' MUHAMMAD AFZAL LONE, J---In a pre-emption suit fileld by Muhammad Din petitioner against the respondents, the learned trial Court treating the sale price of the land in dispute as Rs, 5,000, in pursuance of the provisions of section 24 of the N.-W.F.P. Pre-emption Act, 1987, by order dated 16- 10-1989, directed the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of the said amount in the Court and furnish bank guarantee to cover the remaining 2/3rd thereof. The respondents applied to the trial Court that the land was actually sold to them for Rs,80,000 and, therefore , the petitioner was required to make deposit in the Court on the basis of the said sale price. This contention prevalied with the learned trial Court. Accordingly, through a detailed order dated 15-1-1990 a direction was given to the petitioner to deposit 1/3rd of Rs,80,000 in the Court and arrange bank guarantee in respect of 2/3rd of the said amount. The petitioner assailed this order in appeal before the Distict Judge, who held that the petitioner procured order dated 16-10-1989 as to the deposit of sale amount on the footing of sale price of Rs,5,000 by fraud and misrepresentation, and, the trial Court was duty bound to undo the fraud. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. This dismissal was challenged by the petitioner through writ petition, but the learned Single Judge of the Abbottabad Bench of the Pershawar High Court did not differ with the findings recorded by the learned District Judge.
Consequently, the writ petition failed. The High Court's judgment dated 6-104992 in this behalf is under challenge before us; from which leave to appeal is sought by the unsuccessful pre-emptor.
2. We have heard the learned counsel. The only submission made by him is that under the first proviso to section 24 the deposit has to be made in the Court within 30 days of the filing of the suit.
In his submission the order of the Court requiring the pre-emptor to make deposit has necessarily to be made within said period of 30 days. The argument was that order dated 15-1-1990 having been made beyond this limit could not be sustained.
3. We are unable to lend any weight to the submission of the learned counsel. The first proviso fixes the outer limit of time for the pre-emptor. The order as to the deposit of sale price in the Court having been made in the absence of the respondents would be presumed to hive been passed subject to their objection. In any case, the order having been obtained by the petitioner by practicing fraud on the Court, the latter was under obligation to recall the same the grant of leave is within the discretion of the Court. Upon the facts of the case, we do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed and the leave prayed for refused.