1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, ACTG. CJ.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment and order of the High Court dated 27-9-1989 whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant, herein, was dismissed. Brief facts leading up to the present controversy are that the appellant is a limited company running its business of assembling the Vespa Scooters and Auto Rickshaws since the year 1980. A notice was issued to the appellant by the Inspector Excise, Mirpur, on 19-11-1988, directing the appellant to secure the licence as required under rules. It was also mentioned in the said notice that the appellant had already been informed vide' letter dated 16-11-1988 that the sales tax had been imposed on Scooters and Rickshaws with effect from 26-6-1988 but the appellant did not comply with the notice. It was called upon to the appellant to do the needful and pay the total amount of the sales tax outstanding against him from 26-6-1988 within one day. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid notice, inter alia, on the ground that the sales tax was not leviable by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council because, according to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, it was not included in Schedule III to the Constitution which pertained to the list of the items which fell within the legislative competence of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council; and that the Central Board of Revenue, under whose directions such a tax could be levied, was not properly constituted.
2. ' The High Court dismissed the writ petition holding that the notice was valid as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government had the power to levy the tax in question in view of the relevant provisions of the Constitution; the Constitution of the Central Board of Revenue of Azad Jammu and Kashmir was also held to be valid. The question as to whether the impugned notice was issued by the Inspector Excise acting as functionary of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council or that of the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir State was not adverted to by the High Court.
3. Consequently the present appeal, by leave, has been preferred to this Court.
4. ' Before dealing with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it is expedient to trace out the brief history of the legislative measures taken by the Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. It may be observed that the legislative powers of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council have been enumerated in Schedule III to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. The items not mentioned in the said Schedule are presumed to be on the residuary list and fell within the legislative powers of the Legislative Assembly of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir State.
5. ' The learned counsel for the contesting parties conceded during the course of arguments in this Court that sales tax in question could be levied only by the Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir State and not by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council in view of the legislative powers incorporated in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. Thus, the appellant varied its stand from one taken in the High Court so far as the same pertained to the legislative powers of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly to impose the sales tax.
6. Consequently somewhat different law points from those raised in the High Court fell for determination in this Court.
7. ' In may be stated here that the sales tax in the instant case was to be levied in Azad Jammu and Kashmir according to the provisions contained in the Sales Tax Act, 1951 and the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter shall be called the Salt Act, 1944) which were adapted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir by the Legislative Assembly of the State. For the purpose of levying the sales tax the machinery, provided for carrying out the provisions of the Salt Act, 1944, was invested with the powers to recovery the sales tax.
8. ' Initially the aforesaid Salt Act, 1944 was adapted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir in the year 1959.
9. That remained in force till the year 1974 when the same was replaced by an Ordinance known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Ordinance, 1974. Subsequently, the said Ordinance was passed by the Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and became the Act known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1974. By virtue of section 37 of the Act the Salt Act, 1944, which was earlier adapted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, was repealed.
10. Subsequently, Ordinance LXV of 1978 was promulgated in September, 1978 whereby the Salt Act, 1944 was again adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir but it was not mentioned in the aforesaid Ordinance that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1974 stood repealed. The Ordinance LXV was re-enacted twice and, thus the Salt Act, 1944, remained in force till 12th July, 1979 when an Act known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1979 was passed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council whereby again the Salt Act, 1944 was adopted in Azad Kashmir. According to the said Act all amendments in Salt Act, 1944 as were made in Pakistan after the year 1959 or which might be made after the Act of 1979, would be deemed to be incorporated in the Salt Act, 1944. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1979 was given retrospective effect and was to operate from 1st day of July, 1979.
11. ' The Salt Act, 1944 was again adopted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir through an Ordinance in the year 1989 which was subsequently approved by the Legislative Assembly and become an Act of the Assembly. A validating clause (section 3) was also incorporated in the following terms:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any duty levied and collected, proceedings initiated or pending, notices issued, action taken, orders passed, appointments - made, penalty imposed, powers exercised or anything done in connection with or ancillary to any of the purposes of the said Act or powers conferred thereby on any authority, on or after the first day of July, 1979, shall be deemed to have been validly levied, collected, initiated, issued, taken, passed, made, imposed, exercised, done or conferred."
12. ' Sales Tax Act of 1951 of Pakistan was also adopted in Azad Kashmir by the Legislative Assembly by passing an Act known as Azad Jammu and Kashmir Sales Tax (Adaptation) Act, 1985.
13. ' The above history would reveal that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council were doubtful as to whether in view of the relevant provisions contained in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, the duties leviable under the provisions of the Salt Act, 1944, and Sales Tax Act, 1951 were within the legislative competence of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Assembly or the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. Probably it was for this reason that first the Salt Act, 1944 was adopted in Azad Kashmir by the Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly and subsequently the same Act was adopted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council in the year 1979. It will also be not out of place here to mention that afterwards the Income Tax Department was handed over to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council in view of the provisions of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. In August 1979 an agreement between the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government and the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council was arrived at whereby the functionaries of the Income Tax were to continue to perform their functions as employees of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government so far as their functions under the Excises and Salt Act and Sales Tax Act were concerned. Thus, the functionaries of the Income Tax continued to perform their duties so far as the excise duties etc. Were concerned.
14. ' Evidently the actions taken by the authorities from 1-7-1979 under the provisions of Act VII of 1979, which was passed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, were intended to be validated by incorporating section 3 in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1990.
15. Perhaps at the long last it was understood that the power to impose excise duties and sales tax under the provisions of the relevant statutes were within the legislative competence of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly and not of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council. It may be observed here that a Notification was also issued by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Revenue on 16-12-1986 to the effect that sales tax would be levied by the authorities as if it were excise duty under section 3 of the Salt Act, 1944. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Revenue also issued a notification on 4-11-1986 whereby the Deputy Collectors Excise were appointed as Excise Officers under Sales Tax Act, 1951 and similarly Collector, Central Excise was given powers of Commissioner under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act.
16. ' Now the question which falls for determination is as to whether the validating clause incorporated in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1990, reproduced above, validates the actions of the authorities who had been performing their functions previously under the provisions of the Act passed by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and. Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1979, specially so when they had been functioning on behalf of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and not on behalf of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government from 1-7-1979 to 21-2-1989.
17. ' Before adverting to the aforesaid proposition we would like to first dispose of some preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the respondents.
18. ' It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that Mr. Muhammad Taj, Advocate, who filed the appeal, did not possess a valid power of attorney on behalf of the appellant and, thus, the appeal was not validly instituted. His contention is that Novelty Enterprises is a limited company and appeal could be filed only if the powers to file the same would have been given to the Managing Director by the Directors of the Company according to the Articles of the Association. He submitted that there was nothing on the record to show that the Managing Director, who had signed a "Wakalatnama" on behalf of the appellant, was empowered by the Directors of the Company according to the Articles of the Association. He has cited some authorities in support of his proposition.
19. ' In Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd., Lahore (PLD 1971 SC 550) it was held that the suit on behalf of a company by a person (Director Incharge of Company) is not competent unless he was so authorised by resolution passed by the Company's Board of DirectoRs, ' In Abubakar Saley Mayet v. Abbot Laboratories (1987 CLC 367), it was held that a company cannot orally authorise another person to sign a plaint on its behalf and even subsequent ratification would not cure an illegality committed at the time of institution of suit. It was observed that business of company or corporation had to be run according to Articles of Association, it was observed that the power of attorney should have been executed on behalf of the company as required under the Articles of Association.
20. ' In reply Ch. Muhammad Taj, Advocate, submitted that it was not necessary for the appellant to file the relevant documents with the appeal showing that in fact the General Manager was validly empowered to appoint a counsel on behalf of the company. He submitted that he would place the relevant documents on the record within two days. The learned counsel for the appellant has sent a document by post which purports to contain the extracts from the Minutes of the Meeting of Board of Directors of Novelty Enterprises Ltd. Held on 30-9-1989. It authorises the General Manager to engage the counsel for the purpose of filing appeal in the matter. The document is purported to have been signed by the Chairman but his name is not legible. AThe document does not bear any date nor it is an attested copy of its original. The contents of the document have not been supported by an affidavit. Thus, the document placed on the record is not proved and is inadmissible in evidence. Even otherwise, the said document empowers the General Manager to engage a counsel in the matter but the "Wakalat Nama" filed with appeal is signed by the Administrative Manager and not the General Manager. Therefore, we hold that the appeal was not validly instituted. We could have dismissed the appeal on this sole ground but as the points involed in the present appeal are also in controversy in some other appeals, we propose to resolve all the legal questions involved in the appeal.
21. ' Next, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that as alternative remedy by way of appeal was provided in the Salt Act, 1944 as well as in the Sales Tax Act, 1951, the writ petition was incompetent without first seeking the remedy in the relevant forums. In reply it has been argued that as the appellant challenged not only the authority of respondent No,1 to issue notice in question to levy the tax but also assails the jurisdiction of the appellate authorities to exercise powers under relevant statutes, the question of availing alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision does not arise. The learned counsel has cited Lt.-Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty (PLD 1961 SC 119) in support of his contention wherein it has been held that bar against writ petition on the plea of other remedy is not a rule of law but a rule by which the Court regulates its own discretion. In case of complete lack of jurisdiction of authority passing the impugned order (Controller of Estate Duty) writ petition is not incompetent because the other remedy was available. It was observed that where the attack was on the very jurisdiction of the Controller of the Estate Duty to proceed with the assessment of estate duty on account of section 74-A of the Estate Duty Act and an appeal had been filed during the pendency of the writ petition, the appeal could not stand in the way of the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court because the action is challenged as being wholly without jurisdiction. It was further observed that in case of Taxing Statute, the rule of strict construction does not apply with regard to the proceedings of realisation of tax. The machinery part of Taxing Statute is to be liberally construed so as to give effect to the intention of the Legislature.
22. ' After giving our due consideration we are of the view that as according to the appellant none of the authorities had jurisdiction in the matter under Act VII of 1979. Promulgated by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, the argument that the appellant should have first sought the redress of his grievance by way of appeal or revision is fallacious and is hereby repelled. We respectfully agree with the view taken in the aforesaid authority that when the jurisdiction of authorities to act under a statute is itself under challenge, it is not necessary for an aggrieved person to have recourse for redressing his grievance to such authorities by filing an appeal etc. Before invoking the writ jurisdiction. Consequently the argument that the appellant should have first contested the validity of the notice in question before the higher forum is not tenable and is of no avail to the case of the respondents. It may also be observed here that although this objection was raised before the High Court but it does not appear to have been pressed at the time of arguments, and, thus, there is no finding on the point by the High Court. There is no affidavit by the respondents that the point was pressed before the High Court at the time of arguments but the same was not decided. Thus, even otherwise the respondents cannot be permitted to press the point regarding the alternative remedy when the same was abandoned by them in the High Court.
23. ' It has also been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the Central Board of Revenue constituted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council, on whose direction the respondents have been functioning, was not impleaded as party in the writ petition and in the appeal, the writ petition and the appeal are incompetent in absence of a necessary party. We have given due consideration to the objection raised. No action was taken by the Board of Revenue in the matter nor any such action was challenged. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that although the constitution of the Board of Revenue was not challenged in the High Court, yet the appellant challenges the constitution of the Board before this Court. Thus, the Board of Revenue is a necessary party in the appeal. The appellant did not assail the constitution of the Board rather the authority of the same to act as such has been challenged and that too indirectly. The basic point is as to whether the Board of Revenue was competent to act in the matter because the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council had no jurisdiction in the matter in view of the relevant provisions contained in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. As any specific action of the Board of Revenue has not been challenged, it is not a necessary party in the appeal. The moot point in the present appeal is whether the action performed by the respondents as functionaries of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council can be regarded to have been validated and not that the Board of Revenue was properly constituted or not.
24. ' The learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the actions by the authorities concerned from 1-7-1979 till the promulgation of validating Ordinance could not be validated because according to the learned counsel, the said acts were coram non judice and could not be rectified by passing a validating legislation. The learned counsel has cited the following authorities in support of his contention: ' In Federation of Pakistan v. Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar (PLD 1989 SC 26) the question regarding ouster of jurisdiction of the superior Courts in the certain matters was the subject of controversy. It was observed that in view of the constitutional development taking place in the country after July, 1977, when the fundamental rights stood suspended, Article 4 of the Constitution furnished the only guarantee or assurance to the citizens that no action detrimental to the life, liberty etc. Would be taken except in accordance with the law. Acts, actions or proceedings which suffered from excess or lack of jurisdiction or were coram non judice or mala fide could hardly be treated as those in accordance with law. Thus, as they were bad even under the system which was validated by parliament under Article 270-A on account of violation of the assurance given by Article 4, it is difficult to concede that by enacting clauses (2) and (5) to the aforesaid Article, the Parliament intended to validate such acts, actions of proceedings or to put them beyond the reach of the Courts or to deprive the persons who had suffered thereunder of any remedy or relief whatsoever.
25. It was further observed that there is a presumption that Legislature does not perpetuate inequity or injustice and there is no reason why such a presumption should not be invoked while interpreting clauses (2) and (5) of Article 270-A of the Constitution. It was further observed that taking into account the background in which Article 270-A was enacted, the language in which it was phrased and the absurd results which would follow if it construed widely, it appears that its object was merely to afford protection to the dispensation which came into existence as a result of "Constitutional deviation"; it is difficult to interpret it as conferring validity and immunity upon such acts, actions and proceedings as were illegal or indefensible even under that dispensation. Thus, this Article does not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court from reviewing the acts, actions or proceedings which suffered from defect of jurisdiction or were coram non judice or were mala fide.
26. ' In Miss Asma Jillani v. The Government of the Punjab (PLD 1972 SC 139), the view taken in Dossa's case that "where a Constitution and the national legal order under it is disrupted by a political change, then such a change is a revolution and it not only destroys the Constitution but also the validity of the national legal order, irrespective of how or by whom such a change is brought", was dissented from and not approved. It was observed that the proclamation by Martial Law does not, by itself, involve abrogation of Civil law and functioning of Civil authorities and certainly does not vest the Commander of Armed Forces with the power of abrogating the fundamental law of the country. It was observed that in such cases the doctrine of necessity would come into play to condone the illegality and validate certain legislation in order to save the country from greater chaos.
27. ' In the Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmad Khan (PLD 1974 SC 151) the effect of amendment of clause (2) of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution, Sixth Amendment Order, 1973 (President's Order No,3 of 1973) was the subject of controversy. The question was as to whether the ouster of jurisdiction of superior Courts would operate even in cases where the action is found to be mala fide and without jurisdiction. It was held that in view of the phraseology employed in the relevant amendment order, the question as to whether the protection given to the past actions by using phrase "notwithstanding any judgment of any Court" would also give protection to the actions which were mala fide or coram non judice. It was held that the validity sought to be conferred by these words did not extend to acts done, orders made or proceedings taken without jurisdiction, coram non judice or mala fide, because such acts, orders or proceedings could neither be done in exercise of powers derived from President's Orders, Martial Law Orders, Enactments etc. Or even in the purported exercise of those poweRs, It was held that the acts done or orders passed or proceedings taken without jurisdiction, mala fide or coram non judice, were still open to the scrutiny of the Courts by ouster clause. Thus, it was observed by the Supreme Court that the High Court had rightly expressed the view that actions or proceedings taken without jurisdiction or mala fide or orders of judicial or quasi judicial nature which are coram non judice are not validated by either clause (2) of Article 281 of the Interim Constitution as amended by the President's Order No,3 of 1973 or by clause (2) of Article 269 of the permanent Constitution.
28. ' In The State v. Zia-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49) again the question of ouster of jurisdiction of the superior Courts under Article 281 of the Constitution was the subject of controversy. It was held that Article 281 validates certain actions taken by the Martial Law Authorities and the jurisdiction of the Courts from questioning the same has been ousted. Similarly, persons or authorities acting in the exercise of or the purported exercise of powers given by these measures have been protected from legal proceedings, but the acts done, proceedings taken or orders made in the exercise or purported exercise of powers derived from those measures have only been validated without ousting the jurisdiction of the Courts. It was further held that even the blanket validation given by clause (1) to the legislative measures enacted during the relevant period, is only of formal nature, because clause (1) of Article 281 should be read alongwith clauses (2) and (3) of Article 280. It was observed that no protection was given under the aforesaid Article to cover the acts done without jurisdiction where there was no jurisdiction at all or which were outside the jurisdiction of the Martial Law Authorities.
29. ' In Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar v. Pakistan (PLD 1988 Lah. 49), again the question of ouster of jurisdiction of the Courts by virtue of sub-Article (1) of Article 270-A of the Constitution of 1973 was the subject of interpretation. It was held that it is not usual that a law may be validated but exercise of the power by a public functionary thereunder, may suffer from some illegality and subjected to scrutiny by the Courts. Despite employing the term "purported", the law-maker has used the words "notwithstanding any judgment of any Court" in clause (2) but avoided to add words "notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution". Thus, even if enlarged meanings are given to this word, the acts wholly unwarranted by the Statute under which the public functionary claims to have proceeded cannot be considered as acts done under the purported exercise of powers, derived from such statutes. Thus, acts coram non judice, without jurisdiction and mala fide were not intended to be covered by the protection envisaged by clause (2) of Article 270-A of the Constitution.
30. ' In Azad Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Kashmir Timber Corporation (PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 42), the vices of the Act Jnown as Azad Jammu and Kashmir Timber Trade Nationalization Act and acts taken thereunder were challenged. During the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court, the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 was amended retrospectively so as to validate the actions taken under the Timber Trade Nationalization Act. It was contended that as there was no validating clause in the amendment brought into the relevant provisions of the Interim Constitution Act, the acts cannot be validated by giving retrospective effect to the amendment in the Constitution. The argument was repelled and it was held that relevant amendment in Schedule III of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act read with section 3 of Fourth Amendment Act, would operate retrospectively and, thus, validate all the actions despite the fact that there was no validating clause in the amending Act. However, it was opined that actions coram non judice would be validated by subsequent legislation.
31. ' The perusal of the above-cited authorities, except one reported as Azad Government of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Kashmir Timber Corporation (PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 42), reveals that basic question involved in the said cases was that of ouster of jurisdiction of superior Courts to review the acts of Martial Law Authorities which were functioning under the cover of Martial Law. Taking into consideration the fact that the Constitution was destroyed as a result of imposition of Matrial Law, it was held that the ouster of jurisdiction of superior Courts through amendments in the Constitution and by issuing Martial Law Orders, did not extend to those acts which 'were coram non judice, without jurisdiction or mala fide. Thus, it was opined that the relevant provisions whereby the review jurisdiction of the superior Courts was ousted did not apply to the acts which were coram non judice or mala fide. In other words, on the interpretation the relevant provisions relating to the ouster of the jurisdiction of the superior Courts, it was found that the relevant provisions regarding ouster did not extend to certain classes of actions. It is correct that it was also observed that even otherwise the actions which were mala fide, without jurisdiction or coram non judice could not be validated by the curative legislation but the fact remains that the real question in controversy in those cases was as to whether the provisions pertaining to the ouster of jurisdiction of the superior Courts also provided protection to the acts which fell under a certain category, i,e,, the acts performed without jurisdiction, mala fide or coram non judice. It was opined that the acts which were without jurisdiction even under Martial law Orders were coram non judice and are not immune from the review by the superior Courts; because neither such acts were protected from review, nor the same could be otherwise protected, if the same were found to be without jurisdiction under the law which was protected by validation clause. We have no quarrel with the principle laid down in the aforesaid cases. Generally speaking, the actions which are mala fide, coram non judice or without jurisdiction, cannot be validated if the same are found to be without jurisdiction even after passing the validating legislation which operated retrospectively. No such eventuality exists in the case in hand. It is not the case of the appellant that even after validation of actions by virtue of Act II of 1990, any act of the respondents was coram non judice, because of absence or excess of jurisdiction. The Legislature is fully empowered to validate actions by legislation. We are fortified in our view by the following authorities: ' In Mst. Anwar Jehan v. Additional Member, Board of Revenue (1987 CLC 976), Sukkur Barrage Authorities had cancelled some of the allotments which were made in favour of Hindus who had migrated to India and fresh allotments were made in favour of certain persons. The action of Barrage Authorities was found to be illegal in view of the provisions contained under section 8 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 because a lessor was debarred from forfeiting lease of a non-Muslim migrating to Indian inter alia on the ground of default of terms of the lease etc. And hence the interest of Hindu evacuee would have been vested in the Custodian and the Settlement Department would have been competent to allot the same under the Settlement Scheme. However, for regularizing the actions of the Sukkur Barrage Authorities, Sukkur Barrage (Validation of Orders) Act, 1974 was promulagated whereby the illegal acts of the Barrage Authorities were validated. The validation order was held to be according to law in view of the validating provisions in the relevant Act.
32. ' In The Punjab Province v. Malik Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana (PLD 1956 FC 200), the point involved was as to whether the Constituent Assembly was competent to pass the Validation of Laws Act, 1956. It was contended that the validation clause was itself invalid inasumuch as none of its enacting provisions is a "provision as to the Constitution of Dominion" within the meaning of subsection (1) of Section 8 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. It was contended that the Constituent Assembly exercising the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion was not competent to enact it. The question as to whether the acts, in view of their nature, could be validated by the Constituent Assembly or not was the subject of controversy. The contention was repelled and it was held that the Constituent Assembly in passing the Validation of Laws Act, 1956, acted under subsection (1) of section 8 of the independence Act, 1947 and, thus, the relevant validation law was correctly legislated.
33. ' In Hakim Ahmadur Rahman Malik v. The Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1966 Dacca 411) it was held that the Legislature has power to validate by legislation an invalid order and there is nothing in fundmental rights (as enshrined in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1962) to take away the power from the Legislature to do so.
34. ' Identical view was taken in The State v. Zial-ur-Rehman (PLD 1973 SC 49) and Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Kashmir Timber Corporation (PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 42) which were cited by the learned counsel for the appellant.
35. ' The question which needs to be resolved is as to whether the actions taken by the authorities after 1st day of July, 1979 to 21-2-1989, which were performed by the respondents as functionaries of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council under Act VII of 1979, stand validated. We are of the view that whether certain proceedings or act is coram non judice or not, is to be seen not only in view of the relevant statute but also in attending circumstances of each case. The authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellant on the point mainly pertain to the period when the Pakistan was governed by Martial Law Authorities. The constitutional framework of the country was destroyed and the Martial Law Authorities were mostly acting under the cover of Martial Law Regulations etc. The only remedy against the excesses committed by the functionaries under the Martial Law was by way of having a recourse to the superior Courts of the country. It was under these peculiar circumstances that amending provisions of the Constitution and Martial Law Regulations were interpreted. But in none of the said authorities the Courts opined that Legislature was not competent to validate the acts by subsequent legislation; it has not been held in any of the said authorities that illegal acts or illegal exercise of jurisdiction cannot be validated by subsequent legislation; rather the principle that the Legislature is fully competent to validate the illegal actions by subsequernt legislation was affirmed in the said authorities. Thus, the actions of the relevant functionaries in the instant case cannot be regarded as coram non judice because it has not been argued that the same were coram non judice even after the adoption of Salt Act by virtue of Act II of 1990 which operates from 1st July, 1979 and section 3 validates all the actions taken from the said date. In other words it is not the case of the appellant that even if the 'relevant statutes are regarded to be in force from 1st July, 1979, the action taken by the respondents was not covered by the said statutes. As has already been seen that the statute under which relevant authorities performed their functions, i,e,, Salt Act, 1944 and Sales Tax Act, 1951, remained the same the functionaries were also the same. Only the masters changed due to the misunderstanding regarding the constitutional provisions with regard to the competence of Legislature; none of the authorities concerned performed his functions on his own without the cover of law. All that happened was that at one time they performed the duties as functionaries of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and at other as functionaries of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government. At the time of performing their duties under the relevant statutes, they bona fide believed that the master, for whom they were performing duties during certain period, was legally competent to impose the sales tax and excise duties. Thus, it cannot be said that the actions of the respondents from 1-7- 1979 onwards were not performed in vacuum or in total absence of the jurisdiction. The case, in our considered view, is that of "purported" exercise of jurisdiction and, thus, all actions of the respondents stand validated by the aforesaid validating legislation, i.e, by section 3 of the Azad jammu \and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1990. Thus, as the actions taken in the instant case, do not fall within the ambit of total absence of jurisdiction or for that matter coram non judice, the same stand validated. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the contention of the learned counsel that the actions performed by the respondents as functionaries of Azad JAMMU and Kashmir Council could not be validated by section 3 of the aforesaid Act, has no substance and must fail.
36. ' There is yet another aspect of the case. The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Exercise and Salt Act, 1974, which repealed the Salt Ad, 1944, was not repealed by the Ordinance known as Central Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Ordinance, 1978. This Ordinance was re-enacted twice but there is no provision in any of these Ordinances to the effect that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir,Excises and Sail Act, 1974 would stand repealed. It is settled principle of law that if a permanent legislation is repealed by a temporary legislation, such as by an Ordinance, that revives when the Ordinance expired or is repated..In the instant case, Ordinance LIX of 1979, which was a reenactment of Ordinance LXV of 1978, was repealed by Ordinance XCVII of 1979 and the Act VII of 1979 was promulgated by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir council. Thus, when Ordinance LIX of 1979 was repealed, the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1974 revived. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Ordinance, 1978 (Ordinance LXV of 1978) or any other subsequent Ordinance on the subject had the effect of repealing the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1974, by implication, the said Act would be deemed to have revived when the said Ordinance came to an end or in other words the Ordinance. LIX of 1979 was repealed. There is a ring of authorities on the point that if temporary legislation repeals a permanent legislation the permanent legislation would revive when the life of temporary legislation, i.e, 1D an Ordinance, comes to an end or the same is otherwise repealed. Reference may be made to Crown v. Ghulam Muhammad (PLD 1950 Lah. 479), Arbar Muhammad Hasham Khan v. The Crown (PLD 1953 Pesh. 72), Abdur Rashid v. The State (PLD 1957 Lah. 400), The Sargodha-Bhera Bus Service v. The Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1958 Lah. 77), The State v. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1960 Lah. 236) and Messrs Nau-Asio Trading Co. Ltd. v. Sh. Saeed Ahmad, Civil Judge, III Class (PLD 1966 Lah. 269).
37. ' It follows from what has been stated above that during the relevant period after 1st July, 1979 the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1974, remained on the statute book of Azad Kashmir after its revival and, thus, it cannot be said that the relevant functionaries acted in vacuum without any legal cover. It is correct that during the period starting from 1-7-1979, the relevant functionaries performed their duties on behalf of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council but that would not make any difference; specially so when the same functionaries had also been performing the functions on behalf of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt Act, 1974 when the same was in force, and was again revived. After the repeal of Ordinance LIX of 1979. If there was any case of illegal exercise of jurisdiction during that period commencing from 1-7-1979, it stood validated by the provisions contained in section 3 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1990 (prior to that it was in form of Ordinance).
38. ' It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Board of Revenue was not constituted under any enactment, it cannot be regarded to have been validly constituted. He has further argued that even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the Board constituted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government through Order No, 626/59 dated 19-12-1959, was validly constituted, the actions taken on the direction of the said Board could not be regarded to have been validated because in section 2 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1990, it is mentioned that the expression "Central Board of Revenue" shall be construed to be "Board of Revenue of Azad Jammu and Kashmir". The learned counsel has maintained that according to the Notifications dated 19-12-1959 and 22-3- 1964, the Board constituted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir was not named as the "Board of Revenue of Azad Jammu and Kashmir"; rather it was merely referred to in the said notifications as "Board". Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, as the reference in section 2 of Act II of 1990 having been made as "Board of Revenue of Azad Jammu and Kashmir" is erroneous; it nullifies the effect of validating provisions contained in section 3 of the said Act.
39. ' We have given our due consideration to the arguments. There is no controversy that there has been only one Revenue Board constituted in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Mere wrong reference to the Board constituted by Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government would not render the constitution of the said Board or for that matter the validation of the actions taken by the Board as invalid. It is settled principle of law that if a statutory provision is unhappily worded for want of skill in drafting, it would not go to the root of the matter and should not affect the correct interpretation of the statute. A reference may F be made to Abdul Jamil v. Registrar of Trade Unions, West Pakistan, Lahore (PLD 1971 Lah. 220) and Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1971 Kar. 333), wherein the aforesaid principle has been affirmed. So far the law under which the Board of Revenue was constituted by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, the same was constituted in pursuance of provisions contained in section 7 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Excises and Salt (Adaptation) Act, 1959, as is evident from the notification itself.
40. ' Next, it was contended that under the relevant provisions contained in Sales Tax Act, 1951 and Salt Act, 1944, the authorities concerned could only collect the tax and not "levy' the same. According to the learned counsel the word "levy" would only signify the collection of the tax by authorities concerned and not imposing the tax. It may be stated here that the word "levy" does not carry restricted meaning as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant. A reference may be made to Zaibtun Textile Mills Ltd., Karachi v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1971 Kar. 333), wherein it has been held as under:- "In my opinion, the expression 'levy' does not carry this restricted meaning. In Shorter Oxford Dictionary the word 'levy' is defined to u include powers to impose tax or to raise taxes as well as power to A- collect taxes. This is also the meaning of the word "levy" adopted in a alt26 Canadian decision City of Vancover v. B.C. Telephone Co. (1951 SCR 3) cited in Buterworth's words and phrases Legally Defined' (1969 Edn., Vol. 3, page 151)."
41. ' It is clear from the aforesaid meaning of the word "levy" that it not I G only signifies the collection of the tax but also imposition of the tax.
42. ' It has also been contended that under section 31(4) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 tax could not be levied for the purpose of territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir except by the authority of an Act of the Council Dr the Assembly. He has contended that in the instant case the tax was levied in pursuance of the Ordinances which were illegal. The learned counsel for the appellant has cited Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah v. Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PLD 1974 Azad J&K 67) in support of his contention. It may be observed that after the aforesaid judgment an amendment was brought in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 and expression "Act of the Assembly" was defined in section 2 (2) of the Interim Constitution Act. According to the said definition "Act of the Assembly" includes an "Ordinance". Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that tax cannot be levied by an Ordinance has no substance and is hereby repelled.
43. ' In the light of what has been stated above, finding no force in this appeal it is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.