' The facts out of which this application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Has arisen are simple and may be briefly summed up.
2. Applicant Muhammad Irfan Khan, an employee of Pakistan Railways is the owner of a house which is in occupation of one Mst. Hajra as tenant. He used to visit the house of Mst. Hajra, mother of grown up daughters, to collect rent, which was objected by respondents Nos.1 to 3. It is alleged that the applicant No,1 and his relatives, the applicants Nos.2 to 4 had strained relations with respondents Nos.1 to 3 over this affair and there was previous litigation between the parties. In order to prevent a breach of peace between the parties the A.S.I. Orangi Town Police Station submitted a report under section 107/117, Cr.P.C. Before Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M. Orangi Town, Karachi West, against both the parties. On 27-2-1991 the learned S.D.M. Passed an order under section 112, Cr.P.C. Calling upon the applicants to execute a bond in the sum of Rs,5,000 (Rs,five thousand) each with one surety for keeping peace for a period of one year. It is in these circumstances that the applicants have invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court seeking quashment of proceedings pending against them under section 107/117, Cr.P.C., in the Court of Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M. Orangi Town, Karachi West.
3. I have heard Mr. Akhlaque Ahmad Siddiqui, learned counsel for applicants and Mr. Aziz-ur- Rehman Shaikh, learned counsel for State. The respondents Nos.1 to 3 who were served for previous dates of hearing have preferred to remain absent.
4. The object of section 107, Cr.P.C. Is preventive and not punitive and an action under this provision of law is intended to prevent a breach of peace. Admittedly the relations between the parties are strained. The applicant No,1 is said to have filed a suit for damages/compensation against respondents Nos.1 to 3 which was pending when the proceedings under section 107, Cr.P.C. Were drawn against the applicants. The perusal of the report filed by A.S.I., Orangi Town before Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M., Orangi Town, Karachi West, further reveals that an action under section 107, Cr.P.C. Was proposed against both the parties. The applicants instead of contesting the case before learned S.D.M. Rushed to this Court without realising that the conclusions as to the truth or otherwise of the evidence proposed to be adduced by the parties are so manifestly pure questions of fact, which cannot be examined by this Court at this stage.
5. As observed in the well-known case of M.S. Khawaja v. The State reported in PLD 1965 SC 287, to quash a judicial ix oceeding in order to secure the ends of justice would involve a finding that if permitted to continue, that proceeding would defeat the ends of justice, or in other words, would either operate or perpetuate an injustice. No such situation exists in this case. In fact the applicants had invoked the jurisdiction of this Court at a premature stage.
6. Mr. Aziz-ur-Rahman Shaikh, learned counsel for State has, however, contended that the period of one year from the date of passing order under section 112, Cr.P.C. Has already elapsed and since under section 118, Cr.P.C. The final order could not be for a period longer than the one specified in the order under section 112, Cr.P.C. The proceedings pending against the applicants have become infructuous. The cases reported as Jamal Khan v. State PLD 1958 Kar. 646, State v. Shafi Muhammad and others PLD 1961 Kar. 118, and State v. Hyder PLD 1963 Kar. 673, are relevant on this point. All these cases were examined in Criminal Reference No,51 of 1973, decided on 15-2-1974 by late Tufail Ali Abdul Rehman, CJ., who was pleased to observe as follows:-- "Inclined as I myself am to holding that the period referred to in section 118 must be regarded as a period equivalent in length to the one stated in the order under section 112 and to commence from the date of that order, yet I find it impossible finally so to hold in view of the language of section 120, Criminal Procedure Code, which I have already reproduced. Subsection (1) of that section, as I have already stated, applies in a very special set of circumstances but there can be no question but that subsection (2) applies in all other cases and the language of this subsection is plain and unambiguous and requires that the period shall commence on the date of "such order", meaning the order under section 118. This might be illogical but it is not for the Court to ascribe meaning to expressions used by the legislature which they do not bear merely on the ground that it would be unreasonable so to do if the meaning of the legislature is expressed in plain language incapable of being misunderstood, I feel constrained by .Reason of the language in this subsection to hold that the order under section 118 is for a length of time no longer than the one mentioned in the order under section 112 but that length of time is to commence from the date of the order under section 118 and not the order under section 112., Criminal Procedure Code. In these circumstances I am compelled to reject this reference. I am conscious of the fact that in some cases I have myself, while setting aside orders under section 117(3) of the Code directed the quashment of the entire proceedings on the ground that the period mentioned in the order under section 112 had already elapsed but these were based upon the understanding of the expression "period" in the sense in which I would have been inclined to interpret it, had it not been for section 120. In none of these cases was the question argued before me nor was section 120 considered."
' I am in respectable agreement with the above view.
7. Having regard to the above legal position, I see no substance in this application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Which is accordingly dismissed.