' This revision petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by Muhammad Yousaf and other legal representatives of Malik Jalal Din, vendee defendant, has arisen in the following circumstances.
2. The property in suit was sold by Sheikh Abdul Ghani, vendor, on 21-6-1981 to Malik Jalal Din. Two suits to pre-empt the sale were filed; one by Mst. Zubaida Bibi and the other by Karam Elahi. Both the suits were consolidated and decreed by the order of the trial Court dated 10-9-1986; each of the plaintiffs was given 1/2 of the property in suit. The petitioners filed Appeal No,380 on 5-10-1986 in the District Court; in that appeal both Mst. Zubaida Bibi and Karam Elahi, plaintiffs were made respondents. In that appeal copies of judgment and decree were filed. Later another appeal viz. No,378 was filed by the petitioners in the District Court; in that appeal only Karam Elahi, plaintiff was made respondent. However, copies of judgment and decree were not appended with the memorandum of appeal. By his judgment, dated 23-1-1989, the learned Additional District Judge, Bhalwal accepted Appeal No,380, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge and remanded the suit for fresh decision. By another judgment of the same date viz. 23-1-1989, the learned Additional District Judge dismissed the petitioners' Appeal No,378, (in which Karam Elahi, plaintiff was the respondent) on the ground that with the memorandum of appeal copies of judgment and decree were not appended. It is against the judgment and decree in Appeal No,378 that this revision petition is directed.
3. It should be noted here that the suit of Mst. Zubaida Bibi was again decreed by the trial Judge's judgment, dated 10-9-1986 and an appeal against that decree is pending in the District Court.
4. As regards the merit of the revision petition, it is contended that both the suits had been tried together and a consolidated judgment was delivered by the trial Court; that no decree was prepared in the file of the suit of Karam Elahi; that the petitioners had applied for copies but copies were not supplied. It is stated that the petitioners had obtained copies of judgment and decree in Karam Elahi's suit and had tried to place on the file of Appeal No,378 but the learned District Judge had declined permission to do so on the ground that this could not be done at that belated stage.
5. It is not necessary to decide these contentions, for the revision petition must in my opinion be dismissed on another ground. It is that this is the second revision petition against the judgment and decree in Appeal No,378; the earlier one, viz. Revision Petition No,585-D of 1989 was dismissed as withdrawn by this Court's order dated 7-6-1989.
6. This Court had not assumed suo motu jurisdiction in Civil Revision No,585-D of 1989. That revision petition was filed by the petitioners. It seems to me that like an appeal a party has only one right of revision and if that right is exercised and the revision petition is decided, whether on the merits, by consent or default or by the revision petitioner withdrawing it, then on general principle, on the legislative intent as expressed in section 115 of the C.P.C. and by reasons of the provisions of Order 23, C.P.C., he has no right to file another revision petition. The general principle was expressed by the well-known maxim "res judiciata pro veritate occipitur". A judgment by consent or by default raises an estoppel no less than does a judgment which results from a decision of the Court after a matter has been fought out to the end. (see Broom's Legal Maxims page 217,221). And if a judgment by consent or by default raises an estoppel, there is no reason why a withdrawal should not.
Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it stood before its amendment by Ordinance XII of 1972 (by which subsections (2), (3) and (4) were added to it) simply empowered the High Court to call for the record of any case which had been decided by any Court subordinate to it and in which no appeal lay thereto. Under that section, the High Court can assume jurisdiction suo motu or on being moved to do so by a party. By the newly-added subsection (2), the same power has been vested in the District Court in cases in which the amount or value of the subject-matter thereof does not exceed the limits of the appellate jurisdiction of the District Court. Subsection (3) of section 115 provides:-- "(3) If any application under subsection (1) in respect of a case within the competence of the District Court has been made either to the High Court or the District Court, no further such application shall be made to either of them."
This subsection expressly recognizes the right of a party to make an application seeking revision of an order of a subordinate Court. By providing that if an application has been made by a party to the District Court, another application shall not be made to that Court or to the High Court, the intention that only one right of revision is available has been made clear. Then, section 141 of the C.P.C. provides that the procedure provided in that Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction. The provisions of Order 23 read with section 141, C.P.C. are, therefore, applicable. This view receives support from Municipal Committee, Jhelum v. Maulvi Muhammad Shafi 1971 SCMR 740 and Mst. Sahib Khatoon and another v. Khan Muhammad and another 1979 CLC 273. The latter case is directly in point, for it was held that the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the C.P.C. read with section 141 apply to a revision petition under section 115, C.P.C. Learned counsel for the petitioners maintains that there is a distinction between an appeal and a revision petition, in that there is power in this Court under section 115 to call for the record of a case and to examine and make such order as it thinks fit it if the case is otherwise within the provisions of that section. But as observed above, in Civil Revision No,585-D of 1989, this Court exercised its jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. on the application of the petitioners; the jurisdiction was not assumed suo motu. He cited two cases; Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies PLD 1964 SC 97 and Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678. I find nothing in Muhammad Swaleh's case supporting the view point of the petitioners' counsel. In Khuda Yar's case, it was held that normally "legal technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice unless they present a hurdle brushing aside which might lead to unsettlement and uncertainty of law". It was, however, added that "it is equally important to bear in mind the well-known maxim that equity follows the law, a maxim acted upon by the Court of Chancery in England", and that where the law clearly applies it has to be given full effect howsoever harsh it might appear to be.
7. For these reasons, I hold that this revision petition is not competent. It is dismissed but the parties are left to bear their own costs.