' Facts of the case out of which this Second Appeal from Order, has arisen are that Mst. Arbila Noreen and two others, minor daughters of Dr. Bashir Ahmad, who are owners of property No,431-D, Peoples Colony, Faisalabad filed a petition for ejectment against the appellants who are occupying the same as their tenants, on the ground of need for expansion of their parents' hospital which is being run in adjacent Property No,432-D, Peoples Colony, Faisalabad, which property is insufficient for the purposes of running of hospital. This ejectment petition has been contested by the appellants on the ground that the property in question is not genuinely required for personal use and occupation by the parents of the respondents for the purposes of expansion of their hospital as they own other properties in the close vicinity which have been rented out and therefore the 'petition is liable to be dismissed. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the petition is hit by section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance? OPR.
(2) Whether the petitioners have no cause of action to bring this petition? OPR.
(3) Whether this petition is not maintainable in its present form? OPR.
(4) Whether the premises in suit are required by the petitioners in good faith for their personal needs? OPA.
(5) Relief.
' After recording of evidence, vide order dated 5-5-1991 (Rent Controller) passed an order of ejectment against the appellants on the ground of personal need as alleged in the ejectment petition. Aggrieved by this judgment, the appellants filed an appeal which has been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge/Appellate Authority, Faisalabad vide order dated 13-1-1992.
Both the learned Courts below have concurrently held after scanning of evidence that the property in dispute is required by the respondents for their personal need as alleged in the ejectment petition. These orders have been challenged in this second appeal by the appellants who are in possession of the premises as tenants under the respondents.
2. Mr. Gulzar Ahmad Qureshi, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellants whereas Mr. S.M.
Tayyab, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondents.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the premises in question are not required by the respondents for their own use and occupation and therefore no ejectment order can be passed in their favour under the provisions of section 13 of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 and further that parents of the respondents own other properties in the same locality which have not been shown to be insufficient for the purposes of expansion of their business, therefore, the ejectment petition was liable to be dismissed on this short ground inasmuch without proving that the property already owned by the respondents' parents is insufficient for the purposes of their need, no ejectment order could have been passed in favour of the respondents. In this behalf, the learned counsel has submitted an application for leading additional evidence (C.M.No,2/1992) and for placing on record copies of the assessment register from the Excise and Taxation Department, Annex. A-1 to A-4 in order to prove that the parents of the respondents own other properties in the same locality. Learned counsel in support of his arguments has relied upon case of Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan v. Messrs Chcmfabs Ltd. And 2 others (1985 CLC 982) wherein it has been held that the existing accommodation of the landlord has to be proved insufficient to obtain an order of ejectment by the landlord and further bona fides have to be proved by positive evidence.
4. Mr. S.M. Tayyab, Advocate has appeared on behalf of the respondents and has argued that need of the respondents has been Fully explained in the ejectment petition which has been proved on record by leading of positive evidence by the respondents. There is no misreading or non-reading of evidence by the two learned Courts below who have concurrently held that the premises are required by the respondents for their personal use and occupation. According to the learned counsel, the words "personal use and occupation" will also cover the needs of the parents of the minors in whose custody the minors are living inasmuch as the expansion of hospital which is owned by parents of the respondents shall definitely enure to the benefits of the minors and as such it cannot be said that the respondents have not asked for ejectment of the premises on the ground of their personal use and occupation. Learned counsel has further argued that merely because parents of the respondents own other properties in Faisalabad which are admittedly on rent and are not adjacent to the hospital owned by the respondents' parents, will not be a ground to refuse ejectment nor is it necessary to explain the factum of ownership of those properties which are definitely not owned by the respondents and even otherwise keeping in view the non- availability as well as the situation of those properties, it is irrelevant to allege and explain that respondents' parents own other properties. Learned counsel has argued that the application for additional evidence, therefore, is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. The appellants have shown absolutely no justification for non-production of the documents which they now want to produce in this Court and further the documents being irrelevant and inadmissible in evidence, cannot be allowed to be produced by way of additional evidence.
5. I have considered the arguments addressed by both the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record including the evidence in this case. Admittedly the respondents have proved their need as alleged in the ejectment petition by producing evidence on record. There is a concurrent finding of fact with regard to the existence of this need. Expansion of hospital which is owned by the respondents parents for which the premises are needed will definitely ensure for the benefit of the respondents as well and therefore it cannot be said that the present ejectment petition has not been filed on the ground of personal need of the respondents. In order to obtain an order of ejectment on the ground of personal need, it is not necessary that the landlord should himself physically do the business in the premises. He can get it done through his servants/agents or attorneys and in any case why not through the parents who are the guardians of the minors and are interested in their welfare as well as wellbeing. Merely becuase the respondents are minors is not a ground to refuse ejectment on the ground of personal need. The respondents do not own any property in the same locality and the premises in question are best suited to the need for which the same are required to be vacated inasmuch as the same are situate adjacent to the existing venue of the hospital of the respondents' parents. Merely because parents of the respondents own other properties in the city is not at all a ground to refuse ejectment to respondents who admittedly are not owners of such properties. The said properties even otherwise are in occupation of tenants as stated by the appellants themselves in their written statement, para. No,7 whereof is reproduced as under:-- "7. It is incorrect. The property in dispute is not genuinely required by the parents of the petitioners for hospital purposes as they own other properties also in the close vicinity which are also rented out, nor this property in dispute is actually required by the petitioners for their personal and legitimate use."
Consequently ownership of other properties which admittedly belong to the respondents' parents and which are on rent is not at all a valid ground to refuse ejectment. In fact this circumstance is not even relevant for the purpose of decision of the controversy in this case and therefore the application for production of additional evidence filed by the appellants is misconceived. The same is, therefore, dismissed. Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case and in no way helps them. In this case need of the respondents as alleged by them having held to have been concurrently proved, and no misreading or non-reading of evidence or other legal infirmity having been pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants, it cannot be said that the judgments rendered by the two learned Courts below are erroneous in law or on facts.
' Resultantly this second appeal is dismissed. However, the appellants are given a period of four months for vacating the premises with effect from today. The parties shall bear their own costs.