' The petitioner Muhammad Suleman and the respondent Mst. Zubaida, were husband and wife.
However, Rukhsati of respondent Mst. Zubaida did not take place after the conclusion of their Nikah.
She filed a suit for dissolution of marriage against the petitioner. During these proceedings, a voluntary compromise took place between the parties on 10-4-1986 whereby the dower amount was enhanced from Rs,5,000 to Rs,4,00,000. In the result, the respondent went to live in the house of the petitioner as his wife. After some time, the relations between the parties again became strained and as such she filed another suit for dissolution of marriage which was decreed on the ground of cruelty on 27-64989. The contesting respondent also filed a suit for recovery of dower amount of Rs,4,00,000 (Rupees four lacs). In support of the suit, Mst. Zubaida produced Hasan Din P.W.2, Muhammad Rafique P.W.3. She also appeared as P.W.3 In rebuttal, the petitioner/defendant produced Muhammad Ramzan D.W.1, Muhammad Asghar D. W.2. He himself appeared as D.W.3 in support of his plea that the dower amount has been paid by him to the respondent. Learned trial Judge after discussing the evidence dimisssed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff. However, in appeal the suit was decreed by the learned Additional District Judge on 23-10-1990.
2. According to the learned counsel, it is established beyond doubt that the entire dower amount was paid by the petitioner to his wife in presence of her brother and mother. He argues that said persons were not produced by the respondent to rebut the evidence of the petitioner. It is therefore, submitted that evidence of the petitioner was not properly construed by the learned Appellate Court. He further states that finding of fact having been arrived at by the learned trial Judge was not taken into consideration by the learned appellate forum. It is argued by the learned counsel for the contesting respondent that a finding of fact has been given by the learned appellate Court that the petitioner did not pay the dower amount to the respondent. He also argues that the writ petition suffers from laches and delay inasmuch as the petition was filed after a delay of one year and seven months without offering any explanation in that behalf.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also read the record with care. Learned counsel for the petitioner has miserably failed to explain the delay in the institution of this petition before this Court. The impugned order was passed by the learned Additional District Judge on 23-10-1990 and the Constitutional petition was instituted before this Court on 11-5-1992. There is, therefore an inordinate delay of more than one year for which no plausible explanation has been given by the petitioner. Learned counsel urges that there is no period of limitation having been fixed by law for filing the Constitutional petition in this Court. This may be true but it is well settled that the petitions under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, are to be instituted as early as possible by the aggrieved persons after the adverse orders are passed against them. In my view, learned counsel has failed to give any sufficient explanation for the delay in the institution of this writ petition. It is accordingly held that this petition suffers from laches and delay and as such is liable to dismissal. Learned counsel has relied upon the fact that it was the duty of the respondent to have produced her mother and brother to show that she did not receive the dower amount. In reply, learned counsel for the contesting respondent says that it was for the petitioner to summon mother and brother of respondent No,1 to prove that no such payment was ever made because burden of proof was on him. Learned counsel has failed to point out any legal infirmity much less jursdictional defect in the impugned order. There is, therefore, no substance in B the petition which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.