' This judgment will dispose of R.SA. No,8 of 1993 and Civil Revision No,255 of 1993 as they arise out of the same judgment.
2. Facts of the case out of which these two matters have arisen are that Raja Muhammad Yunus son of Najeeb Ali, real brother of Raja Muhammad Yasin, appellant in R.SA. No,8 of 1993 and petitioner in Revision Petition No,255 of 1993, owned and possessed agricultural land situate in village Dhoke Reham Ali, Dakhli Adrana, Tehsil Sohawa, District Jhelum. He was co-sharer in the Khata wherein the land referred to above is situate, was an employee in Pakistan Tobacco Company and was drawing handsome pay. He died in an accident on 19-4-1989, leaving behind Mst. Zatoon Begum his widow respondent No,1, Mst. Amreen Younus and Mst. Sadia Parveen, respondents Nos,8 and 9 minor daughters, his brother Muhammad Yasin, Mst. Naseem Akhtar, Mst.
Zatoon Begum and Umatul Maroof, respondents Nos,3 to 6 and Mst. Jim Quli, who has now died, leaving behind respondents Nos,7-A to 7-C as her heiRs, After his death, Muhammad Yasin, his brother immediately after his death filed a suit C.S. No,25 of 1989 against respondent No,1 his widow on 27-5-1989 seeking a declaration to the effect that Raja Muhammad Younus deceased had divorced the defendant and therefore she is not entitled to claim any right of inheritance out of their estate left by him which consists of immovable property. In paragraph No,7 of the plaint, he has made a general allegation to the effect that immovable property has been gifted to him. In this suit except Mst. Zatoon Begum, respondent No,1, no other heir of the deceased was impleaded as a party nor it was specifically stated that Raja Muhammmad Younus during his lifetime on 19-8-1988, had orally gifted the whole land landed as well as residential property in his name and that he had executed an acknowledgement of a gift on 4-9-1988 in his favour. The alleged deed of acknowledgement dated 4-9-1988 was also not appended with the plaint nor appears to have been mentioned in the list of reliance filed in the suit. This suit was contested by respondent No,1 by filing a written statement which was filed on 6-7-1989. In the written statement plea taken by the respondent No,1 is that she has never been divorced and the suit is false and frivolous and further that the deceased had never gifted the property in question in favour of the plaintiff. During the pendency of the suit, Raja Muhammad Yasin, on 7-11-1989, filed another suit wherein he initially impleaded the respondents Nos,2 to 13 as co-plaintiffs, seeking a declaration to the effect that the respondents Nos,14 and 15, who are the Collector and Tehsildar, Jhelum are illegally refusing to sanction a mutation of gift in his favour on the basis of deed of acknowledgment of gift dated 4-9- 1988, which was executed by Muhammad Yunus in his favour and further he is owner in possession of the land in question and that the said respondent had no jurisdiction to refuse to entertain the mutation of gift and sanction the same in his name. He intentionally did not implead the respondent No,1 as a defendant who got herself impleaded by herself by filing an application as a defendant in the said suit. Subsequently, the appellant amended his plaint, became the sole plaintiff and all other co-plaintiffs were transposed as defendants. This suit was contested by the respondent No,1 by filing of written statement wherein she controverted the allegations regarding the factum of gift and her alleged divorce. It appears that the appellant managed to get a written statement filed on behalf of other defendants wherein they allegedly admitted his claim. It may be mentioned here that some of the contesting defendants were minoRs, Both the suits were consolidlated and the proceedings were held in Civil Suit No,501 of 1989 out of which. R.S.A. No,8 of 1993 has arisen and on the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following consolidated issues, were framed:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of action to file the present suit ? O.P.D.
(2) Whether the Suit No,501 is undervalued and the plaintiff has not paid proper court-fee ? O.P.D.
(3) Whether Muhammad Younus deceased gifted the suit property to the plaintiff vide gift deed dated 4-9-1988 ? O.P.P.
(4) Whether Zaitoon Begum defendant No,3 was divorced by Muhammad Younus ? O.P.P.
(5) Relief.
' In support of their respective contentions, both the parties led evidence. Plaintiff produced Muhammad Akram P.W.1, Muhammad Iqbal, P.W. 2, Addalat Khan, P.W. 3 and himself appeared as P.W.
4. Besides oral evidence, plaintiff produced a photo copy of divorce deed Exh. P.1, deed of acknowledgement of gift Exh. P.2, copy of an order passed by the Chairman, Union Council, Exh. P3 and closed his case. As against the above case, the respondent No,1 produced in evidence Muhammad Iqbal, D.W.1, Secretary Union Council, Rajwali Khan D.W. 2 and Gul Zameer Kiani, D.W. 3 and herself appeared as D.W.
4. After scanning the whole evidence produced in the case, learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29-6-1992 dismissed both the suits. Issue No,1 was held in favour of the plaintiff, issue No,2 was decided against him and he was directed to make up the deficiency of payment of court- fee. Issues Nos,3, 4 have been decided against him and it has been held that no gift has been proved to have been made in favour of the plaintiff and that Mst. Zaitoon Begum has not been proved to have been divorced by her husband during his lifetime.
3. Aggrieved of these two judgments, plaintiff filed two regular first appeals challenging both the judgments and decree passed in the suits filed by him. Both the appeals have been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Jhelum vide judgment and decree dated 17-4-1993. Findings of the learned trial Court on all the issues have been upheld. Plaintiff in both the suits has filed Regular Second Appeal No,8 'of 1993 and Civil Revision No,255 of 1993 respectively to challenge the aforementioned consolidated judgments and decrees. Regular Second Appeal No,8 of 1993 was admitted to regular hearing whereas Civil Revision No,255/1993 is still at motion stage. Both the matters have been heard together.
4. Mr. Muhammad Younus Bhatti, Advocate has appeared on behalf of Raja Muhammad Yasin, Appellant, in both the matters, and has vehemently argued that both the Courts below have illegally excluded from consideration evidence produced by the plaintiff merely on the ground that the witnesses are tenants of the plaintiff. Hence, two Courts below have exercised jurisdiction illegally and with a material irregularity. Learned counsel has placed reliance on case of Khalid Javed v. The State 1984 PCr.LJ 100. Learned counsel has further contended that there is sufficient evidence on the record that the deceased who was real brother of the plaintiff had gifted the property in question which is in his possession and that he had divorced the respondent No,1 during his lifetime but the two Courts below by wrong appreciation of evidence have decided issues Nos,3 and 4 against the plaintiff, and, have dismissed the suit, therefore, impugned judgments and decree are erroneous in law and are liable to be set aside. Learned counsel further contended that the suit was admitted by the respondents Nos,2 to 13 and therefore the plaintiff was entitled to grant of decree against them but the two learned Courts below dismissed the suit in toto and, hence have committed an error of law.
5. Raja Irfan Aziz, Advocate, has appeared on behalf of respondent No,1 and has vehemently opposed the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the appellant and has contended that the impugned judgments and decree are unexceptionable and hence, not to be interfered with by this Court. None has appeared on behalf of other respondents.
6. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. Admittedly, the deceased was 42 years of age at the time of his accidental death. He was employeed in Pakistan Tobacco Company and was getting a handsome pay. He had his wife and two minor daughteRs, He was living in his own house till the time of his death. He was not suffering from any ailment. No evidence has been led in this case to prove that on account of what services rendered by plaintiff, he took a decision to gift whole of his property which he needed for himself and his living family members and which had to be inherited by his heirs after his death. It is very strange that in the earlier Suit No,253/89 which was filed immediately after the accidental death of the deceased, no mention of a deed of acknowledgement of the gift has been made nor any details about the gifting of the property in question have been given in the subsequent suit. Except respondent No,1 no other heir of the deceased was impleaded as a defendant. Subsequent suit was filed by the plaintiff by impleading other heirs of the deceased as co-plaintiffs which includes the minor daughters of the deceased as well without impleading the respondent No,1 as a defendant. Subsequently, however, they Were transposed as defendants, initially respondent No,1 even was not impleaded as a defendant. She got herself impleaded by making an application. It appears that the subsequent suit was intended to be decreed uncontested by the official defendants who initially were the only defendants in the suit. No other circumstance has also been brought on record as to why the deceased thought it necessary to transfer whole of his agricultural property as well as residential house in favour of the plaintiff. No cogent evidence of delivery of possession is produced in the case. The transaction itself is so unnatural that there is a strong probability against its genuineness. Under the law circumstantial evidence and a probability is a strong piece of evidence which can be relied upon while deciding a matter in issue. Plea raised by the respondent No,1 that she was turned out of her husband's house, after death of her husband and the minor daughters were snatched and thereafter hetic effort has been made by the plaintiff to grab the whole property left by the deceased is most probable, as held in the following cases. Case of Said Wali v. Yaqoot Khan and another (PLD 1983 SC 440, at page 441 of the report). It has been held as under: "The inferences drawn from the matters placed before the Court could be drawn by a "prudent man" so as to hold that the transactions in question" were in reality exchanges even if the Court was to give a decision on "probabilities" as contended; because, according to the defmition of "proved" a fact is said to be poved "when after considering the matter before it the Court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists."
' In case of State v. Habibur Rehman and others (PLD 1983 SC 286 at pages 288 and 289 of the resport) it has been held as under:-- "It is most painful to see very close relations pitched against each other in this case. No doubt both sides, it seems from record and admissions, are highly influential parties. It might have been due to this that attemps seem to have been made to divert the smooth flow of stream of justice, at the initial stage before the trial. There is sufficient guideline in the governing precedent and the law, that the Courts would not be deterred by reaching their own correct conclusions notwithstanding the incompleteness of stories, statements, and records from either side---private or public, individual or otherwise. It is also natural (besides danger of aforementioned influences) that in cases involving deep enmity or even strong adversary/partisan positions that each side would be interested in withholding that part of the case which goes against it. It is for this vital reason amongst others, that the legislature duly provided the following definition of, what the Courts would hold as, "proved"; section 3 of Evidence Act reads: "Proved---A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that . a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists."
' It is significant that in this definition one requirement is of consideration of all matters which carries a wider connotation; wider than "evidence", its "statements" and the "documents".
Circumstantial deduction reaching "probability" is a mental cognition which leads to "supposition' regarding existence of a fact. This the law permits as an alternative to positive "belief' in its existence. "Probability" is not lower than "likelihood": which is higher than a mere possibility, a surmise or a conjecture. And it is not a very difficult task to distinguish a "probability" from conjecture and even possibility. Thus the Courts when applying some artificial rules of appreciation of evidence, which do not form part of statutory guidance, must also attach due and purposeful importance to the above aspect of a statutory mandate. It will be of some advantage to conclude this by reproducing from Monies Law of Evidence (1974 Edition, page 27)". The authors of the Evidence Act in their wisdom did not mention the term "evidence" while defining the words "proved" and "disproved"; evidence means only statements and documents. The Court is therefore not bound to look for its findings on the "evidence" alone as defined in the Evidence Act, but has to see to the high probabilities regarding the existence or non-existence of a fact after considering "the matters before the Court".
' In case of Fazle Ghafoor v. Chairman, Tribunal Land Disputes, Dir, Swat and Chitral at Mardan and 6 others (1993 SCMR 1073) at pages 1076 and 1077 of the report, it has been held as under:- "As has already been mentioned there is always a feeling in such like cases that the concrete evidence for giving final clear findings was neither before lower authorities nor before the High Court. Mostly the decisions are rendered on the high probability principle and there is nothing wrong in doing so provided the material available was in the circumstances before the forum concerned and or it was noticed in the orders concerned. Even under the Evidence Act this recourse is possible where the evidence as defined in the said Act is not forthcoming. And judgment regarding 'proof' of a certain fact could be rendered 'if after considering the "matters" before it, the Court considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the.
Circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists'."
' See the cases of The State v. Habibur Rehman (PLD 1983 SC 286), Saidwali v. Yaqoot Khan (PLD 1983 SC 440) and Muhammad Arshad v. The State (1992 SCMR 1187).
The word "evidence" has been defined but the word 'matters' which could include evidence as defined as well as other matters did not fall strictly within the scope of evidence. In the cases, like the present one the matters would include the material as well which would fall within the scope of mixed facts and law. Amongst others, they will also include documents, presumptions, statements, which might otherwise benot included in the strict scope of evidence. The selection of word `matters' instead of evidence when defining proof, by the legislature its widsom, was perhaps to decide a large number of cases of this nature wherein evidence in stricto senso would not be available."
' The witnesses which have been produced in favour of the transaction are admittedly tenants of the plaintiff and are inimical to Raj Wali a close relation of respondent No,1. Their evidence has been rejected on the ground that they being tenants and inimical towards the respondent No,1 are interested persons and therefore their evidence cannot be believed. This exclusion is quite in accordance with law keeping in view the aforementioned strong probabilities and circumstances.
Case of 'Said Wall' referred to by the learned counsel for the plaintiff is distinguishable on facts and is not at all attracted in the case in hand, particularly, when it relates to administration of justice in criminal cases where the mode of assessment of evidence is a little bit different. Similarly, evidence regarding divorce has also been rejected for cogent reasons. Under the provisions of Muslims Law Ordinance, 1961, unless and until a divorce is routed through the Union Council within whose territorial limits his wife resides and is processed in accordance with law and the rules framed under the aforementioned Ordinance, it does not become effective. In the case in hand, the alleged divorce had neither been routed through the Chairman, Union Council nor is processed in accordance with law hence cannot be held to have become ineffective. Living of the deceased with his wife in the same house till the time of his death is another very strong circumstance to disprove divorce inasmuch as a validly pronounced Talaq can be withdrawn even by implication. It is not understandable as to why the deceased should divorce his wife as there is no evidence on record that he had strained relations with her. Consequently, it has rightly been held on the basis of the statement of the Secretary of the Union Council and other evidence that respondent No,1 was never divorced by her husband. The transaction in question from another angle is also not maintainable. No gift can be created or pleaded sole intention for creation whereof is to deprive the heirs to inherit the property of their predecessor against the expected devolution as contemplated by the 'Holy Qur'an'. The whole effort on the death of the last male owner appears to be the deprivation of the heirs of the deceased to inherit the property in question and therefore it is on the face of it a sham and void transaction. It has been held in case of Sardar Ahmad Khan and another v. Mst. Zamroot Jan (PLD 1950 Peshawar 45) at pages 49, 50 and 51 as under:-- "This gift deed however, in my view, is bad on account of the fact that in executing it Mian Muhammad wanted to disinherit Tila Muhammad rather than give away the property to his minor grandsons. It is also bad on account of the fact that it is not a completed gift. A reference has already been made to the contents of the will, which Mian Muhammad made on the 12th of June 1943, seventeen days after the execution of the gift deed, in which he made it perfectly clear that he was extremely annoyed with Tila Muhammad and did not want him to inherit any of his property. Muhammad Ayub, who had been working with Mian Muhammad and Faqir Muhammad, the sister's son of Mian Muhammad, the decree-holder's witnesses, have specifically stated on solemn affirmation that Mian Muhammad executed the gift deed in order to disinherit his son Tila Muhammad. There is no reason why should Faqir Muhammad favour Mst. Zamroot Jan more than his cousin's sons, the two grandsons of Mian Muhammad. The statements of these witnesses are materially corroborated by what Mian Muhammad himself said about Tila Muhammad in the will.
The evidence, produced by the judgment-debtors, also corroborates, though not directly, the statements of these witnesses. They produced Mst. Sifat Jan, Mirza Abdul Hakim, Gul Muhammad, a brohter of Mian Muhammad and Mst. Amir Begum. The mother of two minors, Mst. Sifat Jan stated that Mian Muhammad disinherited Tila Muhammad because the entire immovable property had been purchased with the earnings of Agha Muhammad, which obviously is incorrect, because Mian Muhammad himself stated in the gift deed that the immovable property was not only acquired by him, but was also constructed by him at his own expense. Mirze Abdul Hakim, a deed writer, stated that Mian Muhammad made the gift of his property, because he wanted to disinherit Tila Muhammad Gul Muhammad, the brohter of Mian Muhammad, also said in his evidence that Mian Muhammad disinherited Tila Muhammad, because he had already given him enough. It is significant that none of these witnesses, nor Mst. Amir Begum alleged that Mian Muhammad gifted the property in favour of his grandsons as a token of his love and affection, or for their miantenance and education. An intelligent study of the Muslim Law regarding the testamentary disposition possessed by a Muslim will show that it is the policy of the Muslim Jurists to prevent any interference with the course of devolution of property amongst the testator's heirs as laid down in the Holy Qur'an. The law would be the same if a certain transaction, though on the face of it, a gift, is in fact a device to deprive a lawful heir of his share in the property. No person can be permitted to defeat the object of Muslim Law by entering into such colourable transactions. It is an admitted principle of law that a gift intended to defeat or defraud the creditor is voidable. On the same principle a gift intended to disinherit an heir would be a sham transaction, and, therefore, nugatory.
The gift in order to be effective should be genuine transaction and not merley a plan to achieve some ulterior object. It is true that the necessary effect of almost all the gifts will be disinheritance of .One or the other of the heirs of the donor but then it should be the effect and not the real object of the gift. If the real object of the gift is disinheritance of an heir, it will be, in my opinion, bad in law.
This view to some extent gets support from Chaudhary Mehdi Hassan and others v. Muhammad Hasan, decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council and reported in 28 All. (ILR) page 439. In this case a gift deed was held to be fictitious and benami, and therefore invalid and void. During the course of the judgment their Lordships observed as under:-- `By the Muhammadan Law (by which the present case is govened) a holder of property may in his lifetime give away the whole or part of his property if he complies with certain forms; but it is incumbent upon those who seek to set up such a transaction to show very clearly that those forms have been complied with. It may be by deed of gift simply, or by deed of gift coupled with consideration. If the former, unless accompanied by delivery of the thing given so far as It is capable of delivery, it is invalid. If the latter (in which case delivery of possession is not necessary) actual payment of the consideration must be proved, and the bona fide intention of the donor to divest himself in praesenti of the property, and to confer it upon the donee must also he proved'.
The learned counsel for the appellant has cited 11 Moore' Indian Appeals page 517 (Nawab Unjad Ally Khan v. Mst. Mohamdee Begum and others). This case has absolutely no relevency to the facts of the present case. It was a case where a father of the Shia sect had gifted Government Promissory Notes to his son. The gift was accompanied by delivery of possession and transafer into the son's name. Their Lordships held that the law of succession abintestate applies only to the assets which constitute the succession.
55 Bom. (ILR) page 238 has also been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this case also the intention of the donor was to disinherit one of his sons, but then the gift was completed by the delivery of possession to the donee, and their Lordships held that the gift was perfectly a valid document. They did not get into the question whether if the intention of the donor was to disinherit a particular person, the gift would still be valid or void. Apart from the fact that it is abundantly clear on the record that the real object of Mian Muhammad in executing this gift was to deprive Tila Muhammad of his legal share in his property after Mian Muhammad's death, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the gilt was imperfect, and Mian Muhammad did not divest himself in praesenti of his ownership in the subject-matter of the gift. In the gift deed just at the end it is noted that the property was being gifted to the minors through one Muhammad Ayub. There is nothing on the record to show as to who this Muhammad Ayub is. No effort has been made to produce this person in the witness-box to show that he took the possession of the property from Mian Muhammad on behalf of the minors after the execution of the gift deed. There is no other evidence produced to show that Mian Muhammad handed over the possession of the gifted property to any one for the minoRs, Normally Mian Muhammad being the grandfather was the natural guardian of his minor grandsons and it was not necessary for him to hand over the possession of the property to the minors, but then he himself chose to name a person, who was to do the needful in order to complete the gift. Under the circumstances it was necessary that he should have handed over the possession to that person. The evidence that Mian Muhammad after the gift left the house and started living with his brother Gul Muhammad is to say the least absolutely unreliable. It has been stated by Gul Muhammad, the judgment-debtors' witness, and admitted by Mst. Amir Begum their mother, in their respective statements that Tila Muhammad died in his paternal house, which shows that Tila Muhammad continued to live in one of the two gifted houses until his death. If the gift were a completed transaction, Tila Muhammad would have been the first person who would have been turned out of the house and not Mian Muhammad.
Faqir Muhammad, the decree-holder's witness, has stated with regard to the other property that he used to realize its rent for Mian Muhammad, which shows that Mian Muhammad remained in possession of the entire property even after the gift. The judgment-debtors have made no effort to prove that they or anybody else on their behalf recovered the rent of the gifted property. Mst. Amir Begum in her statement said that Abdul Rehman, brother of Faqir Muhammad used to collect rent for the minoRs, Abdul Rehman has not been put into the witness-box. So the only evidence on the point is the statement of Faqir Muhammad P.W., which, as has already been remarked, I have no reason to disbelieve".
In case of Amir Chand v. Fajroo (PLD 1991 SC 1001 at pages 1003 and 1004 of the report) it has been held as under:-- "We have heard both the learned counsel at considerable length and have also gone through the record. It is unfortunate that some of the very important pieces of evidence having substantial effect one way or the other have not been correctly read. The appellant in his statement had made two categorical statements. One, that the possession of the land in dispute notwithstanding the gift claimed by the respondent of 5/6th share in the property in dispute, was not with the donee. This was not a bare statement of possession. The appellant/donor had also asserted that he had installed a tubewell in the land. This part of the statement of the donor/appellant was not at all properly challenged in cross-examination. Any explanation worth the name neither in the evidence nor by the learned counsel for the respondents has been given as to why the appellant himself who remains alive challenged the claim of the respondent, should have deprived his own 3 daughters (with whom there is even no allegation that he had any estrangement) of 5/6th of his property and why he should have gifted such a valuable property to somewhat remote relation; namely, the son of the brother of his wife. The remote in the sense that he has his own daughters and also children from his own daughteRs, The only explanation that the donor had treated the respondent as his runs counter to the principles of Islam on the question of adoption as well as Islam to the principles regarding protection of the interest of female relations in Islam as elaborately dealt with in the case of Ghulam All v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1).
One of the respondent's witnesses admitted that when he appeared the possession of the land alleged to have been gifted to the respondent was with the appellant. The explanation that he had turned the respondent out from the land as if forcibly does not at all fit in with the story relating to the gift. Learned counsel for the respondents repeatedly emphasized the point that there was no reason for the revenue authorities to have entered a wrong mutation regarding gift and also having attested it. Although we are not concerned with how and why it has happened, the learned counsel failed to explain why the appellant could have made the gift by depriving his own 3 daughteRs, The mutations by the revenue authorities unless they were also cheated by some contrivance need not be gone into any further. Another possible explanation that the appellant/donor might have fallen out with the daughters on account of the behaviour of his sons- in-law is also untenable. If it is so then the gift in the same mutation to daughters becomes unexplainable. The donor himself who is alive has disowned the gift. The delivery of possession to the respondent has not been established. The circumstances failry strong, lead to the only reasonable and irresistible inference that the appellant had not made any gift to Fajroo. It might be due to a frustration on account of any family estrangement between the two sides may be of marriages, money or property, that a fake transaction was intended to be accomplished, but the appellant having discovered it within the period of limitation though late, duly challenged it. In the light of the foregoing discussion we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree the suit of the appellant with no order as to costs."
Transfer of one's property to deprive his expected heirs even by way of will has been deprecated and there is a complete prohibition against the transfer of the whole property in Islamic Law as is clear from the following `Hadees' reported in Bokhari and Muslim which is reproduced as under:--
7. In view of the above law declared and Injunctions of Islam the judgments and decree rendered by the two Courts below on both the issues are unexceptionable and are not liable to be interfered with in this second appeal and civil revision as no case has been made out to interfere with concurrent findings of facts.
8. Last argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff to the effect that as some of the heirs of the deceased had admitted his suit therefore it should have been decreed to that extent is also misconceived. Firstly it is not established on record that female heirs have admitted his suit with their free mind and consent with availability of free advice. The written statement filed on their behalf appears to have been got filed by the plaintiff himself, as he impleaded them as co- plaintiffs initially. Consequently, written statement is not evidence in the case in hand and at any rate in view of the law declared in case of Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1) that the female E heirs having inherited the property in question due to the death of their father any consenting statement made or writing given by them will not be sufficient to hold that they have relinquished their rights in favour of the plaintiff or that they have admitted the transaction of gift as valid, therefore, I hold that the written statement filed by the other respondents wherein contents of the suit was admitted will not make any difference and as the plaintiff has failed to prove that the property has been gifted to him and that the respondent No,1 were divorced he is not entitled to the grant of decree in his favour on the basis of the title claimed by him in both the suits.
' Resultantly, I see no force in this appeal as well civil revision, and, hence both are dismissed with costs throughout.