1. ' MUKHTAR AHMED JUNEJO, J.---This is a Civil Revision Application filed by Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah and Syed Zamir Hussain Shah challenging the judgment and the decree delivered in Civil Appeal No,17 of 1979 by the First Additional District Judge, Nawabshah, setting aside the judgment and the decree passed in Suit No,40/76.
2. ' Said suit was filed by the applicants against the respondents for declaration and injunction.
3. ' According to the plaint, the suit land belonged to Shahabuddin Shah father of applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah and grandfather of applicant Zamir Hussain Shah. At the time of his death, Shahabuddin Shah left behind three sons namely applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah, Zenalabdin Shah and Ghulam All Shah. After death of Shahabuddin Shah the property left by him was privately partitioned between his three sons. As per the private partition, the disputed land was given to the present applicants as claimed by them. It was added that the third brother namely Ghulam Ali Shah father of the respondents never interfered with possession of the applicants over the suit land. Besides claiming being title holders of the suit property, the applicants also claimed ownership of the suit land by adverse possession.
4. ' The suit was contested by the respondents, who denied if the suit land belonged to Shahabuddin Shah. Respondents contended that in a previous suit of 1975 the applicants had claimed that the suit land was purchased by Shahabuddin Shah as `benami' in name of his son Ghulam Ali Shah from Barrage Department. Case of the respondents was that the suit land was purchased by their father Ghulam All Shah from Barrage Department in 1953 and such entry was made in the record of rights and due instalments were paid. They averred that after death of Ghulam All Shah the suit land stood in their names in the record-of-rights. Ghulam All Shah was said to have purchased the suit land after the death of Shahabuddin. Claim of the applicants about adverse possession was denied and it was stated that the suit land was purchased by Ghulam All Shah in the year 1953 and the applicants could not have remained in possession of the suit land since preceding 45 years.
5. The respondents raised legal pleas about bar of section 172 of Land Revenue Act and challenged the suit to be not maintainable and not in proper form. Court-fee paid was said to be deficient.
6. ' The trial Court prepared issues on all the legal and factual points. Under a judgment dated 28-2- 1979 learned Civil Judge, Kandiaro decreed suit of the applicants after holding that the suit land was not purchased by Ghulam All Shah from Barrage Department in 1953 and that the applicants were in adverse possession of the suit land, which belonged to Shahabuddin and after his death respondents have never remained in possession of the same. The legal issues about maintainability and form of the suit, about payment of court-fee, bar of section 172 of Land Revenue Act and non-payment of proper stamps, were dropped.
7. ' The respondents took the matter to the District Court Nawabshah by filing Civil Appeal No,17 of 1979 against the applicants. Under the judgment dated 10-11-1982 learned Additional District Judge, Nawabshah accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court, after holding that evidence of the applicants was not sufficient to hold that the suit land came to their share in the private partition and that the ingredients required for claiming adverse possession were not established in the instant case and the same were lacking. Hence this revision application.
8. ' I have heard applicant No, 1 Ghulam Mustafa Shah in person and Mr. Abdul Sattar Kazi, Advocate for the respondents.
9. Powers of this Court in dealing with Revision Applications under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code are well defined. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Shahzada Muhammad Umer Beg v.
10. Sultan Mehmood Khan and another PLD 1970 SC 139 observed that a revision under section 115 of Civil Procedure Code was meant primarily for correcting errors made by the subordinate Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction and not those which are made in their jurisdiction unless the discretion is found to have been exercised arbitrarily or fancifully. Said case was followed in the case of Kanwal Nain and others v. Fateh Khan and others PLD 1983 SC 53 where it was observed that ordinarily erroneous decisions of fact are not revisable except in cases where the decision is based on no evidence or on inadmissible evidence or is so perverse that grave injustice would result therefrom.
11. ' The respondents had produced in the evidence record-of-rights copy Exh.71 showing that the suit land was owned by Ghulam All Shah. Respondents examined Muhammad Hussain (respondent No,1) Exh.68 who deposed that suit land was purchased by his grandfather Shahabuddin from the Government. He produced "Perchis" Exhs.69 and 70 about the same. He added that Shahabuddin died in the year 1925 and suit land was mutated in favour of Ghulam Ali Shah and record-of-rights was duly mutated. That after death of Ghulam Ali Shah, the suit land was mutated in names of the respondents, as per true .Copy Exh.72 of Deh Form 7. Muhammad Hussain added that suit land never remained in possession of the applicants. That the applicant No,1 was Jamadar in Police Department while applicant No,2 was compounder. In his cross-examination Muhammad Hussain stated that after death of Shahabuddin his land was distributed by way of private partition and that half of his land went to Ghulam Ali Shah and the remaining half went to brothers of Ghulam All Shah. That Ghulam Ali Shah died in the year 1967. Muhammad Hussain stated in cross-examination that land revenue in respect of the suit land was being paid by Ghulam Ali Shah and after his death by the respondents. Through this witness copy Exh.73 of mutation record was produced but it does not relate to the suit property. In presence of documentary evidence in favour of the respondents a strong proof is required to establish adverse possession claimed by the applicants.
12. ' In the case of Noorali Pir Muhammad Parsala v. Mrs. Patricia Dinshaw PLD 1974 Kar. 235 it was held that a person who claims title to immovable property by adverse possession must show that his possession was open, adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent and that his entry upon or occupation of the immovable property was with the intention to assert hostile title thereto. In the case of Ghulam Qadir v. Ahmad Yar and others PLD 1990 SC 1049 it was held that when a party pleads that it had a valid title through purchase and subsequent inheritance it would become impossible for such a party to succeed in the alternative on the plea that the possession being open and hostile, title had matured otherwise on account of influx of time through adverse possession. This authority is pertinent to the point at issue in this case.
13. ' As against the evidence of the respondents the applicants examined Ghulam Mustafa Shah Exh.44 (applicant No,1), Muhammad Ismail Exh.47 and Muhammad Sharif Exh.54 and closed the side under statement Exh.56. Applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah Exh.44 deposed that on death of Shahabuddin Shah his property was privately partitioned between his three sons, out of whom Ghulam Ali Shah being the eldest got half share. Ghulam Mustafa added that he and Zainul Abdin got each 1/4th share of the property of their father. Applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah further stated that since partition he and Zainulabedin remained in continuous possession and enjoyment of the disputed land for which they had been paying land revenue. He produced land revenue receipt Exh.45 for 1971. Applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah claimed to have remained in continuous possession of the suit land for 45 years. According to him the suit land was his ancestral property and was not Barrage land. He denied if suit land was purchased by Ghulam Ali Shah in 1953 from Barrage Department. He produced Rubkari Exh.46 dated 6-7-1976 signed by the Barrage Mukhtiarkar Nawabshah showing that the suit land was not mentioned in the record as "Na Kabuli" land and it was not shown to have been given on full grant. Fact that the suit land initially belonged to Shahabuddin Shah is admitted by respondent Muhammad Hussain in his deposition Exh.68, although denied in written statement. In his cross-examination applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah admitted that he was in police department till 1968 when he retired. He added that Shahabuddin Shah had inherited the suit land from his ancestors. Ghulam Mustafa Shah also stated that he had made a wrong statement in his previous suit that the suit land was purchased from Barrage Department. Applicant Ghulam Mustafa Shah admitted that in the record of rights suit land stands in name of Ghulam Ali Shah father of the respondents. He admitted being in possession of revenue assessm ent bills and receipts but did not produce any such receipt except Exh.45. He admitted that name of Ghulam Ali Shah appeared in the record of rights since partition of the suit property, which was effected 45 years prior, Muhammad Ismail Exh.47 was Tapedar of concerned Deh for 4 years. He deposed that the applicants were in possession of the suit land for preceding 25 years.
14. He also stated that the respondents were never in possession of the suit land. In his cross- examination Muhammad Ismail failed to give names of real owners of the suit land. He admitted that he had no proof as to who paid land revenue for the suit land. This witness did not support the applicants that they were in possession of the suit land for preceding 45 years. Muhammad Sharif Exh.54 had taken lease of the suit land, of which he failed to give area. He, claimed to have taken lease of suit land from Ghulam Mustafa Shah who was being paid the lease money. In his cross- examination Muhammad Sharif stated that he had not produced in Court any lease deed. He did not remember the amount of land revenue paid. He did not produce any land revenue receipt for the period of his lease. He showed his ignorance about the said land standing in names of the respondents. This oral evidence cannot stand against the documentary evidence adduced by the respondents. The applicants have not C been able to establish their claim about being in adverse possession of the suit property.
15. ' In the circumstances no case is made out for invoking the provisions contained in section 115 of C.P.C. And consequently this revision application stands dismissed with no order as to costs.