1. ' This is an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Whereby the plaintiff seeks to restrain the defendants from interfering with the normal running of the school of the plaintiff or taking any action for resumption of the said school building.
2. ' The plaintiff No,2 claims to be the owner of Plot No,X-30/H, 19th East Street, Phase-I, Defence Housing Authority and in the building that he constructed on that plot he is running a school. It is alleged that as the defendants No,2 and 3 threatened to close down the school and take over the building of the school by force the plaintiffs filed in this Court Suit No,362/89 for declaration and permanent injunction, which suit was, admittedly disposed of by order dated 15-5-1989. It is contended by Mr. Abul Khair, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, that in May, 1992 the defendants threatened to close down the said school and tried to interfere with its working. He states that the earlier suit is no bar to the present application; ' Mr. Nazar Hussain Dhoon, the learned counsel for the defendants Nos,2 and 3, strongly refutes the contention of Mr. Abul Khair. According to him the present suit relates to same matters as were agitated in the earlier suit and were disposed of by the above order.
3. ' I called for the file of the ealier Suit No,362 of 1989. A reading of the plaint of that suit shows that the grievance of the plaintiff was the threatened interference by the defendant Authority in the running of the said school and the cancellation of the lease of the plot. The relief, claimed in that suit was: "(i) Declaring the defendants notices Nos, above are illegal, arbitrary and invalid ab initio.
(ii) The defendants 1 to 3, their servants, agents, officers, employees, attorneys under them and their influence from interfering with the normal running of the school of the plaintiff known as Model Public High School, Defence Society from the premises at X/30/II, 19th East, Street, Phase I, Defence Housing Society in any manner whatsoever.
(iii) Cost of the suit.
(iv) Any other relief/reliefs plaintiff may be found entitled to."
4. ' It may be mentioned that the notices referred above related to the cancellation of the plot on the ground that the residential premises were being used for commercial purposes. That suit appears to have been compromised and by order dated 15-5-1989 it was dismissed as withdrawn with consent of both the parties. The said order reads as follows: "Learned counsel jointly stated that the disputes between them have been settled and that the defendant authority has offered a commercial plot to the plaintiff society on reasonable terms or alternatively option has been given to pass over the students Incharge of the plaintiff Society to the Defence Housing Authority for being accommodated in the educational institution to be started by the latter. All that remains to be done is for the plaintiff to exercise one of these options which will take some time and on that basis the plot on which the present educational activities are going on would be revived on payment of restoration fees.
5. ' In these circumstances while formal matters regarding the above settlement still await to be gone through the learned counsel for the plaintiff is satisfied with the arrangement and therefore, withdraws this suit to which Mr. Nazar Hussain Dhoon has no objection. As such the suit is dismissed as withdrawn with no order as to costs. C.MA. 2418/89 having become infructuous also stands dismissed."
6. ' The abovementioned CMA 2418/89 was an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 seeking to restrain the defendant Authority and its Secretary from interfering with the normal working of the plaintiff school. It is thus clear that the main grievance of the plaintiff in the earlier suit related to the cancellation of the plot and the interference by the Authority in the running of the said school.
7. The suit stood dismissed as withdrawn unconditionally, and, therefore, the plaintiff is precluded from instituting a fresh suit in respect of the subject-matter of the earlier suit.
8. ' In the present suit, although some other reliefs have been claimed but in so far as the present application is concerned that clearly relates to the subject-matter agitated in the earlier suit and disposed of by the consent order inasmuch as in this application the plaintiff seeks to restrain the Authority and its Secretary from interfering with the normal running of the said school and taking action for resuming the building both grievances being covered by the notices on which the earlier suit was based.
9. ' The defendants' counsel has stated that in pursuance of the aforesaid order dated 15-5-1989 passed in the earlier suit the defendants Nos,2 and 3 had offered the plaintiff a plot as well as the option of passing over the students of the plaintiff Society to the educational institution of the.
10. Authority. He stated that the plot was offered at the prevailing rate of Rs,1,800 per sq. Yd. And this price at the request of the plaintiff, as a special case, was reduced to Rs,1,500 per sq.Yd. As regards the accommodating of the plaintiff's students in the educational institution of the Authority he stated that the Authority is prepared to accommodate in its educational institution in the same Phase-I both, the boys and girls of the plaintiff's school. He further stated that as observed in the aforesaid order the defendant Authority is still willing to revive the plot on payment of restoration fee.
11. ' Learned counsel for the plaintiff does not deny that a plot had been offered by the Authority but states that its price was too high. With regard to the cancellation of the plot his submission is that the same cannot be cancelled as held in the case of Munammad Arshad Jalil v. Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority and another reported in PLD 1992 Karachi 304.
12. ' Mr. Nazar Hussain Dhoon distinguishes the above case from the present case on the ground that in the reported case no notice had been issued and that was a case where a formal lease-deed had been issued while in the present case notices had been issued before taking action and a formal lease had still not been issued. Be that as it may, the fact remains that in the earlier suit the consent order had dealt with this aspect of the case. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to agitate the same matter over and over again and thus frustrate the provision of law and the order of this Court passed in the earlier suit. Different expression may have been employed in the earlier suit from that in the present application but the subject-matter is the same.
13. ' Accordingly, in my view, the present application relates to a matter forming part of the earlier suit and disposed of by the aforesaid order dated 15-5-1989 passed in that suit. That being so, I find no force in the application and dismiss the same.
14. ' At this stage, Mr. Abul 'Khair requests that status quo may be continued for a week's time to enable him to file an appeal. Normally such a request cannot be entertained after the disposal of the application but in the circumstances of the case it is ordered that the status quo order passed earlier will continue to remain effective till 8-12-1992 and stand vacated on 9-12-1992.
2. Adjourned to a date in office.
3. Mr. Nazar Hussain Dhoon does not press this application which is dismissed as not pressed.