1. ' These are two connected First Rent Appeals filed by two tenants of respective shops constructed on Plot No,31, Clifton, Karachi and are directed against the order dated 21-2-1991 passed by the IlIrd Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi South. The tenants were directed to hand over vacant possession of the shops in question within sixty days from the date of the order.
2. ' The facts leading to the filing of the above appeals are that the respondents in the above appeals are co-owners of property/Plot No,31, Clifton, Karachi with construction thereon and the appellants in F.RA. No, 232 of 1991 are legal heirs of late Rajab Ali. The appellants in F.RA. No,233 of 1991 are legal heirs of Qurban Ali. R.D. Jagus filed eviction application against Rajab All and Qurban Ali being R.C.
3. No, 2167 of 1989 which case was compromised and as per terms of compromise, the rate of rent was fixed at Rs,150.
4. ' The respondents filed separate eviction applications under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance). The appellants contested the applications. The appellants pleaded/raised the following objections:---
(1) Application under section 14 of the Ordinance is not maintainable.
(2) All the L.Rs, have not been impleaded as parties.
(3) No notice under section 14 of the Ordinance has been given.
(4) All the co-owners have not been treated as parties.
(5) The application is hit by subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance.
5. ' In F.RA. No,232 of 1991 the respondent Mrs. Katiyun B. Khambatta filed her own affidavit-in- evidence in support of the eviction application. Sadruddin son of late Rajab Ali filed his own affidavit-in-evidence in rebuttal.
6. ' In F.R.A. No,233 of 1991 Roshan DJagus filed her own affidavit-in-evidence in support of the eviction application. Anwar Ali, attorney of the appellants, filed affidavit-in-evidence in rebuttal. They were cross-examined by the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.
7. ' The learned Controller on assessm ent of the evidence adduced by the parties, found that the eviction applications were maintainable. The respondents required the shops in question for their own personal use. In this view of the matter, the applications were allowed and the appellants were directed to hand over the vacant possession of the shops in question to the respondents.
8. ' I have heard Mr. Syed Amjad Hussain, learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr. Muhammd Zubair Qureshi, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. I have carefully gone through the impugned orders and have also perused the R & P of the cases.
9. ' Mr. Syed Amjad Hussain raised the following contentions:---
(1) The applications are not maintainable.
(2) All the L.Rs, of the tenants have not been made parties in the eviction proceedings.
(3) No notice under section 14 of the Ordinance was served on the tenants/legal heirs of the tenants.
(4) All the co-owners have not been made parties to the eviction applications.
(5) The applications are hit by provisions of section 14(2) of the Ordinance.
10. ' On the other hand, Mr. Muhammad Zubair Qureshi has supported the impugned orders and controverted the contentions of Mr.Syed Amjad Hussain.
11. ' The contention of Mr. Syed Amjad Hussain that the application under section 14 of the Ordinance was not maintainable, is devoid of force. The applicants/respondents are 60 years old. The learned counsel is unable to point out any illegality and/or ground to show that the present application is not maintainable.
12. ' Reverting to the second contention that all the L.Rs, of deceased tenants were not made parties to the eviction applications, it may be observed that the present appellants are in possession of the shops in question. It is an admitted position that in the earlier eviction proceedings (Rent Case No, 1738 of 1980) no such objection was raised by the appellants. They are estopped from raising any such objection. Section 2 (j) defines 'tenant'. It means "any person who undertakes or is bound to pay rent as consideration for the possession or occupation of any premises by him or by any other person on his behalf and includes (i) any person who continues to be in possession or occupation of the premises after the termination of his tenancy and (ii) heirs of the tenant in possession or occupation of the premises after the death of the tenant". A perusal of clause (ii) of section 2 (j) would show that only those legal heirs who are actually in possession or occupation of the premises after the death of the tenant, become statutory tenant. In the present case, it is admitted position that the appellants are alone in possession and occupation of the premises in question, after the death of original tenant.
13. Therefore, the eviction applications were maintainable against them and it was not necessary for the respondents to join all the legal heirs of deceased tenant, as opponents in the said applications. It seems that the finding of the learned Controller is in consonance with law.
14. ' The third contention of Mr. Syed Amjad Hussain is also devoid of force. It is an admitted position that notice under section 14 of the Ordinance was served upon the appellants. Sadruddin has admitted in his cross-examination that notice under section 1.4 of the Ordinance was served upon the appellants.
15. The fourth contention is that all the co-owners have not been impleaded as parties in the eviction application. This question was considered in the cases reported in 1984 CLC 44, 1983 CLC 3258, 1986 CLC 1534 and 1989 CLC 517 wherein it was held that the word "landlord is defined in section 2(f) of the Ordinance and a widow as co-owner is entitled to file eviction application. In this view of the legal position, Mr.Syed Amjad Hussain fairly conceded that the contention is devoid of force.
16. The last contention of Mr. Syed Amjad Hussain is that the applications are hit by provisions of section 14(2) of the Ordinance. It is an admitted position that premises in occupation of the respondents are residential premises whereas eviction applications filed by the respondents, relate to shops and consequently in my opinion section 14(2) of the Ordinance does not in any way bar the eviction applications filed by the respondents (see PLD 1981 SC 118).
17. ' For the foregoing reasons, there is no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. The above are the reasons for the short order dated 23-2-1992.