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1970 PLC 662

MESSRS A. I. SILK MILLS LTD.; KARACHI vs MUHAMMAD ALI

Citation1970 PLC 662
CourtIndustrial Court
Date1970-01-14
Judge(s)Feroze Nana Ghulamali, Kasam Usman Kandawala, Mohdrasheed
Resultrules made

ORDER

FEROZE NANA GHULAMALLY, (CHAIKMAN).-This application under section 45 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, Mod 1969, made by the A. I. Silk Mills seeks for an order prohibiting per, the continuance of strike resorted to by the workers of the Gh respondent-Union in furtherance of a strike notice given Ch by the Aater on 25-11-1969. The applicants contend that on 4-12-1969, they have filed an application under section 34 of industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for adjudication and determination of an industrial dispute and else whether the respondents were barred from raising any further demands in accordance with a settlement arrived at between the parties oft 25-3-1969. By clause 16 of this settlement, the parties agreed that the settlement will be binding on them for one year up to 31-3-1970 and the workers of the respondent-Union undertook not to raise any demand involving financial implication during the period of the operation of the settlement. It is further contended that the notice period in consequence of the strike notice expired on 16-12- 1969, that respondent did not strike on 17-12-1969, that therefore the strike notice should be considered to have lapsed. Further that the strike resorted to on 24-11-69 is illegal and that in any case having been resorted to during the pendency of the proceedings under section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in this Court, the application under section 45 is within the jurisdiction and maintainable in law and it had caused irreparable loss in terms of, production and wages of the workers, that workers be ordered to call of the strike and resume work immediately.

2. The respondent's case in their statement is that they are not aware of the application under section 34 in this Court, that a strike notice dated 25-11-69, was sent to the applicant which was effective in law from the date of its receipt by the applicant, that the strike is legal having been resorted to on account of the stubborn attitude of the applicants.

3. In the course of these proceedings an application under Order VI, rule 17, C. P. C. read with section 151, C. P. C. and section 36 (2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was made for an amendment/addition in the application specifically that the strike notice dated 25-11 -1969 was not a proper notice in accordance with clause 13 of the constitution of the respondent-- Union since it was signed by the President Mr. Abdul Aziz who was not vested with the necessary powers to do so that since the strike hag been resorted to without a valid strike notice it was illegal. After hearing the parties on 14-1-1970 we dictated a short order declaring the strike as illegal for reasons to be recorded later wherein are our reasons for doing so.

4. We do not consider necessary at the stage to go into the implications of the arguments of Mr. M.

A. Ghana, leaned counsel of the applicants that since an application under section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is pending in this Court, the strike resorted to by the respondent was illegal as we are convinced after hearing the arguments of the learned counsel that on the short point that the notice served on the applicant was not given in strike in accordance with law that it is an illegal notice and strike restored to in furtherance of it is also illegal. It has been urged before us that the strike notice has not been raised in the prescribed manner by a collective Relations Ordinance 1969 and section 67, subsection (2) clause (b) of the Ordinance expressly states that rules previously made shall be deemed to have been done, made, issued, appointed, constituted, given, commenced or taken, as the case may be, under the corresponding provisions of his ordinance of this ordinance, to the extent of consistency therewith.

5. That facts .in the present case are that in the constitution of the respondent-Union Annexure `A' to the application and under clause 13 "the General Secretary shall be the Custodian of all the records of the Union, shall take minutes of ail general as well as Managing Committee Meetings, conduct all correspondence, convene meetings sign bill of the Union and exercise supervision over the affairs of Union and in the absence of the General Secretary, the Joint secretary shall act". Thus it was the General Secretary who was empowered to correspond for and on behalf on the respondent Union. On the other and. proceeding to clause 12 of the constitution the (resident was responsible for the general supervision of the work of the Union add had to preside over all the meetings of the Managing Committee the Vice-President could beside over the meetings. It has been rightly argued that in the constitution of the Union the President has not empowered to conduct any correspondence and/or sign any letter for any on behalf of the union, the General Secretary of the Union being the only legally empowered and competent authority to do so. Even assuming that the General Secretary was not available at the time when he strikes notice was served, only the Joint Secretary could act, on his behalf and not the President. In the background of this we observed that the strike, notice addressed to the Managing Director of the applicant mills dated 25-11-69, is signed by President of A. I. Silk Mills Workers' Union. It is therefore clear to us under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in the manner 'prescribed in the rules, only the General Secretary of the Union and in his absence, the Joint Secretary could sign and serve a strike notice on the applicants and it has therefore been further argued and quite rightly that the constitution of, die Union has given birth to the Unions and that the powers and functions of the affairs of Union have to '3e subjected to the constitution and not be ------from it.

6. In further support of the above arguments it has also strongly urged before us that the consistency of the Secretary of the Trade Union being a person concerned has been retained under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in terms section 67 subsection (2), clause (b) which expressly states' that rules made under any law shall be deemed to have been done under corresponding provisions of this Ordinance, to the extent consistency therewith, No rules have yet been framed in furtherance of the present Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 the consistency of the Secretary being the only official concerned has been maintained by the framers of the Ordinance and it hastherefore been argued in terms section 46 (1) (b) that a strike is illegal if it is commenced or continued in consequence of an industrial dispute raised in a manner other than that provided in section 43.

We are therefore convinced that the strike notice served by the respondent against the applicants was not in strict accordance with the prescribed law that therefore the strike is illegal and it must follow therefore that the strike resorted to in consequence of the illegal notice in itself is illegal. We have therefore declared accordingly on 14-1-70.

Cited by 3 cases

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