' MAMOON KAZI, J.--- A vessel, m.v.liar' while leaving Port Qasim on or about 2-7-1990 ran aground in the approach channel of the Port after having left the port with requisite port clearance. As the vessel posed grave danger to the port and its installations, the petitioner insisted on its being salvaged by the owners thereof. Thereafter, after long-drawn negotiations between the concerned parties, permission was given to salvage the vessel. It was agreed that the salvage would be at the cost and risk of Salvage Company, respondent No,4 and, their contractors, servants, agents etc. Respondent No,5 acted as agent of the said company to carry out the salvage operation to re float the said vessel. As the vessel was fully loaded with rice cargo, it became necessary to first discharge the cargo on board. Consequently respondent No,4 employed its own labour for the purpose. This was objected to by respondent No,3 which was the then Collective Bargaining Agent for the dock workers at Port Qasim and the said respondent started interference with the discharge of the cargo. Thereafter respondent No,3 filed an application with respondent No,1 requesting that payment should be made to the workers by respondent No,5 in their capacity as agents of the principals of respondent No,4. Respondent No,1 after issuing notice to the petitioner and after hearing the parties passed an order dated 12-12-1990 holding that the dock workers had suffered a wage loss of rS,2,50,000 which was payable to them through their . Collective Bargaining Agent by the petitioner "as being the Principal Employer".
2. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order filed an appeal before the learned IVth Sindh Labour Court purporting to be under section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. However the said appeal was dismissed as it was held that the order impugned before the learned Labour Court had not been passed under the Payment of Wages Act. It is under such circumstances that the present petition has been filed before this Court by the petitioner.
' We have heard Mr. Shaiq Usmani, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Zamiruddin, learned counsel for respondent No,3 and Ch. Rashid Ahmed, learned counsel for respondent No,5.
4. The main contention of Mr. Shaiq Usmani before us has been that the order passed by the Joint Director Labour Incharge East Division, respondent No,1, is completely without lawful authority as neither the dock workers are the employees of the petitioner nor the cargo discharged by them could be regarded as a stevedoring operation. It is further contended that the dock workers, who were represented by respondent No,3, if at all had any implied contractual relationship, the same would be only with respondents Nos.4 and 5 and it was for such reason that payment was being demanded by respondent No,3 from the said respondents and not the petitioner.
5. So far as the impugned order is concerned, as is evident from the said order, the same does not appear to have been passed either under the Payment of Wages Act or any other authority of law under which the Joint Director Labour has purported to act in the matter. Furthermore, we find that apart from the fact that the petitioners have been found to be liable for the payment of rS,2,50,000, there are no directions issued in this regard making it obligatory for the petitioners to pay the said amount to the dock workers. No doubt, apparently the impugned order does not appear to have been passed under any authority of a particular provision of law, but it is obvious that the petition raises questions of fact which we are not called upon to decide in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Although we find that no counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of any of the respondents, nevertheless the relief sought in the petition, cannot be granted without first arriving at findings of fact on some of the questions raised in the present petition. We are further of the view that in view of the fact that no directions have been given by respondent No,1 to the petitioners, the order passed by the said respondent could easily have been overlooked by the petitioners, instead of challenging the same before us under Article 199 of the Constitution. However, since the petitioners have chosen to file the present petition, we have no other option but to dismiss this petition but subject to the observations made by us in this judgment. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.