' This petition under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeks revision of the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad dated 5-1-1992 whereby the appeal filed by respondent against the order dated 23-12-1990 was accepted.
2. Muhammad Siddique who was husband of Mst. Hameedah Begum and brother of Muhammad Khurshid and Muhammad Ishaque died on 10-7-1990. During the life time, he was employed as watchman in the service of Pakistan State Oil Company. He was contributing towards Provident Fund, set up for the employees of the company. He had, at that time, nominated his wife to be the person solely entitled to receive the Provident Fund in the event of his death.
3. Muhammad Siddique died on 10-7-1990 and was succeeded by his widow Mst. Hameedah Begum and his 2 brothers Muhammad Khurshid and Muhammad Ishaque, out of whom Muhammad Khurshid died subsequently. On the death of Muhammad Siddique, two applications, one by respondent and other by the petitioner, were filed for the grant of succession certificate. The contest between the parties was confined to the question as to whether after the death of Muhammad Siddique, his widow on the basis of being a nominee could receive and recover the provident fund lying to the credit of the deceased with the employer and whether the brother of the deceased had also any share in it. This controversy was resolved by the trial Court vide order, dated 5-1-1992 in which he came to the conclusion on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Federal Government of Pakistan v. Public at-Large PLD 1991 SC 731 that entire family of the deceased would be entitled to share according to Shariat Laws in the Provident Fund lying to the credit of the deceased. This order of the learned trial Court was, however, set aside in appeal by the learned Additional District Judge on the basis of the same judgment holding that the respondent being nominee alone would be entitled to entire provident fund.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition has contended that the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that the respondent being nominee was sole owner of the amount lying in the provident fund is contrary to law and not sustainable. According to the learned counsel, nomination merely entitles a person to receive the amount from where it was lying but the ownership of the same does not exclusively vest in the nominee. It was emphasised that according to law, all the heirs are entitled to ratable share in the estate including the provident fund. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has defended the impugned judgment by contending that in view of the rules applicable and nomination of the respondent by the deceased during his lifetime, she alone was entitled to receive the provident fund.
5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, I find that the View taken by the learned Additional District Judge is not sustainable as it runs counter to the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Amtul Habib and others v. Mst. Musarrat Perveen and others PLD 1974 SC 185 and also the decision of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in Federal Government of Pakistan v. Public-at-Large PLD 1991 SC 731. In the first-mentioned case, the nature of the provident fund and A the nomination made under the Provident Funds Act were duly considered and it was held that the nomination does not confer any right in the ownership in the provident fund but merely entitles the nominee to receive the amount. It was further observed that the validity of the nomination expires with the death of the mandator and the fund forms part of the. undisposed estate of the deceased to be disposed of amongst his heirs. In view of this position, there is no option but to accept this revision petition and set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge.
' As a result of what has been stated above, this petition is allowed and the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge dated 5-1-1992 is set aside with the result that the order of the trial Court dated 23-12-1990 as regards provident fund stands restored with no order as to costs.