ORDER
(1) For orders on CMA 294/92 (If granted).
(2) For orders on CMA 295/92.
(3) For Katcha Peshi.
(4) For orders on CMA 296/92.
1. Granted.
2. Exemption as prayed is allowed.
Srl. Nos, 3 and 4. I have heard the learned counsel. The facts are not in dispute. Admittedly, there was an order of eviction dated 12-6-1989 passed in Rent Case No,21/1987 against the appellant- tenant. In First Rent Appeal No,62/1989, which was disposed of on 21-10-1991, statement was made by the parties to the effect that the appellant-tenant undertook to vacate the tenant-hold on or before 31-3-1992. Resultantly, the appeal was dismissed as not pressed. Since the appellant-tenant failed to effect compliance in terms of his undertaking to vacate by 31-3-1992, Execution Application No,1/1992 was filed. Objection was taken in such execution by the tenant that the aforesaid order passed in the First Rent Appeal was inexecutable being an order on compromise and not in the nature of an order of eviction. The learned Controller dismissed such Objection and allowed execution. Present appeal arises from that order.
' Learned counsel representing the appellant-tenant has placed reliance on Jumro-Mal v.
Muhammad Paryal, 1991 CLC 489, a decision of my learned brother Abdul Rahim Kan, J. Having gone through the judgment referred to by the learned counsel, without saying more, it may at the outset be observed that the cited precedent itself distinguishes cases of the instant character.
While making reference to the authority reported as Qasim Ali v. Mst. Sakina and others, 1973 SCM R 307, the learned Judge has himself observed that once an order of eviction has been suffered and is varied subsequently on compromise such remains an order of eviction irrespective of its later modification and can be enforced in its varied .Version. With this view I respectfully agree. It may, however, be added that no broad proposition can be laid down to the effect that a Controller cannot, by consent, order ejectment in a rent case, seeking that remedy. Likewise, it will be unacceptable as a proposition of law that even where, upon trial, an eviction case has failed on merits the contestants at an appellate stage may not mutually and amicably settled the lis by agreeing to eviction in permissible terms. All this can lawfully be done. If so and if the terms be precise, spelling out clearly an order of eviction by consent, such can be enforced in execution in the same proceedings provided that no contrary intention appears from the terms agreed as authenticated by the Court. I do not think anything other than this was or could be laid down in Jumro-Mal's case or in the precedents invoked there. Jumro Mal's case was decided on its own facts. In other words, where relevant, agreed terms themselves and the order following thereupon alone would always furnish the criteria to determine as to what is the effect of the culmination of proceedings in the manner agreed. A conditional order of eviction can be passed and that may be by consent. In appropriate cases even reprieve from or relaxation of conditions can be allowed: Ameena Lodhi v. Maqbool Hussain, 1983 CLC 178. It is only when reprieve against agreed condition (s), if any, has lawfully been allowed or the terms of authenticated settlement constitute a fresh and independent agreement of tenancy, bereft of a conclusive order of eviction, that execution may be successfully resisted and fresh proceedings may lawfully be claimed but not otherwise.
' On facts, it becomes manifest that the parties to these proceedings settled the dispute by agreeing to a lawful and enforcible eviction as from the date specified above. No ground is shown as to why, upon default of compliance, execution should not lie. In the result, I see no merit in this First Rent Appeal and dismiss it. With such dismissal CMA 296/92 seeking an order of stay also stands dismissed.