1. ' Through an order in Rent Case No,211 of 1991, passed by the learned Ilnd Senior Civil Judge and Controller, Karachi (West), under section 16(1) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, on February 2, 1992, the appellant tenant was directed to deposit arrears of rent at the rate of Rs,1,600 per month from October, 1990 to January, 1992 up to 25th February, 1992. Besides, accruing rents at the same rate were to be deposited on or before the 10th of every calendar month. Since, however, the arrears were disputed the respondent-landlady was precluded to withdraw such arrears. On February 16, 1992, the appellant tenant filed an application under section 20 of the General Clauses Act, seeking recall of the order, dated February 2, 1992, on which notice for February 20, 1992 was ordered, yet copy was supplied in Court only on February 25, 1992. On February 24, 1992, another application, this time under section 151, C.P.C., was also filed by the tenant, submitting that, on the grounds set out in the affidavit accompanying the application under section 20 aforesaid, the learned Controller may be pleased to extend the time for depositing the arrears of rent by another three weeks, when such application would be decided on merits and also because very short time was allowed for making the deposit. The learned Controller seems to have dismissed the last- mentioned application on February 24,1992 itself, observing that there was no provision in law for recall of the order, dated February 2, 1992 and also because, according to the learned Controller, sufficient time had been allowed for making the deposit. On March 15, 1992, the respondent- landlady filed an application under section 16(2) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, seeking that the tenant's defence be struck off as he had failed to make compliance of the tentative order of deposit, dated February 2, 1992. On replies being exchanged between the parties, there being total absence of deposit of arrears, this application was allowed and the tenant's defence was struck off on September 24, 1992. Hence this appeal.
2. ' Before me, Ch. Muhammad Iqbal for the appellant has contended that the learned Controller erred in not deciding the tenant's application under section 20 of the General Clauses Act, that the time allowed for deposit of arrears was too short and further that the order pertaining to arrears of rent was wrong, since the learned Controller ignored the receipts marked as 'D' to `D-11' attached with the written statement, which clearly revealed that rents for the period September, 1990 to August, 1991 had been duly received by the landlady's son. As to the last, the fact of the matter is that such receipts were denied by the landlady, as forged documents and the learned Controller, at that stage, did not consider it fit to rely upon the same. However, Ch. Muhammad Iqbal drew my attention to Nasir Kamal Pasha v. Muhammad Ismail Khan PLD 1983 Kar. 192, where it was observed that documentary evidence as to payment of rent produced by a tenant could not be rejected upon mere denial of the landlord unless the Controller came to the conclusion that such was prima facie false.
3. ' It is true that the learned Controller has not recorded a categorical finding that the receipts relied upon by the tenant were prima facie false but plainly, she deferred final decision on the point to the stage of ultimate determination in the Rent Case, remaining content to preclude the landlady from withdrawing the disputed arrears, when deposited.
4. Now, an appeal under section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance is clearly a continuation of proceedings of a rent case and the appellate Court is invested with vast powers, including those of a further inquiry. The object is obvious; such is to ensure complete justice between the parties without undue delay, so that finality of appellate orders is not denuded of any purposeful meaning.
5. I have, therefore, gone through the record myself in order to assess whether there was material available with the Controller, in the face of which, at the tentative stage, the documentary material relied upon by the tenant could be negated, as ex facie unreliable. The controversy in the rent case pertains to alleged default from October, 1990 as well as personal requirement. Notice dated September 2, 1991, was addressed by the landlady's Advocate to the tenant in which default from the same point of time was claimed and also personal requirement was projected. Through reply dated September 7, 1991, the tenant, through counsel, questioned even the Agreement of Tenancy, dated November 1, 1988, admittedly signed by him, and demanded proof of title. In the same breath, he alleged that a sum of Rs,25,000 was made over to the landlady's son and attorney, Nadeem Hashmi. Yet another assertion was that a sum of Rs,2,00,000 was, allegedly, given by the tenant, as loan to the said Nadeem Hashmi, who executed an undertaking on February 26, 1990, also assuring that rent, at Rs,1,600 per month, from June, 1990 onwards was not to be demanded but had to be adjusted towards the referred loan. A copy of the undertaking is brought on record, which is predictably disputed. It bears no date of execution and is purportedly attested twice over, firstly by a Notary Public on February 26, 1990 and then by a Magistrate on February 27, 1990, upon identification, though the executant has signed the document only once, without indicating any date of his own. This is a self-defeating document and, at the minimum, a highly suspicious one.
6. The executant, at best, could have executed the document either before the Notary Public or before the learned Magistrate and the single execution could not have enured for both on different dates.
7. Thus, if he subscribed to the document in the presence of the Notary Public he did not do so before the learned Magistrate and vice versa. This, of course, assumes that the two attestations are genuine, which could be too much to assume. Be that as it may, even in the face of such undertaking, curiously enough, allegedly to be on the safe side, the tenant continued to pay the monthly rents to the same Nadeem Hashmi, "smelling the foul game played by him deceitfully and dishonestly". The receipts of rent, therefore, had to clear many a hurdle, before qualifying for acceptance.
8. ' On mg expression of surprise on the tenant's self-contradictory pleas, there was no response from Ch. Muhammad Iqbal except that the tenant in making the disputed payments of rent, wanted to protect himself. Then I enquired as to whether the alleged undertaking, purportedly executed on February 26-27, 1990, had been honoured and any refund thereunder was made over the period of the past nearly three years and, if not, had the tenant taken any legal steps for recovery, since limitation was running out. Learned counsel was unaile to meet these queries.
9. In such circumstances, there was ample material before the learned Controller to come to the conclusion that receipts marked 'D' to 'D-11', as above, denied in totality by the landlady, could not ex facie be relied upon and the order of tentative deposit, with corresponding prohibition for the landlady to effect withdrawals, as regards the disputed arrears, was a just, fair and lawful order. It ought to have been complied with. At the stage of directing tentative deposit the Controller is not to enter into any prolonged inquiry and has merely to ensure that an adequate order, calculated to protect either side during the pendency of proceedings is passed. That, precisely, had been done.
10. ' As regards the purportedly short period of three weeks, within which the deposit of arrears was required, I would have, normally, been with the appellant-tenant. Obviously, the amount was large and the period of a little over three weeks for the purpose was inadequate. But this was not a routine case. If the tenant was to be believed, he was a well to do man allegedly doling out huge sums of Rs,25,000 and Rs,2,00,000 just for the asking. Surely, for such a person neither the amount was too large nor the period allowed for deposit too short. This objection to the order also must, accordingly, fail.
11. ' On the question that the learned Controller did not dispose of the application of the tenant under section 20 of the General Clauses Act before proceeding to strike off the tenant's defence, it seems to me that in the face of the order, dated February 24, 1992, aforementioned on an application that sought for extension of time in terms of the grounds in the application under section 20 of the General Clauses Act and on the tenor of the application under section 151, C.P.C. on the back whereof the order was inscribed, the learned Controller, in effect, had decided both the applications.
12. ' The order of tentative deposit thus being perfectly lawful, the consequential order, striking off the tenant's defence for non-compliance, calls for no interference, there being no independent challenge to the latter.
13. ' In view of the foregoing, I have seen no merit in this appeal and dismiss it in limine, upon pre- admission notice having been issued, for reasons which have been recorded now.