' Respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit against the appellants and respondents Nos.3 and 5 for rendition of accounts. The said respondents were trustees of a trust known as "Pyorrhoea Cure Trust" and it was alleged that they were guilty of mismanagement of the said Trust and had also indulged in misappropriation of various amounts. In short, the following reliefs were sought by respondents Nos.] and 2 against the appellants and respondents Nos.3 to 5:--- "It is therefore, prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass judgment and decree against defendants Nos.2 to 5 for---
(a) the inquiry in affairs of defendant No,1,
(b) rendition of accounts,
(c) appointment of new trustees and Managing Trustee,
(d) vesting of trust property in proper hand,
(e) cost of the suit,
(f) any other adequate and proper relief as this Court may deem fit."
2. The suit, according to paragraph No,13 of the plaint, was valued for court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs,16,000 for the first relief and at Rs,300 for each of the remaining reliefs.
3. The appellants and respondents Nos.3 to 5 filed their respective written statements wherein an objection was raised to the jurisdiction of the learned trial Court as, according to the defendants, the suit had been under valued and if the same had been properly valued the learned trial Court would cease to have jurisdiction in the matter.
4. Admittedly, no issue was specifically framed by the learned trial Court in this regard and a preliminary decree was passed by the learned trial Court vide its judgment dated 28-3-1990.
5. Mr. Khalid Javed, learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 at the very outset has raised a preliminary objection that the appeal filed by the appellants is miserably time-barred. Admittedly, the period of limitation for filing appeal against the impugned judgment is governed by Article 156 of the Limitation Act which provides for a period of 90 days for filing an appeal to this Court and the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date on which the judgment was passed. In this regard, the endorsement made on the certified copy of the judgment shows that the appellant had applied for a copy of the same on 28-3-1990, that is to say, on the same date on which the judgment was given. Thereafter, costs were deposited by the appellants in the office and on 26-5- 1990 the copy was made ready delivered to the appellant. It is also pertinent to note that a decree was prepared on 6-5-1990. However, the appellants had already applied for its certified true copy on 28-3-1990 which was prepared and delivered to them on 26-5-1990. There is no controversy on the point that the provisions of section 12 of the Limitation Act would be applicable in the present case and therefore, time requisite for obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree is to be excluded while computing the period of limitation in the present case. The record shows that 59 days were thus to be excluded during the time when an application for obtaining a certified true copy of the judgment was filed and a copy was made ready and delivered to the appellants.
Similarly 20 days are to be excluded in case of a certified copy of the decree. However, even if this time which was requisite for obtaining certified copies of the judgment and the decree respectively is excluded from the period of limitation between the date when the judgment was passed and the decree was prepared and the date when the appeal was filed in the present case, the appeal would be miserably time-barred.
6. Mr. Riazuddin; learned counsel for the appellants although, has raised no controversy in this regard but he has nevertheless argued that the learned trial Court which has decreed the suit against appellants had no jurisdiction in the matter because the suit had been undervalued by respondents Nos.1 and 2 whereas the evidence given by respondent No,2 before the learned trial Court shows that his claim against the defendants was much higher than rupees one -lac and therefore, the suit could not be filed before the District Court at Karachi as the pecuniary jurisdiction in the matter vested in the High Court. It may be pointed out that respondent No,2 while recording his statement in the learned trial Court had stated as follows:--- ' The auditors had approached the defendants to give them the Accounts Book for the purpose of audit but the defendant did not give such facilities and therefore they were unable to proceed to conduct audit of the accounts. I produce such correspondence from Exh.13/3. The defendant closed the Trust and gave the amount of the Trust viz. 135,000 to Alkhidmat Welfare Association without my consent as a result of which I suffered a loss was caused to the Trust. Rs,40,000 lying in the bank, in the name of the bank were also misappropriated by the defendants."
7. Reliance has been placed by Mr. Riazuddin on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Province of West Pakistan v. Allanditta PLD 1972 Kar. 8 and Abdul Hamid Shami v. Abdul Majid and others 1989 M LD 2150 which was decided by the Supreme Court of India. In the first case, the plaintiff was seeking settlement of a claim and a decree for a sum of Rs,81,821.50 but he had valued his claim for the purposes of court-fee at Rs,200 only. An objection was raised and it was held that the plaintiff could not value the suit arbitrarily and he could be directed to make a reasonable valuation on the basis of his knowledge and information. If the plaintiff was aware of the extent of his claim he should then have valued the suit for the purpose of court-fees at the same amount.
Reference was made in this regard to the cases reported in AIR 1937 Sindh 241 and PLD 1959 Kar.
102. In the other case referred to by Mr. Riazuddin, the Supreme Court of India has observed that although the plaintiff is not obliged to state the exact amount in a suit for accounts, which would result after taking all the accounts and he can put a tentative valuation upon the suit but nevertheless he is not permitted to choose an unreasonable and arbitrary figure for that purpose.
8. In my view, both the cases referred to by Mr.Riazuddin are distinguishable. In the present case although during the recording of his evidence the respondent No,2 had referred to a figure of 135,000 or 40,000 in regard to which a question had been raised but the reliefs sought by the respondent in the plaint nowhere indicated that he had claimed any particular amount from the defendants. The suit was filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2 for rendition of accounts and a preliminary decree has been passed by the learned trial Court to that effect. The exact amount which might have been spent in a questionable manner by the defendants is yet to be determined.
On the other hand, when the claim is yet to be settled the plaintiff can tentatively value his plaint which was done in the present case. The question whether the learned trial Court had pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit could have been determined only when such claim was finally determinable. Mr.Riazuddin has placed reliance on the case of Hussain Bakhsh and others v.
Settlement Commissioner and another PLD -1969 Lah. 1039 wherein it was held that in case an order is without jurisdiction and void, then it need not be formally set aside, and no question would, therefore, arise of holding that the matter cannot be considered on merits on account of any bar of limitation, but in the instant case, in my opinion as the learned trial Court did not suffer from any lack of inherent jurisdiction, therefore, the contention would have no force.
9. The upshot of the discussion, therefore, is that the appeal filed by the appellant is time-barred and therefore -the same is dismissed on that ground and consequently, it would not be necessary to go into the merits of the case. The parties are left to bear their own costs in view of the questions raised.