1. ORDER S. A. Mahmood (Chairman).--By this appeal under section 8(1) of the Punjab Civil Services (Appellate Tribunal) Ordinance, 1970, Rana Gulzar Ahmad appellant, who is now Accounts Clerk prays that the impugned seniority list circulated on 7-6-72 as on 1-1-72 may be quashed and the appellant be placed at the serial No. 3 of the said list with retrospective effect. He thereby intends to claim seniority over respondents Nos. 2 to 14 in the rank of Accounts Clerk. The appellant is present alongwith. Mr. M. A. Faridi, Advocate. Mr. Usman Ghani, Superintendent appears on behalf of the Commissioner Sargodha Division respondent No. 1. Out of respondents No. 2 to 14, Messrs Fazal Din and Zafar Yasin, respondents Nos. 2 and 10 are only present. The remaining respondents are absent in spite of service. The appellant was appointed as Junior Clerk in the office of Deputy Commissioner Jhang on 7-1-46. He was made substantive provisional order by order of 23-11-56.
2. He became substantive permanent Junior Clerk with effect from 11-6-63. He had worked in the Treasury Office, Jhang District. Since 25-8-47, and was working in the Treasury Office at Jhang on 7-5-62, when the posts in the old set-up of District Treasury Service were abolished with effect from 6-5-62, and an equal number of the posts in the re-organised set-up known as the Treasury and Accounts Service were created from 7-5-62, which is the date when the West Pakistan Subordinate Treasury and Accounts Service Rules, 1962 were promulgated in respect of the new service. When options were invited from those who were working in the District Treasury Service, the appellant gave his option in favour of his appointment in the new set-up. By order of 10-1-63, he was appointed as Accounts Clerk with effect from 7-5-62 on one year's probation. As he was working in the Treasury from 25-8-47, he> is to be deemed to have taken over as Accounts Clerk from 7-5-62.
3. The appellant as well as Mr. Manzoor Hussain, respondent No. l2 belong to the District Treasury Service of J hang, which under the Punjab District Subordinate Service Rules, 1942 was constituted on District basis, so that the cadre of each district of the Subordinate Service was separate. While in the case of the appellant, he was appointed as Junior Clerk on 7-1-46, Mr. Manzoor Hussain respondent No. l2, was appointed on 1-4-47, but the latter was confirmed substantively from 17- 8- 60, while the appellant became substantive permanent on 11-6-63. If these dates be correct, then under rule I6 of the Punjab Subordinate Service Rules, 1942, Mr. Manzoor Hussain, respondent No. l2, would be senior to the appellant in the cadre of Junior Clerks of the Jhang District. There is, however, a dispute about the date of confirmation of Mr. Manzoor Hussain, respondent No. l2. The appellant claims that he was senior to him in the rank of Junior Clerk in the Jhang District, and in this connection he has relied on the seniority list of Jhang District, corrected up to 1-1-60, in which Mr. Manzoor Hussain respondent No. l2, was shown junior to the appellant. We were asked to leave the question of date of confirmation of this respondent open and direct that their inter se seniority may be determined on the basis of their actual dates of substantive appointment as Junior Clerk. It is argued that whoever is substantively confirmed earlier, shall rank senior. In this connection, it is argued on behalf of the appellant that his date of substantive appointment should be considered as 23-11-56 when he was made provisional substantive, but we cannot accept this date as the date of substantive appointment for purposes of rule I6. We, however, find from the order of Deputy Commissioner Jhang, dated 6-7-63 that while the appelant was made substantive permanent as Junior Clerk with effect from 11-6-63, this respondent was made provisional permanent Junior Clerk from the same date. It, therefore, follows that Mr. Manzoor Hussain, respondent No. l2 was not made substantive permanent from 17-8-60, which is the date assigned to him of confirmation in the seniority list. It, therefore, appears that the appellant was senior to him in the District Subordinate Cadre of Jhang District. It is obvious to us that when the old District Treasury Service was abolished from 6-5-62 and equal number of posts were created in the new set-up of the Treasury and Accounts Service under the 1962 rules. It was a case of re-organization and the staff having been recruited by transfer from other offices, they are entitled to count their previous service as Junior Clerk in the new set-up, as we have held in the cases of Mr. Ali Ahmad and Rana Muhammad Iqbal (Case No. 219/ 147 of 1972 and No. 220/148 of 1972), decided by us on 12th and 13th December, 1972.
4. In the case of re-organization and transfer in the public interest from one department to another the principle of seniority applicable is the date of continuous appointment in the grade from which a person is transferred. On this basis, the appellant and respondents are entitled to count their date of continuous appointment in the grade of Junior Clerk as the basis of their inter se seniority.
5. In this case we find that the appellant as well as the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 have been appointed to the new set-up as Accounts Clerk with effect from the same date, namely, 7-5-62. As such, their date of continuous appointment in the new set-up is the same. We have, therefore to find some other basis on which their inter se seniority should be decided. The most equitable and just basis of determination of their inter se seniority, since they were drawn from different offices in the grade of Junior Clerk, is the date of continuous appointment subject to the condition that those who had attained a higher rank will remain senior to those who were Junior Clerks. Whether the principle of re-organization as laid down by the S & GAD or the principle of induction into the grade of Junior Clerk as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Khushi Muhammad is taken, the earlier date of continuous appointment will entitle a person to seniority over those appointed later.
6. Applying this principle we find that Messrs Fazal Din, Bashir Ahmad Bhatti, Hafiz Mian Muhammad, Malik, Muhammad Aslam, Noor Muhammad, Gulzar Ahmad and Muhammad Akbar Khan, respondents were appointed earlier as Junior Clerks and as such are entitled to rank senior to the appellant in the new set-up. In respect of Mr. Fazal Din, respondent No. 2, it may be mentioned that though he was appointed on 19-6-46, the date assigned to him on the basis of war service rendered by him is 21-2-40 which is earlier than the date of appointment of the appellant as Junior Clerk. He was also Senior Clerk on 7-5-62. Thus in these circumstances the appellant does not now claim seniority over these respondents Messrs Fazal Din, Bashir Ahmad Bhatti and Zafar Yasin, respondents were Senior Clerks on 7-5-62. Therefore, they being in a higher grade on 7-5-62, the date of their joining the new set-up, they are entitled to rank senior to the appellant, who was a Junior Clerk. There remain the cases of Messrs Muhammad Afzal, Faiz Ullah, Bahawal Khan and Gul Muhammad, respondents who were appointed later than the appellant. Of these, Mr. Gul Muhammad, respondent No. 14, was appointed substantively permanent on the same day, namely, 11-6-63 as Junior Clerk as tne appellant was. He is shown senior to the appellant in the impugned seniority list, but on the application of rule 16(c) () of the Punjab 1942 Rules, which provides that persons appointed substantively by direct recruitment on the same J date, an older member shall be senior to a younger member, the appellant, being older, will be senior to Mr. Gul Muhammad, who is younger to him in age. We, therefore, hold the appellant to be senior to Messrs Muhammad Afzal, Faiz Ullah, Bahawal Khan and Gul Muhammad respondents. We have already held Mr. Manzoor Hussain, respondent to be Junior to the appellant. For the reasons stated above, we declare the appellant senior to Messrs Muhammad Afzal, Faiz Ullah, Manzoor Hussain, Bahawal Khan and Gul Muhammad respondents but he cannot be declared senior to the remaining respondents. We accept this appeal to that extent, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The security deposit made by the appellant shall be restored to him.