1. ORDER This is an appeal by Premier Cloth Mills, Lyallpur, appellant against the decision dated 17-2- 73 of Punjab Labour Couit, Central Zone, Lahore, under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 whereby the petition of Rehmat Ali, respondent, was accepted and he was ordered to be re-instated with all back benefits within a week from the date of order. The facts of the case are that the respondent joined the appellant mills as a Chowkidar in the year 1960. Subsequently he was promoted as a checker to supervise the work of Chowkidars. In other words he was a member of security staff of the mills. On 11-9-72 he was directed by the Security Officer to check the unauthorised occupation of the residential quarters. It appears that on that very day he was absent from duty without leave for two hours and forty-five minutes. On 12-9-72 he was served with a charge-sheet Exh. P. I. containing the above allegation. On 14-9-72 he was dismissed from s-.rvice without any enquiry. Thereafter he sent a grievance notice to the management of the mills for redress of his grievance but received no reply. He then filed the present petition which was accepted as already mentioned above. The learned counsel for the appellant raised a preliminary objection that the respondent being a member of the security staff was not a workman within the meaning of section 2(0 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and as such the petition was not maintainable. The learned Court below rejected this preliminary objection on the following grounds:-- "The petitioner was charge-sheeted under Standing Order 15(3) (A) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and was dismissed from service under Standing Order 15(2) (iv) of the said Ordinance which shows that the Management treated him as a worker. Moreover, the word "worker" used in section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 means a worker as defined in that Ordinance and since the petitioner does not fall within the definition of "Employer" therefore, he is a workman within the meaning of section 2(xxviil) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The petition can, therefore, proceed." The respondent in the present case under section 25-A had brought his grievance in respect of right guaranteed or secured to him by or under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and therefore he has to establish that he is a workman under that Ordinance, otherwise he can not get any relief under that Ordinance. The mere fact, the Management of the appellant mills had charge-sheeted and dismissed the respondent from service under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 will not estop him from raising the plea that he is not a workman within the meaning of that Ordinance, because there can be no estoppel on point of law. Itp is well established principle of law that representation on a question of law does not create an estoppel. The question as to whether an order is illegal or invalid is a question of law and there can be no estoppel on such a question. Farther no estoppel can be pleaded against the directions and prohibitions enacted by statute law. Thus where the Legislature declares a contract, a transfer, or any other transaction, to be void, it can not be validated by resorting to the doctrine of estoppel. In view of the above the Management cannot be estopped from raising the plea that the respondent is not a workman within the meaning of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Now the question for determination is as to whether the respondent was a workman. According to his own evidence he was a checker who supervised the work of the other Chowkidars. In other words he was a member of security staff.
2. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that under section 2(0 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, a workman means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or re vard. Since the appellant was the member of the security staff he did not do any manual labour in the discharge of his duties. The learned counsel relied on the definition of labour given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, according to which labour is defined as manual labour and not manual work. The true meaning of the labour is that which tests a man's muscles and sinews. Thus according to him a member of security staff is not a workman because in the discharge of his duties he does not employ his muscles and sinews. In support of his contention the learned counsel relied on the judgments of Industrial Courts in cases:-- Sind Cement Workers* Union, Rohri v. The Manager, Rohri Cement Works Ltd., Rohri (1), Pak Dyes & Chemicals Employees* Union v. Pak Dyes & Chemicals Ltd., Daudkhel (2), Mohammad Ishaq and another v. Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi (3), Roshan Din Cheema v. Chairman, Railway Board, Lahore (4) and Pfizer Employees* Union v. Mjs. Pfizer Laboratories Ltd., Karachi (5), wherein it was held that a member of security staff or a watchman was not a workman. I have gone through all these cases and find that they all relate to section 2 of Industrial Disputes Ordinance (LVI of 1959) and not to the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In view of the latest Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 all doubts on this point have been dissolved. "Workman" as per definition contained in section 2(xxviii) of this Ordinance covers all employees of Industrial Establishment, whatever the nature of their duties, and include employees who have been discharged in connection with an industrial dispute or whose discharge has led to that dispute. Therefore a member of security staff or a watchman will be covered by the above definition of a workman. In other words he would be held to be a workman. I am fortified in this view by the unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in the case . (5) 1964 PLC 671 (1) 1964 PLC 102
(3) 1964 PLC 332 (2) 1965 FLC 92 (4) 1967PLC444 The question still remains to be seen is as to whether a member of security staff is a workman as defined in section 2(0 of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. It is no doubt true that originally a workman under the above meant any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical labour for hire or reward, but this definition has been amended and now it reads as follows:-- " 'Workman* means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward." Thus it will be seen that in place of word 'labour* word 'work' has been introduced in the last line. Therefore the definition of labour in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary will not help the appellant and a member of security staff will be deemed to be performing unskilled work and thus will be covered by the definition of a workman given in section 2(0 of 1he West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. In the result the priliminary objection raised by the appellant has no force. On merits it has been admitted by the appellant that no enquiry was held against the respondent and therefore his order of dismissal was rightly set aside by the Court below. I, accordingly, find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.