1. ' CH. MUSHTAQ AHMAD KHAN, J.---This order will dispose of I.CA. Nos.405 of 1992 and 406 of 1992 as both the appeals arise out of the same order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court and out of the same dispute.
2. ' Briefly stated the facts of the case out of which these appeals have arisen are that Sh. Muzaffar Ali Jawa was elected as a Chairman of Town Committee, Tandlianwala on 29-1-1992. On 15-10-1992 14 members of the local council out of a total number of 19 members constituting the said council; moved a requisition for convening of a meeting to consider a no-confidence motion against the appellant, to the respondent No,1 who on the same day directed convening of the meeting and forwarded the requsition to the Assistant Director Local Government, Failsalabd. On 18-10-1992, the appellant moved an application before the respondent No,1 for supply of a copy of the requisition but allegedly this copy was not supplied to the appellant and ultimately he filed Writ Petition No,10057 of 1992 which came up for preliminary hearing before the learned Judge of Single Bench on 20-10-1992 on which date copy of writ petition was handed over to the learned Advocate- General, Punjab with a direction to assist the Court. As the meeting was scheduled to be held on 24-10-1992 for consideration of no-confidence motion against the appellant, learned Singel Judge did not stay the proceedings of the meeting. However, directed that the declaration shall not be made by the Presiding Officer. Resultantly, the meeting was held on 24-10-1992 and 14 members of the local council voted against the appellant and in favour of the motion of no-confidence which proceedings were duly recorded by the Presiding Officer. The appellant aggrieved of these proceedings filed another Writ Petition No,10589 of 1992. Both the writ petitions were heard together and the learned Single Judge of this Court vide a consolidated order dated 14-11-1992, dismissed both the writ petitions. This order has been challenged in these two Intra-Court Appeals.
3. ' Ch. Hamiduddin, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the appellant has raised the following contentions in support of these appeals:---
(1) That the requisition on the basis whereof meeting to consider no-confidence motion was convened was not genuine and inasmuch as 14 members had not actually signed the requisition and, therefore, as per Rule 3 of Punjab Local Councils (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman or Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1980 an enquiry should have been held by respondent No,1 before convening the meeting as according to the learned counsel very wording of the rule which fixes a period of 7 days for convening of the meeting clearly shows that respondent No,1 was obliged to hold a proper enquiry about the genuineness of the requisition before convening meeting and could not convene the meeting the same day and at the same time, on which the requisition was made before him;
(2) That the proceedings held in the meeting dated 24-10-1992 are illegal inasmuch as according to the provisions of Rule 6 of the aforementioned rules, the voting had to be by standing up in their seats by the members and in this case the proceedings do not reflect that this procedure was adopted while counting the votes. According to the learned counsel it clearly proves that the procedure as given in rule 6 was not adopted by the Presiding Officer, therefore, the proceedings stand vitiated. Argument of the learned counsel is that under the law if any act is provided to be done in a particular manner it shall be done in the same manner and not otherwise. Consequently, proceedings held on 24-10-1992 being void, the declaration of success of the move of no- confidence against the appellant cannot be made absolute.
4. ' Elaborating his argument with regard to contention noted as point No,1, learned counsel has stated that keeping in view the political situation in the country and the methods of election and carrying of no-confidence motion being adopted by the members of the local councils whereby coercive methods are being used to get the requisition of no-confidence motion signed and in certain situation horse-trading is also in vogue, it is necessary that this Court should hold that before convening the meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence, an enquiry must be held about the genuineness of the requisition, particularly the signatures on the requisition. Learned counsel has stated that in cases of requisitions relating to Municipal Committee, Jaranwala and Faisalabad, the respondent No,1 did refer the matter to Assistant Director Local Government for submission of a report with regard to the genuineness of the requisition and this is the only legal method which should be adopted in the prevailing circumstances in the country and the necessity of adopting of this method according to the learned counsel finds support from the very fact that 7 days period has been given to Convening Authority to convene the meeting. If a meeting is convened the same day the requisition is submitted the very object of fixation of maximum period of 7 days shall stand frustrated and, therefore, the meeting in this case having not been convened after holding a proper enquiry about the genuineness of the requisition, the whole proceedings stand vitiated. According to the learned counsel the Courts have the authority to read some thing in the rules which is not specifically provided and, therefore, this Court should read the necessity of holding an enquiry before convening the meeting a prerequisite while deciding the question about the validity of an order of convening of the meeting. Regarding the second contention, learned counsel argued that the Presiding Officer should have specifically written in the proceedings itself that the members supporting the motion have been asked to stand up in their seats and to express their opinion and if the proceedings do not reflect this procedure having been followed, it should be presumed that the method as given in the rules has not been adopted and, therefore, whole proceedings shall stand vitiated inasmuch as they are in violation of statutory rules.
5. According to the learned counsel Election Laws and the Rules have to be strictly construed in favour of an elected person unless and until the voting is expressed in the proceedings having taken place by standing up of the members in their seats, it shall automatically be proved that the voting has not taken place in accordance with the provisions of rule which is mandatory in nature, hence, the declaration of success of the motion of no-confidence cannot be allowed to be issued in this case as, the proceedings are illegal, without lawful authority and are liable to be quashed.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant argues that the learned Single Judge of this Court has not at all taken into consideration the arguments in its true perspective and, hence, has committed a serious error of law while dismissing the two writ petitions. On our quarry learned counsel for the appellant has admitted that the respondent No,1 has clearly written in his order of convening of meeting dated 15-10-1992 that all the 14 members who have signed the requisition are present before me and have verified their signatures on the application. Learned counsel for the appellant has also admitted that the said members also appeared before the learned Single Judge on the date on which the case was argued and was decided and denied the various allegations levelled by the appellant in the writ petition and had supported the genuineness of the requisition as well as the passing of the motion of no-confidence against the appellant.
7. ' We have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant, have perused the record of the two writ petitions as well as the judgment recorded by the learned Single Judge. .
8. Order dated 15-10-1992 passed by respondent No,1 clearly reflects that the 14 members who had signed the requisition appeared before the respondent No,1 and verified the signatures on the requisition. Under the law a presumption of correctness is attached to the proceedings held before a public officer. This presumption has not been rebutted in this case by any cogent and lawful evidence and, therefore, the presumption is that the order passed by respondent No,1 is quite lawful and valid and 14 members who had signed the requisition must have appeared before him and must have verified their signatures on the application. In this view of the matter we consider that there was no occasion for respondent No,1 to hold an enquiry with regard to the genuineness of requisition, who in performance of his statutory duty convened meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence against the appellant in accordance with law. Period of 7 days mentioned in rule 3 is a maximum period during which respondent No,1 is to convene a meeting. There is absolutely no bar in convening the meeting on the first day of filing of the requisition, therefore, we do not agree with the learned counsel that there is any legal bar to convene the meeting on the same day and at the same time, the requisition is moved before the authority, particularly when the members who were signatory to the requisition, were also present before the respondent No,1. Even otherwise, law and rules referred to above do not envisage holding of enquiry which has been suggested by the learned counsel during the course of his arguments which on the face of it appears to be constructive and attractive but when examined deeply is without any lawful basis and justification.
9. Convening of a meeting by authority is a statutory function of the authority and is to be performed on the will of the members who submit requisition for convening of the meeting. No doubt that the convening authority has jurisdiction to hold an enquiry for his own satisfaction about the genuineness or otherwise of the signatures on the requisition but it is not a pre requisite for convening of a meeting. The appellant can only succeed if he can show that it is always a prerequisite that the meeting should be convened after holding enquiry and not merely because the convening authority may hold enquiry if it so feels. It is correct that the omission can be supplied by the Courts in order to harmonise the two existing provisions of a statute or a rule, as held in cases of "Hakim Khan and 2 others v. Government of Pakistan, through Secretary, Interior PLD 1992 SC 595 and The State v. Syed Qaim Ali c Shah 1992 SCM R 2192" but the Courts have no jurisdiction to legislate and to add something to the statutory provisions which is the function of the legislature alone. In this case omission to provide holding an enquiry appears to be intentional on the part of legislature inasmuch as necessity of holding of an enquiry prior to the convening of the meeting will rather more aggravate the situation and methods which have been mentioned as vices by the learned counsel for the appellant shall be adopted in a more aggravated form. During the course of enquiry very object of convening of a meeting to consider a motion of no-confidence shall stand frustrated, therefore, the rule does not provide holding of any such enquiry prior to the convening of meeting and as such if respondent No,1 in certain cases has asked for report from his subordinate officer with regard to the genuineness of requisition, it does not mean that it becomes a law that no meeting can at all be convened, unless and until an enquiry about the genuineness of the requisition is held, even if all the signatories are present before the convening authority and they verify their signatures on the requisition. Consequently, this argument of the learned counsel that meeting having been convened on the first day of filing of the requisition without holding of enquiry was illegal, has no force and the same is, therefore, repelled. Second argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has also no force. It is true that rule 6 does provide the method of voting but there is nothing on the record to show that this method was not adopted. The proceedings before the Presiding Officer only show that 14 members expressed their vote against the appellant in favour of no-confidence motion and the presumption is that expression of the opinion by the voters must be in accord with the method as provided in the rules particularly when no objection was raised during the course of proceedings which were held by the Presiding Officer although there is a provision in rule 6, that if a person has any objection against the counting which definitely includes the method of voting he can raise objection and in such a situation the Presiding Officer shall be obliged to order recounting. No such objection was taken in favour of the appellant particularly when 14' members after voting in favour of the motion of no-confidence appeared before the learned Single Judge, engaged a learned counsel and categorically took the stand that the appellant is not entitled to remain as a Chairman of the Town Committee inasmuch as he has lost the confidence of the house. Hence, the judgment of the learned Single Judge is unexceptionable.
10. ' Resultantly, these two Intra-Court Appeals have no force and the same are, therefore, dismissed in limine.