' This civil revision relates to a lease made in favour of the petitioner, Muhammad Farooq, for excavation of ordinary sand from Block No,8, Chiniot, District Jhang. The respondents, who are four in number, are as follows:
(1) The Province of Punjab through its Secretary, Industries and Mineral Development Department, Government of Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Lahore.
(2) The Director of Industries and Mineral Development Wing, Government of Punjab, Poonch House, Lahore.
(3) The Joint Director, Mineral Development, Poonch House, Lahore.
(4) The Assistant Director, Mineral Development, Chiniot.
' The lease was sanctioned by respondent No,
3. Dispute arose between the parties in regard to the said lease whereupon the petitioner filed a suit at Lahore. Plaint in the suit was rejected by a Civil Judge, under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, holding that the petitioner had no cause of action. The petitioner went in appeal before an Additional District Judge. View taken by the learned Additional District Judge was that the Civil Courts at Lahore had no jurisdiction to hear the suit and that the same could be heard by the Civil Courts having territorial jurisdiction qua the area under lease. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, set aside the order of the learned Civil Judge and ordered that the plaint be returned to the petitioner for presentation before a Court of competent jurisdiction. There was also a prayer by the petitioner for grant of temporary injunctions which was refused by the learned Additional District Judge. Orders passed by the learned Additional District Judge have been challenged in this civil revision.
2. As for the question of jurisdiction, it was contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that since the lease in question was sanctioned by respondent No,3, whose office is in Lahore, and the offices of his superiors, namely, respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are also in Lahore, the suit could be instituted at Lahore notwithstanding the fact that respondent No,3 has its sub-office at Chiniot which was being run by respondent No,4. He relied on WAPDA and 2 others v. Mian Ghulam Bari PLD 1991 SC 780 to support his arguments.
3. On the other hand, it was urged by learned counsel for the respondents that since the lease related to the area not within the local limits of the Courts at Lahore, these Courts had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It was also maintained by him that as the lease was terminated (withdrawn) in 1987, the petitioner had no cause of action.
4. While commenting on the submissions of learned counsel for the respondents it was maintained by learned counsel for the petitioner that in pursuance of an application made by the petitioner, he was allowed by the respondents in 1991, to have the benefit of the said lease.
5. As for the question of jurisdiction, the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner finds support from the dictum of the Supreme Court in the cited case of WAPDA and 2 others. Relevant observations recorded in the said case read as follows: "Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that WAPDA is not an ordinary Corporation. It should not be, therefore, equated with the other commercial institutions and further that it should be equated with the Government, the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts in the suits filed against it. While elaborating the argument he has contended that the explanation to section 20, C.P.C. Should be construed in such a manner so as to provide that in case a cause of action has actually arisen at the location of a Branch office of WAPDA, the suit should not be filed with reference to the principal office at Lahore. The explanation reads as follows:- 'A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place.'
' It is true that in the second part of the explanation a scope has been left for filing of the suit at a place where a corporation has a subordinate office provided any cause of action arose at that place. But this part of explanation is preceded by another alternative; namely, that a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office. The use of the word 'or' between the two is very significant. It means that the corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office as well as at any place where it has a subordinate office but in the latter case the cause of action should have arisen at that place. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel being too wide to be accepted and the same also being in negation of the statutory explanation, has no force. Leave to appeal, accordingly, is refused."
In the instant case, lease was allowed by respondent No,3, who functions at Lahore. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 are also here. The cause of action too arose in favour of the petitioner at Lahore due to withdrawal (termination) of the lease by respondent No,3, who, as already stated, is stationed at Lahore. Therefore, in view of the above pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the A Civil Courts at Lahore have jurisdiction to hear the suit. In this view of the matter, the order of learned Additional District Judge by which he directed the return of the plaint for want of jurisdiction is not sustainable.
6. As for the finding of the learned trial Court, that the petitioner has no cause of action, it is to be remembered that there is difference between nondisclosure of cause of action in the plaint and non-availability of cause of action with the plaintiff. If the plaint does not disclose cause of action, it can be rejected under clause (a) of rule 11 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure but if the plaint discloses a cause of action it cannot be so rejected by saying that the plaintiff has no cause of action. When the defendant pleads that there is no cause of action with the plaintiff he, in substance, contends that the plaintiff is not entitled to the right or interest claimed by him. Such a plea cannot be properly disposed of without framing an issue and without recording such evidence as the parties may like to adduce. Aforesaid distinction in the two situations was, I am afraid, not in the mind of the learned Civil Judge when the plaint was rejected by him.
7. As indicated above, there is dispute between the parties with regard to the subsistence of the lease in question. This dispute cannot be properly resolved without framing an issue and recording parties' evidence thereon. For this purpose, therefore, the case will have to be remanded to the learned trial= Court.
8. In result, I accept this civil revision, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court as well as the impugned order made by the learned appellate Court and remand the suit to the learned Civil Judge with a direction that he shall frame all the issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties and then record parties' evidence thereon before deciding the suit afresh.
9. As for the stay matter, I direct that since the position with regard to the subsistence of lease is not very clear status quo shall be maintained during the pendency of the suit. This means that if today, at the present moment (9-50 a.m.). The petitioner is excavating sand from the block in question, he may continue to do so during the pendency of the suit; but if this is not being done by him in pursuance of the order of the respondents, he shall not excavate sand therefrom till the suit is decided. In view of the nature of this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
10. Parties shall appear before the learned Civil Judge on 29th October, 1992 and he is directed to decide the suit within two months, without fail, by giving short dates or by hearing the case daily.