' Inayat Ali, respondent, of this Civil revision filed a suit for payment of damages against the petitioners, on account of filing of a frivolous suit against him which was dismissed and no appeal was filed thereagainst. It is alleged in the plaint that on account of the said litigation, the respondent suffered mental torture, loss of business and also had to incur expenses of counsel fee etc. Muhammad Ashraf and others, the petitioners in the Civil revision contested the suit on the ground that the suit is barred by time; that the plaintiff has no cause of action and that the plaintiff is not entitled to grant of decree for the recovery of damages an amount of Rs,24,500. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:--
(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of Rs,24,500 as damages from the defendants?
(2) Whether the suit is barred by time?
(3) Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of action?
(4) Relief. ' and after recording of evidence vide judgment and decree dated 1-4-1992, passed a decree for payment of Rs,24,500 in favour of the respondent. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the petitioner filed time-barred appeal in the District Court, Lahore alongwith an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing of the same on the grounds that one of the appellants had fallen ill and their learned counsel did not inform about the impugned judgment decree having been passed against them and that immediately on coming to know of passing of the decree they applied for grant of the certified copies of the judgment and decree dated 1-4-1992 passed by the learned trial Court and having obtained the said copies immediately filed an appeal on 8-11-1992 and therefore there is a sufficient ground for condonation of the delay in filing of the appeal. Learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, vide judgment and decree dated 11-11-1992 dismissed the appeal as being barred by time refusing condonation of delay on the ground that firstly there is no proof about the illness of one of the appellants, secondly on the ground that the appeal could have been filed even by the co-plaintiff and thirdly failure of the learned counsel to inform the appellants about the decision of the case is not a lawful ground to condone the delay inasmuch as they are supposed to be vigilant to pursue his case and the law does not favour those who are negligent to pursue their cases. Learned Additional District Judge further held that delay of each day has to be explained and as there is an unexplained delay of six months in filing of appeal and no sufficient cause exists of condone such a long unexplained and contemptuous delay. Aggrieved of these judgment and decree, the petitioner has filed the present civil revision.
2. Mr. Abdur Rashid Khan, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on case of Hussain Bux and others v. Settlement Commissioner and another (PLD 1969 Lah. 1039), and case of Syed Mahmud Alam v. Syed Mehdi Hussain and 2 others (PLD 1970 Lah. 6), and has argued that the decree was void, therefore, it could have been challenged at any time and could not have been dismissed merely on the ground that the appeal was not filed within a period of 30 days with effect from the passing of the decree plus the days requisite for obtaining of certified copies of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Elaborating his arguments, it has been contended that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decree, the suit for payment of damages on account of filing of a civil suit as held in case of Sultan Ahmad v. Ghulam Muhammad Awan etc. (PLD 1987 Lah. 663). Learned counsel has not argued any other point in support of this civil revision and has not even challenged the legality of the reasoning adopted by the learned first appellate Court for dismissal of the appeal as being barred by time and refusal to condone delay in filing of the appeal.
3. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioner and have also gone through the cited judgments. The judgments in cases referred to supra, are not applicable to the facts of the case in hand and as such law laid down in those cases is not attracted. It has been held by their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Basharat Hussain v. Ghulam Hussain (1978 SCM R 357) that even a void order is to be challenged within limitation. In this case merely saying that the impugned judgment and decree is void will not make such a decree and void and therefore without crossing the bar of limitation, the petitioner is not entitled to challenge the legality of the decree passed in the main suit. The reasons mentioned in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing of the appeal are also insufficient and have been repelled by the learned first appellate Court for lawful reasons. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not challenged the legality of those reasons and as such cannot be allowed to raise plea of voidability of decree in support of this revision petition. The judgment which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the proposition that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to grant a decree for damages on account of filing of a civil suit by a defendant in case of the dismissal thereof, also does not lay the rule as has been pleaded by the learned counsel as is clear from the following portion of the judgment:-- "Be the above as it may, the view taken by the two Courts below is undoubtedly correct inasmuch as it is supported by the above-cited judgment of the Privy Council wherein it is laid down:-- ' The reason why the action does not lie for falsely prosecuting any ordinary civil action is that such a case does not necessarily and naturally involve damage to the party sued. A civil action which is false will be dismissed at the hearing. The defendant's reputation will be cleared of any imputation made against him and he will be indemnified against his expenses by the award of costs against his opponent. The law does not award damages for mental anxiety or for extra costs incurred beyond those imposed on the unsuccessful party.'
' To the same effect was also in Ah Fond v. Nam Kee AIR 1934 Nag. 75 wherein it was held:-- ' It is a general rule of law that a civil action though false and malicious in its institution will not give rise to an action for damages. Ordinarily damage is not involved and the expense to which the defendant is put in resisting the suit is met by as order for costs. The test to be applied is whether the civil action complained of necessarily or naturally involved damage which could not be recompensed by an order for costs. If the action did necessarily or naturally involve such damage and was instituted falsely and maliciously the law provides a remedy and a suit for damages will be maintainable.'"
(Underlining is by me.)
' It is clear that only certain conditions for filing a suit for damages have been highlighted in the cited case. In a suit for payment of damages arising out of filing of a civil suit, the plaintiff has to allege false and malicious prosecution of the suit, as well sufferance of special damages, as a result thereof. Therefore, the cited judgment also does not help the petitioner inasmuch as it cannot be said on the face of it that the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge is without jurisdiction. For recording of finding to the effect that the decree is void or invalid also, the bar of limitation shall have to be crossed and as the c appeal has been dismissed as being barred by him, no interference is possible in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.
' Resultantly, this civil revision is dismissed in limine.