JUDGMENT The facts which form the background are stated by counsel for the Petitioner- Corporation to be that respondent No. 3 was appointed by the District Manager, Government Transport Service, Lyallpur, on 22-7-1966 as a conductor. On 11-12-1967 he was served with a charge-sheet by the District Manager, listing the details of the acts allegedly committed by him which constituted misconduct, and he was directed to submit his explanation to the charges within seven days from the receipt of the charge-sheet. The explanation submitted by respondent No. 3 was not considered to be satisfactory by the District Manager. Accordingly an eaquiry into the alleged misconduct was held. The Enquiry Officer found respondent No. 3 guilty of the charges and recommended his dismissal from service. On the basis of the said enquiry report, the District Manager (Appointing Authority of respondent No. 3) dismissed him from the service vide his order dated 1-1-1968.
2. Aggrieved by the said order of dismissal respondent No. 3 filed an application under section 31(1) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, before the West Pakistan Industrial Court (Central Zone), Lahore on 9- 2-1968. In the application it was submitted inter alia that a number of industrial disputes between the workmen and the petitioner-Corporation namely, industrial disputes Nos. 55/65, 81/65, 9/67 and 14/67, were pending before the Industrial Court at the time of the institution of his application, in the subject-matter of which disputes the respondent was directly interested. Consequently the petitioner-Corporation had contravened the provisions of section 30 of the Ordinance in dismissing him from service during the pendency of those disputes and that the proceedings held by the Authorities before ordering bis dismissal were not legal and proper. Hence he was entitled to be re-instated in service.
3. The learned Industrial Court upheld both the above contentions. As regards the first contention it was observed that (Industrial Court) was not convinced that respondent No. 3 "was dismissed on the charge of misconduct, not connected with any Industrial Dispute". As regards the second contention it was observed that the admitted position was that a copy of the Enquiry Officer's adverse report was not supplied to respondent No. 3 before the bnal order regarding his dismissal was passed. In these circumstances the i aid respondent could not be held to have been afforded a just and reasonable opportunity for rebutting the case against him; especially the version of tho Enquiry Officer. In view of these findings the application of respondent No. 3 was accepted and the order of the District Manager dated 1-1-1968 was set aside and the petitioner-Corporation was directed to re-instate the respondent in service immediatly with full benefits. The above award was made on 23-5-1970 (Annexure 'E').
4. The petitioner, feeling aggrieved by the above award, filed an appeal- before the West Pakistan Labour Appellate Tribunal. It is noteworthy that the finding of the Industrial Court that certain Industrial Disputes were pending between the parties at the time of the submission of respondent No. 3's application under section 31(1) of the Ordinance, was not specifically challenged but only a general ground was taken to 1he effect that the application of the respondent under section 31 was not maintainable as there was no violation of section 30 of the Ordinance of 1959, without any specification of the reasons why it was not maintainable. Moreover, this objection was apparently not urged before the Appellate Tribunal because there is no reference to it in the order of the Appellate Tribunal. The sole contention raised before the Appellate Tribunal and pressed before him appears to have been that the respondent had been afforded a full opportunity to defend himself before his dismissal was ordered and that none of his rights had been infringed.
The learned Appellate Tribunal negatived the above contention holding that it was the duty of the Authority concerned to supply to the respondent a copy of the Enquiry Officer's report in order to enable him to meet the second show-cause notice and to prosecute the appeal or revision as the case may be. On this view of the matter the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed by the Appellate Tribunal vide its orderdated 28- 1-1971.
5. This writ petition has been filed to challenge the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal dated 28-1-1971 and the award of the Industrial Court dated 23-5-1970.
6. To appreciate the contention of the petitioner that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of respondent No. 3, preferred under section 31 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of sections 30 and 31 of the said Ordinance : *'30.--(1) No employer shall, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings or proceedings before a Court in respect of an industrial dispute or during the period between the conclusion of the conciliation proceedings and commencement of the proceedings before the Court, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of conciliation proceedings, nor shall he-- (?) save with the permission of the conciliation officer, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings and the period thereafter proceeding the commencement of the proceedings before the Court, and (?) save with the permission of the Court, during the pendency of the proceedings, before the Court, discharge, dismiss or otherwise punish any such workmen except for misconduct not connected with such dispute. "Section 31 : Where an employer contravenes the provisions of section 30 during the pendency of proceedings before a Court, any employee aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner to such Court and on receipt of such complaint, that Court shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were an industrial dispute'in respect of which application has been made under subsection (5) of section 5". The perusal of subsection (1) of section 30 quoted above shows that no employer can, inter alia, during the period of the commencement of proceedings before the Court in respect of an industrial dispute alter to the prejudice of the workman concerned in such disputes the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of conciliation proceedings nor can he, except with the permission of the Court, during the pendency of the proceedings before the Court dismiss any workman except for misconduct not connected with such dispute. In the present case respondent No. 3 had alleged that industrial disputes were pending between the workmen and the petitioner-Corporation before the Industrial Court in which he was directly interested. The Industrial Court also held that the employer had not convinced him that respondent No. 3 was dismissed on the charge of misconduct not connected with any industrial dispute. In these circumstances the respondent could not have been dismissed except wi'h the permission of the Court. As the dismissal of the petitioner was admittedly ordered without permission of the Industrial Court there was a contravention of section 30 of the Ordinance.
Consequently respondent No. 3 was entitled to file an application under section 31 of the Ordinance before the Industrial Court.
7. The only question, therefore, which requires consideration is whether the Industrial Court and the Appellate Tribunal were justified in holding that the employer had contravened the conditions of the service of the respondent while ordering his dismissal from service. Section 3 of the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, lay down that in every industrial or commercial establishment conditions of the employment of workmen shall be regulated in accordance with the Standing Orders. The Standing Order relevant in our present context is clause (4) of Standing Order 13. This provides that no order of dismissal shall be made "unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him. The approval of the Manager of the establishment or where there is no Manager, of the employer, is required in every case of dismissal and when circumstances appear to warrant it the Manager or the employer may institute independent enquiries before dealing with the charges against the workman.'* The Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, was repealed by the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In the said Ordinance the provisions as laid down in Standing Order 13(4) of the Ordinance of 1960 are reiterated in Standing Order 15(4). I have examined the implications of the provisions of Standing Order 15(4) while disposing of W. P. 327/S-71 which has been heard alongwilh the present writ petition, and in fact a common argument was presented on this part of the case by learned counsel for the petitioner and I have held that the terms of the above provisions, impose an obligation upon the authority to supply a copy of the Enquiry Officer's report to the emplojee being proceeded against, in a case where the employer deems it necessary to conduct an enquiry in it. I have also held that it is necessary to issue a second show-cause notice to the employee in order to afford him an opportunity to explain the adverse findings recorded against him by the Enquiry Officer. It may be mentioned that in this case the petitioner has himself taken up the position; in paragraph 6 of the writ petition, that respofident No. 3 was dismissed from service by the District Manager on the basis of the enquiry report. Hence it was all the more necessary to have furnished a copy of the enquiry report to the respondent to enable him to show cause against the findings contained in it.
8. In this view of the matter, there is no ground for interference either with the conclusions reached by the Appellate Tribunal in its order dated 28-1-1971 or with the award of the Industrial Court dated 23-5-1970.
9. It may be mentioned that respondent No. 3 had taken a preliminary objection to the effect that Mr. Fiayaz Ali Khan, Secretary to the petitioner- corporation was not a proper person to file the writ petition as he was not authorised under the Rules to file proceedings in Courts on behalf of the Road Transport Corporation and that, therefore, the petition was liable to be dismissed on that short ground. In view of the fact that I have found no force in the writ petition on the merits it is unnecessary to go into the validity of this technical objection.
10. The result is that this writ petition is dismissed, but with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.