1. ' JUSTICE AMIR-UL-MULK MENGAL (MEMBER).--This appeal filed under section 13 of Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1992 is directed against judgment dated 25-1-1993 passed by Special Court for Speedy Trials Balochistan at Quetta whereby the appellants were found guilty under section 302/109/120-B/210, P.P.C. And convicted and sentenced as under:--
1. ACCUSED MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE KAMBOH, SON OF KHUSHI MUHAMMAD
(i) For offence under section 120-B/109, P.P.C. Read with section 302 of Criminal Law (Amendment)
2. Qisas and Diyat Act, p92, the accused Muhammad Rafique Kamboh, son of Khushi Muhammad, is convicted and sentenced to death. HE BE HANGED BY NECK TILL HE BE DEAD. The accused Muhammad Rafique Kamboh is also fined Rs,1,00,000 (Rupees one lac), out of which half is to be paid to the legal heirs of deceased Lady Mst. Aamna, daughter of Amanullah and in case of default in payment of fine, he shall further udergo R.I. For seven years.
3. ' For offence under section 201, P.P.C. The accused Muhammad Rafique Kamboh is convicted and sentenced to suffer R.I. For seven years and to pay fine of Rs,10,000 (Rupees ten thousand) and in case of default in payment of fine to further undergo R.I. For two years.
2. ACCUSED QALANDAR KHAN SON OF BAZ MUHAMMAD
(i) For offence under section 302 of Criminal Law (Amendment) Qisas and Diyat Act 1992, read with section 120-B, P.P.C. The accused Qalandar Khan son of Baz Muhammad is convicted and sentenced to death. HE BE HANGED BY NECK TILL HE BE DEAD. The accused Qalandar Khan is also fined Rs,1,00,000 (Rupees one lac) out of which half is to be paid to the legal heirs of deceased Mst.
4. Aamna, daughter of Amanullah and in case of default in payment of fine, he shall further undergo R.I. For seven years.
5. ' For offence under section 201, P.P.C. The accused Qalandar Khan is convicted and sentenced to suffer R.I. For seven years and to pay fine of Rs,10,000 (Rupees ten thousand) and in case of default in payment of fine to further undergo R.I. For two years.
6. ' Both the accused shall not be entitled for the benefit of section 382(B), Cr.P.C..
7. ' Concisely stated the facts of the case are that on 6th of September, 1992 appellant-convict Muhammad Rafique Kamboh informed the police on telephone that when he entered his house he found his wife Aamna Bibi dead lying in pool of blood in the T.V. Lounge. The S.H.O. Of Bijli. Road Police Station, Quetta alongwiLh other police officers rushed to the place of incident. Fard-e-Bayan of Muhammad Rafique Kamboh was obtained and sent to the police station for registration of the case, in pursuance whereof F.I.R. No,74 of 1992 (Exh.P/21) was registered. Initially Sub-Inspector Aminullah was entrusted the investigation of the case who conducted necessary investigation by preparing site inspection note Exh.P/5 and inquest report. He also sent the dead body to Civil Hospital, Quetta for autopsy, obtained blood lying near the deceased and prepared parcel No,1 and completed all the formalities.
8. ' Thereafter Muhammad Iqbal I.P./S.H.O. Was handed over the investigation of the case. It may be noted that by that time the police suspected appellant as murderer and he was also included in the investigation. In such circumstances on 9th of September, 1992 the convict-appellants were arrested. At the pointation of appellant Qalandar Khan, Dopatta and shirt of decesased lady were recovered from almirah lying in the room adjacent to the T.V. Lounge. Likewise an iron grill.. .. ... Was recovered at the instance of Muhammad Rafique Kamboh. The parcels were sent for examination by Chemical Examiner who sent his report Exh.P/14. Another important feature of the case was that during investigation both the convicts were produced before A.C./Magistrate First Class, Quetta for recording of their confessional statements. On completion of investigation challan Exh.P/19 was sent to Sessions Judge, Quetta for trial. However, case was transferred to the Judge Special Court for Speedy Trials Balochistan at Quetta vide Notification dated 17th of December, 1992.
9. ' Charge was framed against the accused persons under section 302/120-B/109, P.P.C. To which both the appellants PLEADED NOT GUILTY and claimed trial.
10. ' In order to substantiate the accusations the prosecution examined nine witnesses namely P.W.1 Faiz Ahmad Bhatti, P.W.2 Tariq Shafique, P.W.3 Azmat Hussain, P.W.4, Dr. Muhammad Amin Mengal, P.W.5, Syed Abdullah, P.W.6 Fawad Hassan Fawad, P.W.7 Najmuddin Tareen, D.S.P., P.W.8 Aminullah Sub-Inspector and P.W.9 Muhammad Iqbal S.H.O. And Investigating Officer. Besides this the prosecution relied on the confessional statements of both the appellants, recoveries, medical evidence and motive. Statements of both the appellants were recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C.
11. And both the appellants were also examined on oath under section 340(2), Cr.P.C. In defence appellants produced D.W.1 Abdul Ghani, D.W.2 Dr. Muhammad Amin Mengal (who was in fact a prosecution witness) and D.W.3 Muhammad Naeem.
12. ' Learned trial Judge while believing the material brought by the prosecution convicted and sentenced both the appellants as mentioned hereinabove.
13. ' Heard Mr. Muhammad Munir Khan, Advocate for appellants, assisted by Mr. S A.M. Quadri, Advocate and learned Special Public Prosecutor Mr. M.S. Rakhshani for the State.
14. ' Appellants' counsel vehemently urged that prosecution has failed to bring evidence sufficient enough for conviction of the appellants. According to him there are serious doubts and glaring contradictions in the confessional statements vis-a-vis other evidence, such as recovery of articles etc. ' The main thrust of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants was that the confessional statements made by both the accused were not voluntary which were, however, retracted at the trial.
15. ' It is important to note that it was an unseen incident. However, the prosecution brought circumstantial evidence to substantiate the charge; out of which the most important piece of evidence is confessional statements made by appellants. Learned counsel, therefore, made every effort to argue that the confessional statements are inadmissible in evidence.
16. ' Three pronged attack was made on the voluntariness of the confessional statements. Firstly, the learned counsel took exception to the conduct of P.W. 6 Fawad Hassan Fawad who was Assistant Commissioner/ Magistrate First Class, Quetta. While criticising the said P.W. It was contended that he failed to discharge his duties in the manner which was required of him being a Magistrate First Class. The said P.W. Visited the house of the appellant alongwith Deputy Commissioner. He visited Thana where the appellants were being interrogated and then it was none else but the same P.W.
17. Who recored the confessional statements of both the appellants. In these circumstances learned counsel proposed that Court should not believe the confessional statements as having been made voluntarily because in fact Magistrate was associated with the investigation of the case. This being so it was incumbent and proper that P.W. 6 should have referred the appellants to any other Magistrate for recording of their confessional statements. Another limb of the argument advanced in this respect was that it was mandatory for Magistrate to have mentioned in writing about asking the police who brought appellants for recording their confessional statements t6 go out of the room and this fact should emanate from the record. Reliance was placed on AIR 1959 Mysore 250.
18. ' We have perused the aforementioned judgment referred to by the learned counsel. The learned Judges held therein that Magistrate taking part in investigation but not informing the accused that he was Magistrate could not have recorded the confessional statement. But in the instant case it is to be seen whether the Assistant Commissioner took part in the investigation at all and whether no material exists on record that he informed the appellants about making confessional statements before him who is Magistrate first class.
19. ' From perusal of record it transpired that the Magistrate who was S.D.M. Went to the place of incident alongwith Deputy Commissioner and other officers. According to learned S.P.P. It was so because he was incharge of law and order situation and this murder had created stir in the town, therefore, his visit was but natural and with bona fides. As far as the fact that he informed the appellants about his being a Magistrate Ist Class, it finds support from Exh.P/15, the confessional statement. Question No,1 and Question No, 3 both are to the same effect which are signed by the appellants. As such the ratio decidendi of the aforementioned judgment is inapt to the facts of present case. Likewise in the end of Exh.P/15 the certificate indicates that each one of the appellants was seated alone to ponder whether to make a confessional statement or not. Thus, from the confessional statement as brought on record it is clear that the Magistrate gave sufficient time to the appellants to think before making confessional statements and that they were before a Magistrate First Class. Nan-referring of the appellants for recording of their confessional statements to another Magistrate could be a question of expediency but not in violation of any mandatory principle of law. We, therefore, find no substance in the arguments so advanced.
20. ' The second objection raised by the learned counsel was that in order to rely on a confessional statement the Magistrate should have been satisfied that it was not made as a result of threat, inducement or promise. In this regard the learned counsel read out Article 37 of Qanun-e-Shaddat, 1984. He pointed out that no question regarding the fact that the appellants were making confessional statements on the basis of a promise was asked from the appellants. Thus one out of the three mandatory ingredients was missing in the instant case, therefore, the confessional statements may be kept out of consideration. Reliance was placed on PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lahore 24 and 1975 PCr.LJ 889. In this regard it may be observed that in question No,7 it was asked whether the confessional statement was as a result of duress,'threat or inducement? So also Question No,11 was to the effect whether the appellants have thoroughly considered to make a confessional statement. However, regarding promise there is no mention but it may be observed that it was not the case of the appellants before the trial Court in their statements recorded under section 342, Cr.P.C. As well as 340(2), Cr.P.C. That the confessional statements made by them were as a result of promise. Replying to question No,22, the appellant Rafique Kamboh stated that the confessional statement was extracted through, pressure, torture and inducement to which he was subjected right from the night of incident. Similarly in his statement recorded on oath he deposed as under:- "The Police brought a prepared statement and asked me that I have to give such type of statement before the Magistrate. That statement was of confessional nature. I refused to do so. On this they again threatened me of torture. The police officials and Fawad Magistrate told me that if a statement already prepared by the police is not given by me then I will be convicted and hanged.
21. The only thing which can save me as they suggested was to record that statement before a Magistrate. Again I refused to accept their dictates. I was kept for three days in the same conditions at Bijli Road and Cantt. Police Stations. I was kept in Cantt. Police Station from 9th September, 1992 till the time when my custody was shifted to District Jail."
22. ' Similary appellant Qalandar Khan in reply to Question No, 19 regarding making of confessional statement stated as under:- "Confession was not given by me voluntarily. I was subjected to severe torture from 7-9-1992 to 12- 9-1992 in the police station."
23. ' Thus it was never the case of the appellants that the confessional statements were obtained as a result of promise. The confessional statements, therefore, cannot be regarded as irrelevant in evidence on the count that they were as a result of any promise.
24. ' The third challenge to the confessional statement was that it was not voluntary but as a result of severe torture and threats. Learned counsel referred to the statement of the convicts and pointed out that younger son of appellant Rafique Kamboh was taken to police station in order to compel him to make a confessional statement. So also Qalandar Khan was severely tortured in order to make a confessional statement. In this regard our attention was drawn to PLD 1960 (W.P.) Peshawar 74 and PLD 1964 Lahore 155. It may be observed that each case has to be decided on its own facts and merits. In the instant case appellant Muhammad Rafique Kamboh contended that the confessional statement was as a result of threat and torture. As to threat he stated that his son was taken to police station. But it may be observed that he was arrested on 9th of September, 1992.
25. However, he was asked to visit the police station in order to give details of the incident but then let free prior to 9th. He could conveniently make a complaint to that effect but he did not. He remained in the police station only for two days whereafter he made the confessional statement on 12th of September, 1992. He was remanded, to judicial custody on 12th September, 1992. He could make a complaint from jail right in time but he took 10 days to make such a complaint on 22-9-1992 where there is no mention of any torture but only threats. So also appellant Qalandar Khan had sent a similar application to the learned Sessions Judge, on 10-10-1992. It appears that while in judicial custody the appellants intended to retract confessions, thus they carved out a basis for regarding it as irrelevant in evidence after a considerable long period of time. Their plea therefore seems to us an afterthought. In such circumstances observations made by the learned trial Judge are very relevant wherein he dealt with this aspect in a detailed manner. We see no reason to conclude that the confessional statements made were as a result of threat or torture.
26. ' The last point urged in this regard was that the learned Magistrate recorded confessional statements in a mechanical manner. However, the learned counsel failed to satisfy us that it was so, because all relevant and mandatory requirements in law as envisaged under sections 164, Cr.P.C., 364 Cr.P.C. As well as Article 37 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat were duly complied with.
27. ' Furthermore, it is to be seen that the confessional statement made by both the appellants discloses such minute details, perusal of which even convinces a man of ordinary prudence that it was voluntarily made by the appellants. So much so that details of such senstitive and delicate facts were disclosed which could not be known to any one else but appellant Kamboh and his deceased wife. Relationship of appellant Rafique Kamboh with his deceased wife, her attitude and conduct, the details of her interest, etc. Were stated in a most elaborate manner.
28. ' Besides this, both the appellants were arrested on 9th September, 1992 who made confessional statements on 12th whereafter they were immediately sent to judicial lock-up.
29. Keeping in view the overall effect of the circumstances, we unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the confessional statements were made voluntarily and without any pressure, threat or inducement as alleged. Therefore we regard these statements as important piece of evidence, admissible in law.
30. ' It was next contended that when confessional statement is retracted then the contents thereof should be corroborated through independent evidence in order to sustain conviction. It was urged with utmost emphasis that since recoveries could not be attributed 'to the appellants, therefore, these recoveries do not provide any independent corroboration to the confessional statements.
31. While further elaborating the argument it was canvassed in the first instance that both the appellants have not mentioned regarding recoveries in their confessional statements. Therefore, these recoveries should not be believed.
32. ' It is to be seen that according to prosecution case Dopatta and shirt of the deceased which were worn by the deceased at the time of commission of the offence were thrown on the scene of occurrence and when the police firstly came to the place of incident, these were put in the almirah which was lying there. Objection raised was that these articles could not have been recovered at the instance of Qalandar Khan from the almirah because he had no knowledge that the same have been put in the almirah. This argument is not convincing for the reason that it has come on record that the police had put these scattered clothes lying on the scene of occurrence into the almirah and it was Qalandar Khan who picked these two articles from almirah. Regarding the iron grill from which iron bar was detached it was argued that the police during investigation had gone to the roof of the bungalow and must have seen the grill. Therefore fact that at the pointation of Rafique Kamboh police recovered the grill is not convincing. We are equally not impressed from this argument because there is nothing on record that police had seen this grill. It may also be noted that Rafique Kamboh by lodging F.I.R. In fact attempted to lead the investigation in a wrong direction. But when, he was arrested he disclosed the conspiracy and the manner in which the offence was committed. He led the police party and at his instance grill was recovered. Regarding the recoveries of shoes and socks at the pointation of accused Qalandar Khan the learned counsel strenuously urged that as per confessional statement, these were washed hence the blood stains on the same could not have been detected. In this regard the prosecution examined P.W. 5 Syed Abdullah who in his cross-examination clearly stated that on the articles i,e. Shoes and socks recovered from parcel No,8 blood stains were visible with a naked eye. This in fact was the complete answer to the objection raised.
33. ' So also the learned counsel, regarding the recoveries, pointed out difference of timing. Despite these minor descrepancies, in our considered opinion the prosecution sucessfully proved the recoveries.
34. As to the objection that bra (sic) of the deceased lady was not sent for examination to the chemical examiner as the same should have been bloodstained keeping in view the nature of injuries, it may be observed that it is merely a presumption and even otherwise non-production of a piece of evidence by the prosecution of the like nature where other evidence on the same point was already produced would not give rise to an adverse presumption against the prosecution.
35. ' Another piece of evidence of prosecution version is the post-mortem report. According to Police Surgeon who conducted the autopsy there were as many as 14 injuries on the dead body of Mst.
36. Aamina Bibi. In his opinion the cause of death was the injury to the skull, crushing of brain matter and haemorrhage caused by blunt weapon. Injury No, 11 was sufficient to cause death of deceased.
37. However, learned counsel took exception on this statement arguing that as per medical report injuries on right ear and left nostril were mutilations just after death. According to learned counsel aforemetioned two injuries created doubt which should be given to the accused persons. In this regard it may be noted that the same were minor in nature and could be caused due to falling on the ground.
38. All the injuries as disclosed by the police surgeon were caused by a blunt weapon like iron bar etc. ' The reapprisal of the aforementioned evidence fully established the charge against the accused/appellants. The inescapable conclusion, therefore, would be that deceased was killed oy Qalandar Khan as a result of conspiracy between him and appellant Rafique Kamboh.
39. This leads us to the alternate plea taken by the counsel for the appellants regarding quantum of sentence. Learned counsel without conceding that appellants were responsible for the commission of the offence, however, challenged the sentence of death mainly on the following two grounds:-
(a) Motive;
(b) the offence actually committed; ' It was argued that deceased was not a Masoom-e-Dam (URDU TEXT). She did not prove to be a lady of good moral character and serveral persons including one Aamar used to visit her. So much as that when admonished by appellant, Rafique Kamboh she did not mend her ways. Thus being the husband of deceased, Rafique Kamboh was under a constant mental pressure and agony.
40. While referring to the confessional statement of Rafique Kamboh learned counsel pointed out that at the eventful night when Rafique Kamboh went to Sarena Hotel to take the deceased to the house, he in fact changed his mind to kill the deceased. He, therefore, asked the deceased to go alongwith him to his mother's house in order to take the children but she refused. Not only that but she clearly stated that she had given time to a friend. This added to the fuel and Rafique Kamboh was much perturbed and then decided to act according to his plan. Learned counsel then explained the mental condition being faced by appellant Rafique Kamboh in such circumstances.
41. ' Regarding appellant Qandar Khan learned counsel urged that he was the servant of Rafique Kamboh and used to work in his factory. Further referring to the contents of confessional statement it was pointed out that Qalandar Khan was taken to the house of appellant Kamboh who administered oath to him on Holy Qur'an that he would do for him any work which he is assigned.
42. Thus being the servant and under oath appellant Qalandar Khan as a faithful servant to his master acted upon his plan. He had no motive to kill the deceased nor he had any part to play otherwise.
43. He did whatever was ordered by his master. For the foregoing reasons learned counsel prayed that this Court should take into consideration the circumstances while confirming the death sentences.
44. According to him Mst. Aamna Bibi was a woman of ill-repute having relations with other persons although she was mother of six children. So much so that people started visiting her in the house thus the chastity of the house was violated and she proved to be an unfaithful wife. Appellant No, 1 in such circumstances hatched a conspiracy with Qalandar Khan to do away with his wife.
45. Therefore, death sentence in the circumstances was not warranted.
46. ' Another argument advanced regarding quantum of sentence was the offence committed by each of the appellants. Taking the case of appellant Rafique Kamboh first the learned counsel contended that he has not committed an offence of Qalt-i-Amd liable to Qisas. His case, therefore, falls within section 306, P.P.C. (as amended). For the sake of convenience we reproduce the aforementioned section 306, P.P.C. As under:-- "306. Qatl-i-Amd not liable to Qisas.--Qatl-i-amd shall not be liable to Qisas in the following cases, namely:--
(a) . ..
(b) . .
(c) . When any Wali of the victim is a direct descendant, howlowsoever of the offender."
47. Learned counsel strenuously argued that admittedly the children of the victim are direct descendants of the appellant Kamboh being his children. In such circumstances the punishment awarded could only be Diyat and not Qisas. This being so the learned counsel argued that punishment would be governed under section 308, P.P.C. (as amended) which reads as under:-- "308. Punishment in Qatl-i-Amd not liable to Qisas, etc.--(1) Where an offender guilty of Qalt-i-Amd is not liable to Qisas under section 306 or the Qisas is not enforceable under clause (e) of section 307, he shall be liable to Diyat: ' Provided that, where the offender is minor or insane, Diyat shall be payable either from his property or by such person as may be determined by the Court: ' Provided further that, where at the time of committing of Qatl-i-Amd the offender being a minor, had attained sufficient maturity or being insane, had a lucid interval, so as to be able to realise the consequences of his act, he may also be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen years as Tazir: ' Provided further that, where the Qisas is not enforceable under clause (c) of section 307 the offender shall be liable to Diyat only if there is any Wali other than offender and if there is no Wali other than the offender, he shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen years as Ta'zir.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) the Court having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case in addition to the punishment of Diyat, may punish the offender with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to fourteen years, as Ta'zir.
48. We have already held that the prosecution has brought sufficient evidence and proved the fact that appellant Rafique Kamboh conspired to kill his wife Aamna Bibi for which purpose he used appellant Qalandar Khan. He is, therefore, found guilty under section 120-B, P.P.C. Read with section 302, P.P.C. However, it is an admitted position that the Walis (heirs) of the victim Aamna Bibi are also his Walis direct descendants being his children, conspiracy for Qatl-i-Amd is not liable to Qisas in view of section 308, P.P.C. The offence, therefore, falls within section 306, P.P.C. (as amended) which envisages that Qatl-i-Amd shall not be liable to Qisas if any Wali of victim is direct descendant of offender. Offender Rafique Kamboh in fact was found guilty for conspiracy to commit offence under section 306, P.P.C. When the capital offence is not liable to Qisas obviously the conspiracy to commit the same cannot be liable to Qisas as well in view of section 109, P.P.C. In such circumstances the death sentence awarded to appellant Rafique Kamboh is not confirmed.
49. However, he shall be liable to Diyat as per provisions of section 308, P.P.C.
50. ' It has come on record that appellant Rafique Kamboh is owner of a factory and man of means. He is ordered to pay an amount of Rs,6,00,000 (Rupees six lacs) to the legal heirs of deceased Aamna Bibi including her mother, other than himself. The aforementioned amount shall be recovered from the convict to be paid to the legal heirs of Aamna Bibi in accordance with law.
51. ' In addition thereto we have taken into consideration the entire material on record and we have come to the conclusion that keeping in view attending circumstances of the case and in exercise of the powers as provided by proviso (2) to section 308, P.P.C. We also sentence Rafique Kamboh to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 14 years. There is ample evidence on record that appellant Rafique Kamboh knowingly caused the evidence of commission of the offence to disappear with the intention of screening himself as offender from legal punishment and also gave information respecting the offence which he knew was false, therefore, he is liable to be punished for the same.
52. It is pertinent to point out here that learned counsel for the appellants emphasised that if the accused person is punished for the capital offence then punishment and sentence under section 201, P.P.C. Cannot simultaneously be awarded to him as it would cause double jeopardy. We do not find any force in this argument because section 201, P.P.C. Is an independent and separate offence K although committed in the same transaction. We, therefore, maintain the conviction and sentence awarded under section 201, P.P.C. To appellant Rafique Kamboh by the trial Court.
53. However, sentence of imprisonment awarded under section 308, P.P.C. And section 201, P.P.C. Shall run concurrently.
54. ' Regarding accused Qalandar Khan learned counsel argued that he was servant of first appellant Rafique Kamboh and in fact was trapped by him. He repeated the version that Qalandar Khan was given oath on Holy Qur'an after he found himself under obligation to perform whatever was ordered to him by the first appellant. Further he had no motive to kill the deceased and that whatever was done by him was under the influence of Muhammad Rafique Kamboh.
55. We have given our anxious consideration to the arguments so raised. It has come on record that appellant Qalandar Khan was serving in the factory of appellant Rafique Kamboh. He had no personal grudge nor any motive to commit the offence. However, being influenced by his master, he committed the offence.. Keeping in view the attending circumstances and the evidence brought on record in this case we are inclined to maintain conviction of Qalandar Khan under section 302, P.P.C. As amended read with section 128-B, P.P.C. However in view of the peculiar circumstances as mentioned hereinabove we convert his sentence from death and fine to imprisonment for life under section 302(c), P.P.C. As amended. We also uphold his conviction and sentence under section 201, P.P.C. The sentences of imprisonment shall, however, run concurrently.
56. ' The upshot of the above discussion would be that we partly accept the appeal of Muhammad Rafique Kamboh son of Khushi Muhammad, caste Kamboh and while maintaining his conviction under section 302, P.P.C. As amended read with section 120-B, P.P.C. And extend him the benefit of section 306(c), P.P.C. Being Wali of deceased as he is direct descendant of deceased.
57. Consequently we decline to confirm the death sentence. However, we award him 14 years' R.I.
58. Besides payment of a sum of Rs,6,00,000 (Rupees six lacs) as Diyat, payable to the heirs of the deceased including the mother of deceased but other than himself. We further maintain his conviction and sentence of imprisonment and fine under section 201, P.P.C. So also the death sentence of Qalandar Khan is NOT CONFIRMED but his conviction under section 302, P.P.C. Read with section 120-B, P.P.C. Shall be maintained.
59. ' However, death sentence is converted into imprisonment for life. His conviction under section 201, P.P.C. Is also maintained. The sentence, however, shall run concurrently.
60. ' Criminal Appeal No,1 of 1993 is thus disposed of accordingly and here are the detailed reasons for the order passed by us on 21-2-1993.