' Mst. Allah Wasai, predecessor-in-interest of Noor Muhammad etc. Had pre-empted a sale of 100 'Kanals of land, situate in village Haiderabad, Tehsil Mankera, District Bhakkar (then part of District Mianwali), effected by the owner in favour of Khameesah, and the suit was decreed on 14-12-1973 by the learned Civil Judge, Bhakkar, holding Rs,2,500 as the consideration of sale. Khameesa defendant-vendee filed an appeal, and the learned District Judge, Mianwali, Mr. Zaheer Ahmad Khan Yousafi, on 31-5-1974, amended the lower Court's decree dated 14-12-1973, enhancing the amount of consideration from Rs,2,500 to Rs,3,500, in view of statement made on oath by the vendee, Khameesa. The plaintiff-pre-emptor was directed to deposit the additional amount of Rs,1,000 by 29-6-1974, failing which her suit was declared liable to dismissal. Mutation was sanctioned in favour of the decree-holder (preemptor) on 13-9-1974. To have it set aside and to get himself declared to be owner of the land, Khameesah filed a a civil suit for declaration and perpetual injunction on 30-1-1984 against Allah Wasai alias Wasos husband, Noor Muhammad, son of Faiz Muhammad and daughters Mst. Bakhtan, Mst. Hayatan, Mst. Siani, Mst. Alam Khatoon and Mst. Mureed Fatima. The suit was decreed by Mehr Muhammad Yousaf, Civil Judge, Bhakar, on 2-6- 1987, and the decree was affirmed in appeal by Mr. Talib Hussain Khan Baluch, Additional District Judge, Bhakkar, on 14-9-1991. Noor Muhammad etc. Have preferred the present revision petition, assailing the validity of the aforesaid judgments and decrees delivered by the two Courts below.
2. What has mainly influenced the learned lower Courts is the fact that the deposit of additional amount of Rs,1,000 appeared not to have been made in time by the pre-emptor, in accordance with the order dated 31-5-1974, passed by the learned District Judge, Mianwali. According to Khameesah judgment-debtor (defendant in pre-emption suit), the trial Court and the first appellate Court have failed to appreciate the issue and have arrived at incorrect conclusion in holding that there was no proof available about deposit aforesaid having been made by the due date i,e, by 29-6-1974. Petitioners before me have made an application under Order 41, rule 27 read with section 151, C.P.C. With a prayer that they be permitted to produce in additional evidence a report recorded by the District Accounts Officer, Bhakkar to the effect that Rs,1,000 had been deposited on 24-6-1974 by the pre-emptor and had been withdrawn on 9-9-1974 by Khameesa defendant-vendee. If it is a correct report, it will obviously eliminate the fallacy involved and displace Khameesa's claim of having become owner of the land, by reason of default on the part of the plaintiff-pre-emptor in making payment of additional amount of Rs,1,000 in time. The prayer has been resisted by Khameesa respondent, according to whom ample evidence has already come on record, giving a lie to the petitioners' plea of having made the deposit by the due date and having thus successfully pre-empted the sale of the suit land in favour of the former.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on 1988 SCM R 1782, Ahmad Ashraf v.
University of the Punjab, in which case a similar question was involved and the Supreme Court had upheld the order passed by the High Court, permitting production of additional evidence, observing that although the jurisdiction available under section 115, C.P.C. Had a limited scope, the Court was not divested of its discretion in allowing additional evidence, asked for by a party to the litigation, in a proper case, in ultimate ends of justice. It is well known that it is not as much right of a party as it is indeed the requirement of the Court, and provisions of Order 41, rule 27, C.P.C. May be invoked even suo motu by the Court, without a move in that behalf having been made by any party. If it is felt that in the case in hand the controversy involved cannot conclusively be resolved and the rights of the parties cannot objectively be adjudicated upon, without additional evidence, forthcoming from an authentic quarter or a secure source, and of real consequence, having direct bearing on the dispute between the parties, the Court must not hesitate to requisition such evidentiary material, to be brought on record in additional evidence, on having been asked for by a party, and even otherwise. In the instant case, the report said to have been recorded by the District Accounts Officer, Bhakkar will have to be authenticated by the officer, on appearing in the Court as a witness, and he will, of course, be subjected to cross-examination, in the light of the earlier report having been made to the contrary by Nazir of the Civil Courts, Bhakkar. It has also to be ascertained with exactitude as to when and where had the amount in question been deposited, and to whom had it been paid subsequently, and with what effect. The parties have been litigating over a long time (for 19 years now), and it seems it would only be fair, just and proper, if the request made by the petitioner to lead additional evidence, to clear a crucial point of confusion and to establish an important development of immense consequence is acceded to, in the interests of justice. I would accordingly allow C.M. No,2 of 1992, and also accept the revision petition, in consequence. After the petitioners, who were defendants in the suit, are allowed to lead additional evidence, Khameesa plaintiff shall also be permitted to adduce evidence in rebuttal; and the case shall be redecided all over again. Judgments and decrees delivered by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge, on 2-6-1987 and 14-9-1991, are hereby set aside. The civil suit is entrusted to the learned Senior Civil Judge, Bhakkar, for final disposal, at an early date. Parties shall appear before him on 15-12-1992.