' This second appeal is directed against order, dated 30-7-1990 passed by learned Addl. District Judge, Sheikhupura whereby the appeal filed by the appellant against order passed by learned Rent Controller, dated 10-5-1990 accepting the ejectment petition of the respondent, has been dismissed.
2. The appellant is admittedly occupying the shop in dispute as tenant under the respondent. The respondent filed an ejectment petition on 13-11-1988 seeking the eviction of the appellant on the ground of personal need. Neither the ejectment petition nor the Vakalatnama had been signed by the respondent whereas both these documents were signed by her father. The written-statement was filed by the appellant on 16-1-1989 in which no such objection was specifically raised that both these documents had not been signed by the respondent.
3. The evidence of A.W.1 one of the witnesses of respondent was recorded on 13-2-1989 whereas the statement of attorney of respondent as witness of respondent was recorded as A.W.2 on 6-3-1989.
The power of attorney was executed in favour of her father by the respondent on 31-1-1989 which was produced in evidence as Ext. A2, therefore, it is evident from this that on the date of institution of ejectment petition the father of the respondent had not been constituted as attorney by the respondent through any written document.
4. However, on 22-7-1989, an application was moved on behalf of the respondent through an Advocate whose Vakalatnama was appended with this application which was duly signed by the respondent for permission to amend the ejectment petition to put her signatures on the same. It was specifically stated in this application that the ejectment petition had been filed on her instructions from which it is manifest that she was owning whatever the proceedings had already been taken. This application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller and the respondent put in amended ejectment petition duly signed by her.
5. In his evidence, the appellant examined Ali Muhammad as R.W.1 Abdul Majeed as R.W.2 and Muhammad Ashiq as R.W.3 and the appellant examined himself as his own witness as R.W.4.
6. The learned Rent Controller through order dated 10-5-1990 accepted the ejectment petition. He was satisfied after considering the evidence that the shop in dispute was required by the respondent bona fide in good faith for her personal need. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Sheikhupura through order, dated 30-7-1990.7.
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the Vakalatnama attached with the ejectment petition when it was originally instituted on 13-11-1988 had also not been signed by the respondent therefore the defect was not curable and the ejectment petition shall be deemed to have been instituted on the day when the amended ejectment petition duly signed by the respondent was filed in pursuance of order passed by the learned Rent Controller permitting her to file the amended ejectment petition as such whatever evidence of the respondent had already been recorded and proceedings taken stood nullified and the same could not have been taken into consideration for determining the bona fide need of the shop by respondent unless fresh evidence was recorded on her behalf. In support of this contention reliance has been placed on judgments reported as Muhammad Riaz Khan v. Sardar Rahim Dad and 12 others PLD 1990 SC (AJ&K) 13, Chunilal Bhagwanji v. Kanmal Lalchand AIR (31) 1944 Bom. 201 and The Prince Line Ltd. v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay AIR 1950 Bom.
130.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent argued that there are chain of authorities by the superior Courts that non-signing of plaint as well as Vakalatnama was mere irregularity which defect could be cured at any stage by permitting the plaintiff to put signatures on the same. He referred to judgments reported as Ismail and another v. Mst. Razia Begum and 4 others 1981 SCM R 687, Abdul Majid v. Syed Azhar Ali Shah and others PLD 1985 SC 191, Chaudhari Muhammad Ali & Co. v. Dr. Sirajul Haq and 2 others PLD 1972 Quetta 5, Haji Muhammad Rafiq v. Shahenshah Jehan Begum PLD 1987 Kar. 180, Ghulam Bahauddin Qureshi v. Mrs. Hawa Bai PLD 1979 Kar. 597, Shabbir Hussain v. Mst.
Ansar Fatima and 3 others PLD 1975 Lah. 491, Messrs Aziz Flour Mills and 2 others v. The Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 1990 CLC 1473, State Bank of Pakistan v. Jehangir Rustom Kakalia 1984 M LD 1220 and Muhammad Bibi and others v. Nawaz and others 1986 M LD 771. In the last reported case neither the plaint nor the Vakalatnama had been signed by the plaintiff.
9. In view of these reported judgments the argument that non-signing by the plaintiff of the plaint and Vakalatnama was not curable defect, has no force. As I have already observed the respondent in her application seeking permission to amend the ejectment petition to put her signatures on the same, categorically stated that the ejectment petition had been filed on her instructions therefore she rectified the proceedings already taken and owned the same as if the same, had been initiated and conducted by her therefore, there was no need to record the evidence of the petitioner over again after the amended ejectment petition was filed as the proceedings already taken were not legally defective as argued. It is firmly settled law that where the amendment in the plaint is allowed at any stage and amended plaint is filed the same does not alter the date of institution of the suit and the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted on the date when the original plaint was presented.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant then argued that the respondent being female therefore was unable to carry on any business personally as such the application was not filed bona fide. I am afraid, the argument in my opinion is plainly unsound. A landlady is not legally debarred from seeking eviction of a tenant from non-residential building for doing business. She could run the business through a servant or otherwise after acquiring services of any other person. Merely because she was a female, could not be held to be a circumstance, adversely affecting her bona fides. If the argument of learned counsel for the appellant is accepted, no female would be in a position to seek eviction of her tenant from non-residential building.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence produced by the respondent about her bona fide personal need is not sufficient to establish the bona fide personal need.
12. It is second appeal. Both the Courts below have concurrently held that they are satisfied that the respondent required the shop for her bona five personal need in good faith. It is primarily the jurisdiction of the learned Rent Controller to satisfy himself about the bona fide need of a landlord which is to be based on the material placed before him and his finding is subject to correction in appeal by the learned lower appellate Court and in second appeal such a concurrent finding of fact could only be challenged if the same had proceeded upon a misapprehension or was condemnable on any of the grounds recognized by law for maintaining second appeal. The principles as contained in section 100, C.P.C. are applicable to second appeal filed under the Rent Laws. The statement of attorney of the respondent is categorical on the point that respondent had obtained an agency for the sale of Fans and she wanted to run business in the shop. This statement was subjected to lengthy cross-examination and inspires confidence. I, after having gone through the said statement, am convinced that the ejectment petition was filed with bona fide intention and the respondent had established that she needed the shop bona fide for her personal need in good faith. The concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Courts below has not been shown to have suffered from any illegality such as misreading, misconstruction or non- reading of evidence. The evidence of the witnesses of the appellant does not establish that the respondent did not need the shop for personal need or that ejectment petition had not been filed bona fide.
13. No case has been made out for interference in the impugned orders which do not suffer from any illegality. The appeal fails which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. The appellant is granted four months time to vacate the shop failing which the respondent may execute the ejectment order.