1. ' HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-This appeal, by special leave, arises out of an order of a Division Bench of the former High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore Seat, dismissing a writ petition in limine.
2. ' The appellant, it appears, applied in the year 1961 for the grant of Government lands under the Tubewell Sinking Scheme. In the lottery held for this purpose, he drew lot No, 2 in Chak No, 114/15-L in Tehsil Khanewal, District Multan, on the 29th November, 19b1. He was subsequently formally informed by the Deputy Commissioner, Multan by a letter No, 355/HVC dated 11--1962 that "Lot No, 2 comprising of Khasra Nos. 63/1-25, 69/1-4, 7-14, 17.25, 70/1-4, 7-14, 17-25=128 acres 3 kanals and 12 marlas, situated in Chak No, 114/15-L, Tehsil Khanewal in Multan, has been allotted to him and that he should take possession of the land from the Tehsildar, Khanewal within a week from the date of receipt of the order."
3. ' In pursuance of this letter, he took possession on the 28th September, 1962, but, on actual measurement, it was found that tee total area of the Khasra Nos. Mentioned in the aforesaid letter cane only to 05 acres, 3 kanals and 12 marks. He, accordingly in October 19)2, put in an application for the want of the balance of the area offered to him and pointed out that surplus uncommanded land was available in the area, namely, Khasra Nos. 75, 93 and 96, which were still lying vacant. The Collector rejected this application on the 8th December, 1962, on the ground that the Government had since terminated the Tubewell Sinking Scheme and, therefore, new areas could not be included in the lot. From this order, he went in appeal to the Additional Commissioner, Revenue, Multan Division, who allowed the appeal by his order of the 11th March 1963, and directed that "efforts should be made to allot uncommanded and uncultivated area to the appellant so t iat this Tube well lot comes to the prescribed limit".
4. ' It appears that the prescribed limit was about 150 acres and the view taken was that since this was not a case of new allotment but merely a continuation of an old allotment, the request of the appellant was not injustice.
5. ' The Collector moved for a review of this order and the Board of Rovenue sanctioned the review under its Memorandum No, 7127/05 dated 4th November, 1965. On this review, a successor Additional Commissioner, Revenue, set aside the order of his predecessor on the ground that the order sought to be reviewed was "contrary to the existing orders of the Government". Against this order, the appellant went in revision before the Board of Revenue. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, rejected the revision on the ground that the "scheme under which the allotment was made originally to the petitioner, had ceased operation and no further allotment could be made thereunder."
6. ' The appellant challenged this order by a petition under Article 98 of the Constitution of 1962 but, as already stated, a Division Bench of the High Court, after considering the report of the department, dismissed it in limine, because, the allotment was by reference to lot and not according to the acreage erroneously mentioned in the letter of the Deputy Commissioner and furthermore, because, the first term of allotment of the petitioner had already expired and he was not given any further allotment of any excess area.
7. ' Leave was granted in this case to consider whether in view of the term of the Tube well Sinking Scheme that the area of allotment would be about 150 acres the Member, Board of Revenue, took a correct view in regard to the claim.
8. ' After hearing the learned counsel and examining the original file of the department which was produced before us, we find that the grant was by reference to lot No, 2 and not by reference to acreage. The copy of the letter included in the brief is not a correct copy. The portion "equal to 128 acres, 3 kanals and 12 marlas" is not to be found in the original letter in the departmental file. It is also correct that the original lease was for five years and that since then proprietary rights in these lands had already been granted to the lessee.
9. ' As pointed out by the High Court, the appellant was never granted a lease of any area in excess of the Khasra Nos. Which were originally allotted to him but the appellant has since been trying to take advantage of the mistake committed by the department in including the acreage also in this leiter. Hence the main question that arises is as to whether the allotment was by lot or by acreage?
10. If the allotment was by lot, then the petitioner could only get what was allotted to him. If the lot did not come up to his expectations, he should have refused to take possession thereof and insisted upon the total acreage being made good at that very point of time, but, in this case, it appears, that he accepted the allotment according to the lot and the Khasra numbers mentioned in the letter without any protest or demur. He also took possession thereof without any protest and only after he had taken possession of these lands that he started moving for the allotment of more lands. By this time, the scheme had already come to an end and, therefore, the Collector was right in taking the view that no further allotment could be made to him. This is the view that has been upheld by the Member, Board of Revenue, and the High Court, we see no reason to disagree, for, it is patent that the appellant has been trying to take advantage of the mistake which crept into the schedule only and was not included in the body of the copy of the letter of allotment on the departmental file. The grant, therefore, was identifiable by lot and not by area. The appellant has received the whole of the lot granted to him and he cannot legally insist upon getting more than that. The Revenue authorities were not bound to give him anything more.
11. ' In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Revenue authorities had acted either illegally or unjustly in refusing to accede to the request of the appellant. This appeal is without any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed but having regard to the special facts of this case, we make no order as to costs.