1. ' The learned Controller by her order, dated 2-4-1992, has directed the appellant to vacate the premises occupied by him, upholding the respondent's plea that the same were required in good faith for his own personal use and that of his two married daughteRs, The premises are situated in Block-10, Federal 'B' Area, Karachi.
2. ' It is pertinent to point out that the respondent is permanently residing out of Pakistan and he occasionally visits Pakistan. As regards the requirement of the applicant's daughters who intended to shift into the premises in question are married and independent and are respectively residing with their families in rented premises. However, it had been urged that the rent which they were required to pay was exorbitant and, therefore, they were finding it difficult to meet their daily expenses.
3. ' The application was resisted by the appellant and one of the grounds urged by him was that the respondent was in possession of another house in P.I.B. Colony, Karachi, which was sufficient for the needs of the respondent and his family and, therefore, the ejectment application had been filed with mala fide intention. It was also urged that another portion of the house which was in occupation of a tenant was got vacated in April 1988 on the plea of personal use but the same was rented out thereafter in the month of May.
4. ' The learned Controller on the basis of the evidence however held that the case of the respondent for personal requirement had been established and, therefore, she ordered the appellant's ejectment from the premises, as pointed out earlier.
5. ' Mr. Amanullah Khan, learned counsel for the appellant has firstly argued that the ejectment application was filed by the landlord through his daughter, MRs, Nusrat, but it was doubtful whether a valid power of attorney had been executed in her favour. Admittedly, when the eviction application was filed no power of attorney had been filed alongwith the said application and the power of attorney which was subsequently produced showed that the same had been executed on the same date when the eviction application had been filed but an admission made by MRs, Nusrat showed that when the eviction application was filed the respondent was out of Pakistan.
6. Consequently, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the power of attorney could not have been signed by the respondent and consequently the signature thereon purporting to be that of the respondent is forged.
7. ' It is pertinent to point out in this regard that, the first question which requires consideration is whether any power of attorney was required to be filed by the respondent's daughter alongwith the eviction application. The term "landlord" has been defined in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance to mean "the owner of the premises and includes a person who is for the time being authorized or entitled to receive rent in respect of such premises". In the very first paragraph of the eviction application, MRs, Nusrat has been shown as rent collector of the respondent. As is evident from the definition of the term "landlord", a person who is authorised or entitled to receive rent in respect of the premises is to be deemed as "landlord". Consequently, a mere statement by such person to the same effect would be sufficient to authorise him to institute ejectment proceedings against a tenant. However, in the present case, since ejectment was sought on the ground that the premises were required for personal use of the landlord and his daughters, the said ejectment application could be filed only by the owner of the premises: definition of the expression "personal use" in clause (g) of section 2 of the Rented Premises Ordinance But, turning to Article 95 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat, there is a presumption as to the authenticity of the power of attorney. The power of attorney in the present case was evidently authenticated by a notary public. Consequently, the burden of proof would lie on the person who disputes its genuineness. Furthermore, even oral authorization would be sufficient to enable the agent to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the principal. Therefore, unless the respondent had himself disputed the execution of the power of attorney, the same cannot be challenged by the appellant in the present case. The first ground urged by Mr. Amanullah Khan is, therefore, without much substance.
8. ' The second contention of Mr. Amanullah Khan is that no explanation was given by the respondent in regard to the other property in his possession because neither any reference was made to it in the eviction application nor it was stated that the same was not suitable for his requirement. In my opinion, this ground is also without force firstly, because such an explanation can be found in paragraph No,10 of the affidavit-in-evidence filed on behalf of Mst. Nusrat. The depondent has explained in the said affidavit that the premises situated in P.I.B. Colony were in occupation of the respondent's son, Subhanuddin Siddiqui, who was living there with his family which comprised of four children and a wife. In any case, as was held in Mst. Saha Bai v. Anisur Rahman (1989 SCM R 1366), the landlord is required to state in his application, only the material facts, i,e, facts which constitute cause of action alongwith those facts which prima facie show that the requirement was according to law and was made in good faith. No further details are to be provided by the landlord to successfully make out a case for eviction of a tenant on the ground of a personal use.
9. Consequently, the respondent was not under obligation to explain as to why the premises situated in P.I.B. Colony were not sufficient for his use, but, in any case the explanation offered by MRs, Nusrat in her affidavit in evidence, in my opinion, is sufficient for discharging such obligation, if at all it is found incumbent upon her to furnish such explanation. The second ground urged by Mr. Amanullah, therefore, is also without force. Lastly, it was contended by Mr. Amanullah Khan that personal requirement of the landlord would not include the personal requirement of his married daughteRs, Reliance in this regard has been placed on Mst. Hajra Bai Sulaiman v. Mst. Aisha Bai (1982 CLC 1444), wherein with reference to the provisions of section 13 (3) (a) of the West Paldstan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that requirement of the landlord can include need of such family members who are dependent upon him. Somewhat similar observations appear to have been made by me in the case of Habib v.
10. Abdul Ghani (1993 M LD 396). In the case of Mst. Anwar Jehan v. Ismail Khan (1984 CLC 2849), which was decided by another learned Single Judge of this Court, it was held that personal requirement of the landlord would not include requirement of his daughter, her husband or children. In my view, the question would depend upon the facts of each case. Although, under section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance personal use of the landlord includes the need of any of his children as is also provided in section 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, but at the same time the expression "personal use" has been defined for the first time in the latter enactment to mean as "use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter". It is pertinent to note that the words, "son" or "daughter" have not been qualified by the word "dependent" in the said definition. The word "children" occuring in section 13(3)(a) of the W.P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance or section 15(2)(vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance is the plural of the word "child" which, according to its ordinary dictionary meaning, dentoes a person who has not yet attained the age of discretion. However, in case of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance since the expression "personal use" has been separately defined to include use of the premises by a "son" or a "daughter" which expressions are distinct from the expression "children", the intention clearly was to enlarge the scope of section 15 (2) (vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance by including the use of the premises even by an independent son or daughter of the landlord. It therefore follows that even if the daughter of the landlord is married and she is living with her husband and other family members, yet the landlord can successfully maintain an eviction application on the ground that the premises are required for use by such married daughter. There is nothing in the said definition to indicate that the Legislature only intended to include a daughter who was dependent upon the D landlord or to exclude a daughter who separately resides with her husband or children.
11. Consequently, I am unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Amanullah Khan that personal use of the respondent in the present case would only include the use of his dependent children and the same could not include married daughteRs, It has however, been pointed out by Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui, learned counsel for the respondent that, the property was not only required by the respondent for the use of his daughters but the same was also required by him for his own personal use. The mere fact that the respondent was living abroad and he occasionally visited Karachi, cannot defeat his case E for personal requirement. Consequently, the last argument of Mr. Amanullah Khan also fails.
12. ' For the aforesaid reasons, I find no force in this appeal and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Mr. Amanullah Khan has requested that the appellant may be allowed four months' time to vacate the premises. Mr. Mubarak Hussain Siddiqui has no objection to this request provided the appellant regularly pays rent to the respondent during the said period. It is, therefore, ordered accordingly. It is further ordered, by consent, that in case the appellant fails to vacate the premises in question, the learned Controller would be at liberty to issue writ of possession without notice to the appellant.