1. ' SYED HAIDER ALI PIRZADA, J.---Both these Constitution petitions have been heard together and will be governed by this common judgment. In these petitions prayer has been made to quash the order of respondent No,1, dated 30-1-1984 and the order of respondent No,2, dated 4-1-1983.
2. ' The facts leading to the filing of the above petitions are that property bearing No, L.Y. 12/5 VI-B-175, G-1 and G-2 was evacuee property and the same was acquired under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and formed part of the compensation pool. The aforesaid tenement No,G-1 was transferred by the Settlement Authority to Muhammad Ibrahim on his Form NCH and the transfer price was adjusted from the compensation book. The petitioner Muhammad Ibrahim was issued PTO No,1973, dated 8-6-1967 and PTD, dated 30-9-1971. The petitioner and respondent No,5 entered into an agreement of sale dated 30-5-1978 and a supplementary agreement of sale dated 10-7-1979 in respect of the aforesaid property No, L.Y. 12/5, G-1 and a public notice was issued in the Daily Mashriq, dated 19-9-1978 inviting objections, if any, within seven days of the publication of the said notice. No objection was received from any party.
3. Similarly tenement No,G-2 was transferred by the Settlement Authority to Mst. Ulfat wife of Qamaruddin respondent No, 5 in Constitution Petition No, 205 of 1985 on her form CH and the transfer price was adjusted from the compensation book. The said Mst. Ulfat was issued PTO No,21346, dated 16-6-1971 and PTD, dated 13-10-1971. Similarly the petitioner and respondent No,5 entered into agreement of sale in respect of the aforesaid property No, L.Y. 12/5 G-2 and a public notice was published in the Daily Mashriq, dated 19-9-1978 inviting objections, if any, within seven days of the publication of the notice. No objection having been received from any quarter, the petitioner purchased the said property through a registered sale-deed, dated 20-12-1978.
4. ' It is the case of the petitioners that they applied for the mutation of their names in the record of the City Deputy Collector. The City Deputy Collector called for no-objection certificates from the Settlement Authority before the mutation of the names of the petitioners and on such a query the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi vide letter No, SCK/78-356, dated 24-6-1978 and letter No, SCK/78-1182, dated 4-11-1978 intimated no objection if the names of the transferees were mutated in the City Survey Record. On receipt of the said letters, mutations were allowed. The names of the petitioners were also mutated in the Form PT-1 maintained by Excise and Taxation Office some correspondence between themselves and the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi through his letter No, SCK/79-Admn-4, dated 1-1-1980 wrote to respondent No,3 that tenements No,G-1 and G-2 had been transferred to petitioners and PTD were issued in their favour.
5. It was specifically clarified in the said letter that there is something on record to show that the property was attached with religious or charitable trust.
6. ' It is the case of the petitioners that the respondents Nos.3 and 4 had ' The respondent No,3 moved applications before the respondent No,2 stating therein that as per entries in the CDC record, the property stood in the name of Khatri Punchayat Bathing Ghat. It was prayed that the property in question be declared as an Evacuee Trust Property. The parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions. The respondent No,2 on assessment of evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the property in question is Evacuee Trust Property. The petitioners being aggrieved, filed revision before the respondent No,1. The respondent No,1 on reassessment of the evidence on record, affirmed the findings of the respondent No,2. The petitioners have challenged the orders of the respondents Nos.1 and 2 in these petitions.
7. ' Mr. Abdul Naseer Khan contended that the impugned orders being illegal and void inasmuch as the property is not evacuee trust property. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the following decisions:---
(1) Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, Karachi v. Abdullah and 2 others 1970 SCMR 503.
(2) District Evacuee Trust Property Committee, Hyderabad v. Bashiruddin and another PLD 1973 Note 21 at p.32.
(3) Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Office and others v. Bashir Ahmad and others 1977 SCMR 208.
(4) Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, Karachi v. Muhammad Idris Qureshi and another PLD 1978 Kar.
8. 125.
(5) Eastern Federal Union Insurance Company Ltd. v. Bawany Industries Ltd., Karachi 1979 CLC 321.
(6) Mst. Farkhanda Akhtar and 3 others v. Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore PLD 1980 Lahore 804.
(7) Mst. Hafeez Begum v. Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property and 11 others PLD 1983 Kar.
9. 374.
(8) Muhammad Rafiq v. Mehr Din etc. 1983 SCMR 1184.
(9) District Evacuee Trust Property Committee, Hyderabad v. Sarfraz Khan and 7 others 1989 SCMR 1753.
(10) Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Rahim Khan and 3 others 1989 SCMR 1605.
(11) District Evacuee Trust Committee, Hyderabad v. Mustafa Ahmad and another 1990 SCMR 15.
(12) District Evacuee Trust Committee v. Muhammad Umar and others 1990 SCMR 25.
(13) Mst. Mariam Bi and 2 others v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1990 Karachi 427.
(14) Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Lahore v. A.R. Chaudhry and 4 others 1981 CLC 1006.
10. ' On the other hand, Mr. S.H. Fani, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, supported the orders. He submitted that the property in question is Ashnan Ghat. There is evidence on record to show that the property in question is Khatri Ashnan Ghat and is an evacuee property. In support of this contention, he invited our attention to Hindu Law by Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastri (6th Edition) and Law of Endowments, Hindu and Mahomedan (Ist Edition) by A. Gosh, page 67. He placed reliance on decisions:-
(17) Makhan Lal v. Gayan Singh and others (1911) 33 ILR Allahabad 255.
(18) Birendra Kishore Manikya v. Akram Ali ILR 39 Calcutta 439.
(19) District Evacuee Trust Committee, Hyderabad v. Mustafa Ahmad and another 1990 SCMR 15.
(20) District Evacuee Trust Committee v. Muhammad Umar and others 1990 SCMR 25.
11. ' We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties. We have been taken through the documents annexed to the petitions and also through the decisions.
12. ' The question for consideration is whether the property in question is a religious or charitable trust or not.
13. ' In the case of Divisional Evacuee Trust Committee, Karachi v. Abdullah and 2 others 1970 SCMR 503, it was held that sale-deed did not by itself prove that the Nasarpuri Panchayat was a religious or charitable institution or that any property acquired by the Panchayat was trust property.
14. ' In District Evacuee Trust Property Committee, Hyderabad v. Bashiruddin and another (PLD 1973 Note 21 at p.32), it was held that an extract from the record of rights would only show that the property was a part of trust property but would not show as to what was the nature of the trust and, therefore, such piece of evidence cannot be relied upon for coming to a finding that the property was attached to a trust of the kind contemplated by section 4(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.
15. ' In Mst. Hafeez Begum v. Assistant Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property and 11 others (PLD 1983 Karachi 374), it was held that the question whether an evacuee property is attached to a charitable or other specified trust or institution or not is to be decided by the Chairman.
16. ' In Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property, Lahore v. A.R. Chaudhry and 4 others (1981 CLC 1006), it was held that the mere entry "Wakf Ahl-e-Hanood" in the Record of Rights is not sufficient to establish that the property in dispute is an evacuee trust property. It was further held that it was necessary for the Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property to have brought evidence on the record relating to the constitution of the trust, aims and objects thereof and also the beneficiaries thereunder.
17. ' In Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Rahim Khan and 3 others (1989 SCMR 1605), it was held that the property in dispute has been entered in the Property Register maintained by the City Survey.
18. Authorities as `Tikano Kalachand Rochiram' with an embargo that Kalachand Rochiram or his heirs will have no right to sell the property. The copy of the extract from the Property Register Card also mentioning `Tikano Kalachand Rochiram' would clearly indicate that the property was a religious endowment dedicated to a temple or, in any case, for religious purpose.
19. ' In another case reported in 1989 SCMR 1610, the property was shown in the extract from Property Register Card maintained by the City Surveyor, Hyderabad as 'property attached to Ramdev Mandir Manager, Sobraj Mangaram, Totaram, Mahraj Rijumal Dubumal.' It was held that the property is therefore clearly known in the relevant official record maintained by the City Survey Department, to be attached to a temple and names of persons are shown as Managers. It was further held that under section 135-J of the Sindh Land Revenue Code and section 52 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, such entries have attached to them a presumption of correctness and this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the property was attached to a religious and charitable trust.
20. ' In District Evacuee Trust Committee v. Muhammad Umar and others (1990 SCMR 25), it was held that evacuee property entered in the Property Register Card as trust property. A presumption of correctness would attach to the entries in the said Register.
21. ' In District Evacuee Trust Committee, Hyderabad v. Mustafa Ahmad and another (1990 SCMR 15), the District Evacuee Trust Committee, Hyderabad produced the extract from the Record of Rights or City Survey Record. The extract contained inconsistent entries. In that view of the matter, the Chief Settlement Commissioner came to the conclusion that the entries on the Survey Record are conclusive. In that view of the matter, the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not interfere with his order.
22. ' In the light of the above decisions, we have to consider that the property in dispute is an evacuee trust property or not. The Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property examined Akhlaq Ahmed, Legal Assistant in support of the plea that the property in question is evacuee trust property, i,e, It is Khatri Panchayat Ashnan Ghat. He produced Gazette notification dated 9-8-1963 as Exh. P/1, the extract of the Record of Rights of the City Deputy Collector as Exh. P/2 and extract from Evacuee Property Register as Exh. P/3. The petitioners examined their witnesses in support of their contentions. The respondent No, 2 on assessment of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the property in dispute is an evacuee trust property. This finding is affirmed by the respondent No, 1.
23. The impugned orders were passed by the respondents Nos.1 and 2 on the clear findings of fact that the property in dispute is Khatri Panchayat Bathing Ghat. The findings of fact recorded by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are based on appreciation of evidence and cannot be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Chairman of Evacuee Trust and confirmed by the Secretary to the Government of Pakistan Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such findings the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible or have refused to admit admissible evidence or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The impugned orders do not suffer from any such infirmity. The findings of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are supported by the evidence as indicated above. This Court cannot reappraise the evidence and substitute its own finding as long as the finding is based on evidence and is not shown to be perverse.
24. ' Golap Chandra Sarkar Sastri author of Hindu Law (6th Edn.) at page 680 has stated that the excavation of a tank made for the performance of a work of recognised religious merit comes under the class of religious purposes.
25. ' A. Ghosh stated at page 67 of his book Law of Endowments (Ist Edition) that "to effect a valid dedication 'it is not necessary to establish the image of an idol; all that is essential is that the religious purpose should be clearly specified and the property intended for the endowment set apart for that object. Planting holy trees on ground consecrated for the purpose is a valid form of dedication for a religious purpose according to Hindu law. A place so dedicated for worship ceases to be private property according to Hindu religious ideas and the case of reservoirs is included in the rule. Certain trees are regarded with great veneration by the Hindus. Thus the Asvatha tree, the Tulsi plant and Bilva tree are objects of worship. The first is sacred to Aditya, the second to Vishnu, and the third of Shiva. The Kadamba tree in the Minakshi temple at Madura and the Jambu tree in the temple of Jambukeswa r near Trichinopoly are regarded with great sanctity. It may also be conceded that according to Hindu Shastras special religious merit accrues from the planting of trees in the roadside, on the banks of tanks and in gardens or groves; and the Shastras also inculcate the fear of various punishments on those who fell trees; indeed special ritual is prescribed for the planting of trees for the benefit of the public".
26. The statement of law in the books supports that Khatri Asnam Ghat is a religious and charitable trust as the Ghat is dedicated for religious and charitable trust because there is a board affixed clearly mentions "Khatri Ashnan Ghat" and there is a Tulsi tree planted. We are of the view that the findings of respondents 1 and 2 are in consonance with law.
27. ' Mr. Abdul Naseer Khan vehemently contended that the petitioners being bona fide purchases for value, the sale in their favour should not have been affected and they should have been protected on the principle of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the case of Officer on Special Duty v. Bashir Ahmed 1977 SCMR 208. This contention was not favoured by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bashir Ahmed and others v. Additional Settlement Commissioner with powers of Settlement Commissioner (L) and others reported in 1983 SCMR 1199. We reproduce the relevant observation which appears at page 1200 of the Report: "3. We notice that in Officer on Special Duty v. Bashir Ahmad (1977 SCMR 208), where the basic question was whether after an allegation as to the genuineness of the claim had .Been examined under sections 10 and 11 of the Act and a final order passed, a fresh inquiry could be made, this Court had while holding that it could not be made, because finality attaches to the earlier order in view of section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act and there being no power of review available, further observed in that context that the argument in favour of the reopening the matter overlooks the fact that there was no discoverable principle for penalizing the purchasers for value who were not privy to any fraud or misrepresentation alleged against their predecessor-in- title, the original right-holders. However the question of protection on the principle of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act to the purchaser for value had itself not been in controversy there. Nor was the observation essential to or made the basis of the decision in that case. Since an allotment of land is subject to the provision of sections 10 and 11, every purchaser from an allottee is to be saddled with the knowledge that the transaction of purchase is subject to the incidence of those sections and as such he cannot raise the plea of protection on the principle of section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. His remedy is not against the Department but against the vendor."
28. ' In this view of the matter, it is not necessary to decide other contention of Mr. Abdul Naseer Khan.
29. ' In the premises aforesaid the Constitution petitions are devoid of any merit and they are accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs.