mian Qamruddin and 10 others).
37. Petitioner, in order to succeed in application for temporary injunction, is not required to establish his case conclusively, but only to show that he has an arguable case.
(b) Molasses Export Co. Ltd. v. Consolidated Sugar Mills Ltd. (1990 CLC 609). It was held that where in a suit for specific performance of agreement, plaintiff seeking temporary injunction, had proved that he would suffer irreparable loss in case agreement was not specifically performed by defendant, temporary injunction, could not be refused to plaintiff merely for reason that plaintiff could be compensated by awarding damages, if plaintiff would establish his case.
38. ' The above contentions of the learned Advocate have been considered and the case-law referred by them is perused. The execution of agreement Annexure 'A' is not denied by the defendants. All that is stated is, that it was executed under threats, coercion and political pressure of Mr. Zardari.
39. Certain inter-departmental notes exchanged between various functionaries of defendants have been filed to suggest that execution of agreement was not approved and was being criticised on the assumption that the same was under political pressure and in deviation of the manual formalities. These notes adorned the files of the defendants but never saw the light of the day inasmuch as the same were never committed to plaintiffs. Even after the political pressure of Mr. Zardari came to an end, in August 1990, for nearly 11 months thereafter, i,e, till 15th July 1991, the defendant never objected to the agreement on the ground that it was executed by them under duress or coercion. The agreement was acted upon up to the time, the defendants sent letter dated 15th July 1991, intimating plaintiffs that agreement was void ab initio and of no legal effect.
40. This action of the defendants was arbitrary and is under challenge in the suit. At this stage it would be premature to comment upon the legality or propriety of the agreement as any finding in this regard could prejudice the case of either party.
41. ' The agreement Annexure 'A' has been acted upon and the plaintiffs have supplied quite a big number of drums to defendants, the payment for which is also made to plaintiffs. Whether the supplies were pursuant to agreement Annexure 'A' or some other contract, would also be a matter determinable at the trial. Similarly if any manufacturing defects were pointed out by the defendants, it could not be said with precision if the same were in respect of supplies consequent upon the agreed supplies in agreement or the supplies that were made by plaintiffs before the period of contract commenced and at lower rate.
42. ' I do not agree with the contention of defendant learned Advocate, that since the plaintiffs have claimed damages, no relief by way of temporary injunction could be granted. Under rule 2 of Order 39 of C.P.C., the plaintiff can apply to the Court, for a temporary injunction, to restrain the defendant from committing breach of contract whether compensation is claimed in the A suit or not. The damages claimed by the plaintiffs are in addition to the relief of specific performance and is not claimed as an alternative relief. The loss or injury which, the plaintiffs would suffer in case the defendant commit breach of agreement, in my view, cannot be calculated and the proper course would be to restrain the defendant from committing threatened breach of contract pending decision of suit. The balance of convenience in the instant case in such circumstances also lies in favour of plaintiffs.
43. ' All legal pleas taken by defendant shall be resolved at the trial after detailed examination of evidence adduced by the parties. Any finding on such legal assertions would prejudice the case of either party. It is to be seen if the plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of the grant of temporary injunction, or have established an arguable case. The merits of case are not to be closely examined at this stage. It can hardly be accepted that in case injunction is granted, Courts become helpless to act, if the plaintiffs, taking advantage of such injunction, commit breach of terms of contract. The Courts can in such cases, put plaintiff on certain terms to enforce its ordeRs, ' As a result of all that is discussed above, the plaintiffs have made out a case for grant of interim injunction and the application (CMA 5340/91) is accordingly allowed in terms of the prayer contained therein.