1. ' MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.---Ia this appeal through leave of the Court the leave grant order is as follows: "Petitioner seeks leave to appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 6th March, 1989 whereby the petitioner's Constitution Petition was dismissed in limine on the ground that the petitioner's conviction by the Summary Military Court could not be challenged unless it was coram non judice, without jurisdiction or mala fide.
2. "Petitioner alongwith others was convicted under M.L.O.72 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner relying on Federation of Pakistan v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar (PLD 1989 SC 26) that the conviction was without jurisdiction inasmuch as on the face of the charge against the petitioner no offence under M.L.O.72 and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was made out. It may be stated that according to the learned counsel of the petitioner, the petitioner has served out the sentence of imprisonment awarded to him but the mount of fine imposed on him has not been so far recovered from the petitioner.
3. "The contention raised requires consideration."
4. ' The point for examination as is apparent from the leave grant order contains mixed question of law and fact. The appellant was required to show that the charge against him on its very face was, untenable and thus no case on merits was made out against him.
5. ' We in absence of the appellant, treating this matter as jail appeal, called upon the learned counsel for the respondent to assist us. He in all fairness to the appellant stated that although the condition regarding the appearance of alleged executant before the appellant might be established even if the case is now remanded for re-trial, yet as held by the High Court there was enough material to come to the conclusion that the appellant was directly involved in the crime.
6. He in this behalf relied on the following observations in the impugned judgment: "We cannot subscribe to the contention of the learned counsel that the petitioner in capacity as a Sub-Registrar had only to act mechanically in accepting documents for registration without enquiring into the title or authority of executant. It will suffice to reproduce Rule 126 of the West Pakistan Registration Rules which reads as under:- 1.26. Enquiry as to execution, identity, etc. ---The registering officer shall then, with as little delay as possible, enquire whether the document was executed by the alleged executant, and satisfy himself as to the identity of the person appearing before him to admit execution. In cases of alienation, he shall satisfy himself of the identity not only of the alienor, but also of the alienee, if the latter is present. If the presenter is the executant, or his representative, assign or agent, or if such executant, representative, assign or agent is present, the registering officer shall make the necessary enquiry at once. He should also require the presenter, if an agent, to produce a power- of-attorney authenticated in the manner prescribed in section 33 of the Act and, if a representative or assign, to produce evidence of his status'."
7. Even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that somebody appeared before the appellant and claimed to be the trustee executant, that by itself was not enough to show that he was truly representing the trust and inquiry by the appellant was a must. On merits there is enough other material to show that the appellant was rightly found guilty. Therefore, in so far as the point noted in the order for grant of leave to appeal is concerned, there is no scope for any further examination nor for, interference by this Court with the impugned judgment of the High Court.
8. ' Before closing it needs to be mentioned that in this case other conditions of coram non judice or lack of jurisdiction as spelt out in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar (PLD 1989 SC 26) are not at all satisfied; nor, there is any question of mala fides. It has rightly been held so by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Thus this appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.