' This revision petition arises out of a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction filed by Malik Ghulam Qasim, respondent claiming ownership of Plot No,38, Block 'B', Mandi Town, Joharabad. He prayed that the order dated 7-4-1986 passed by the Deputy Secretary (Development) H.P. & E.P.
Was without jurisdiction and inoperative qua his rights. The trial Court dismissed the suit vide the judgment and decree dated 23-12-1990. However, the appeal filed by the respondent was allowed, the judgment and decree of the trial Court was set aside and the respondent's suit decreed by the learned Additional District Judge, Khushab vide his judgment and decree dated 19-10-1991.
2. The petitioner's learned counsel urged that the Deputy Secretary was competent to recall his earlier order dated 2-3-1986 on coming to know the true facts. He further submitted that the decree dated 18-12-1981 (Exh.P.3) was collusive in nature and could not be relied upon. He adds that the trial Court had rightly dismissed the respondent's suit and the appellate Court illegally reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court.
3. I am afraid, there is no substance in the arguments raised by the petitioner's learned counsel.
The disputed plot was originally allotted to Muhammad Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan by the Colonization Officer, Thal Development Authority, Joharabad on 12-8-1978 physical possession of the plot was delivered to the allottees on 15-8-1980 as is borne out from the possession report (Exh.P.9). The respondent purchased it for a sum of Rs,20,000. Subsequently dispute arose between the parties which was settled through the award of the arbitrator dated 3-12-1981. The award was made rule of the Court through the decree dated 18-12-1981. Thereafter, the department accorded approval of transfer of the plot in the name of the respondent on 16-6-1982. The respondent got possession of the plot and is in its physical possession till today. The petitioners were not parties to the proceedings which culminated in passing of the decree dated 18-12-1981 but even after coming to know the said decree, they never challenged it. The plot at one stage was resumed from the names of the allottees without affording them an opportunity of being heard. However, The resumption order was set aside and the plot restored to the allottees by the Assistant Director
(Thal) through his order dated 23-7-1980, subject to payment of Rs,300 as penalty. The said order was challenged by way of an appeal before the Deputy Secretary (Development) Department of Housing, Physical and Environmental Planning, Government of the Punjab, Lahore who dismissed it vide his order dated 2-31986. Thereafter, he reviewed his own order and recalled it vide the order dated 7-4-1986.
4. Admittedly, there is no provision for review of the order either under the Thal Development Act, 1949 or Thal Development Authority (Colonization) (Appeal and Revision) Rules, 1973. The Rules merely embody provisions relating to appeal and revision. The provisions of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 cannot be pressed into service regarding powers of review even in the light of Rule 7 of the Rules. The said rule reads as under:-- "Subject to provision of these Rules, the procedure provided in the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967, and the Rules made A thereunder shall so far as may be followed in the proceedings under these Rules."
' Obviously the proceedings under the Rules are relatable to appeals and revisions and the procedural provisions of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act may be invoked in relation thereto.
Since the power of review is conspicuously absent from the Act and the Rules the question of any proceedings in review does not arise. The right of power of review is creation of statute and cannot be exercised unless specifically provided under the law. This view finds support from the judgments in the cases of Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others (PLD 1970 SC 1) and Muzaffar Ali v. Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1981 SC 94). It was laid down in the first mentioned authority, "the right to claim review of any decision of a Court of law, like the right of appeal, is a substantive right and not a mere matter of procedure." After observing that even a right of appeal is not available unless expressly given in an enactment, it was held: "This is equally true in case of review, because both the appeal and review, though they differ in scope, are substantive rights. As such, neither of them is available unless it has been conferred by law."
' The second precedent pertains to the power of review under the provisions of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated its earlier view expressed in Hussain Bakhsh's case and further held that if there was no statutory conferment of jurisdiction of review, like jurisdiction of appeal, the theory of continuation of proceedings would be of no avail. Resultantly, the Division Bench Judgment of the High Court embodying the contrary view was set aside. In the present case, the learned Additional District Judge has rightly concluded that there being no express power of review the Deputy Secretary had no jurisdiction to recall his own earlier order.
5. It is also significant to mention that in the review petition the original allottees namely, Muhammad Khan and Dost Muhammad Khan were impleaded as respondents. Malik Ghulam Qasim, respondent whose title had been recognized by the Department in the year 1982 was not arrayed as a respondent. Thus he was condemned unheard. The order passed in review petition was liable to be struck down on this score alone. The argument that the petitioners were not parties to the decree dated 18-124981 is of no avail to them because they learnt about the said decree in the year 1982 but never came forward to challenge its validity. As mentioned above the Housing and Physical Planning Department approved transfer of plot in favour of the respondent on the basis of the said decree. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to assert that the said decree has no legal validity. The petitioners' learned counsel has failed to point out any misreading or non-reading of evidence or commission of any material irregularity by the appellate Court to justify interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.
6. For the foregoing discussion, the petition fails and is dismissed in limine.