' This is a revision petition against the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 19-6-1991.
2. The application of the respondent for grant of proprietary rights was rejected by the Collector on 17-12-1988. He went in appeal to the Additional Commissioner, who accepted it on 18-3-1989. The petitioner went to the Board of Revenue in a revision petition against the order of the Additional Commissioner dated 18-3-1989. The Board of Revenue dismissed the revision petition of the (present) petitioner by its order dated 5-9-1990. A review application by the petitioner to the Board of Revenue was dismissed by the Board of Revenue on 31-10-1990.
3. The petitioner then went to the Additional Commissioner seeking a review of the Additional Commissioner's earlier decision dated 18-3-1989. This review petition was dismissed on 19-6-1991.
4. The present petition is against this order dated 19-6-1991.
5. It has been argued on behalf of the petitioner that his petition is not affected either by section 163(2)(d) or subsection (4) of the same section of the Land Revenue Act, 1967. His contention is that in both these provisions, the word used is "appeal" and not "revision". In other words under subsection (4) a revision may lie from an ing review or confirming on review a previous order, and on the same reasoning, an order against which a revision has been preferred, or even decided, may be reviewed. The present case is not affected by any interpretation of subsection (4) either including or excluding revisions. However, an interpretation of subsection (2)(d) would be necessary to decide on the contention of the petitioner, which is, that since a revision petition has been decided by the Board of Revenue against the order of the Additional Commissioner, a review by the Additional Commissioner is not prevented under subsection (2)(d), since the word used is "appeal" and not "revision".
6. If these contentions were accepted, it would result in two possible consequences. One is that in every case it would be open to a party to first go in a revision petition to the superior Court, and having failed there, come back to the subordinate Court and get the same matter agitated and reopened through a review petition. This consequence is preposterous. If accepted, this would result in a superior Court with revisional jurisdiction deciding one thing in a case, and a subordinate Court deciding quite another through the review jurisdiction. This can never be the intention of the legislature. It would be against natural justice, common sense, and the time-honoured principles of procedural jurisprudence to permit such a thing to happen.
7. On the other hand, if a decision by the Board of Revenue in a revision petition is allowed to be questioned before a Commissioner/Additional Commissioner through a review petition, the party losing its case before the Commisioner/Additional Commissioner would again come up to the Board of Revenue by a revision petition to challenge the decision of the Commissioner/Additional Commissioner given in review. The Board of Revenue, in such a case, would be reopening its own earlier decision in a round-about way, without the petitioner having to prove jurisdiction under section 8 of the West Pakistan Board of Revenue Act, 1957, because, on the face of it, it would be entertaining a revision petition against an order of a Commissioner/Additional Commissioner, and not a review petition. In other words, putting the construction on subsection (2)(d) that the petitioner urges, would render the provision in the law restricting review jurisdiction practically meaningless.
8. It is, therefore, clear that either of the above two consequences would lead to an absurdity. I would, therefore, not agree with the interpretation of the law pleaded on behalf of the petitioner, and would decide that an order against which a revision has been preferred shall not be reviewed, and therefore, an order against which a revision has been decided shall not be reviewed a fortiori.
9. I would reject the petition.
Petition rejected.