1. ' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---This case has come to this Court for the third time. At the two previous occasions the judgment passed by the High Court was set aside and the case was remanded for fresh decision in light of certain observations which were made by this Court. At both these occasions appeals were brought to this Court by Mst. Shero &gum and this time also the High Court has decided the case against her. However, we need not go into the details of the remand orders passed by this Court or the judgments pronounced by the High Court at the previous occasions because nothing turns on them.
2. ' The facts forming the background to the present appeal, by leave of the Court, are that half of the land bearing No,1772/1513 measuring 7 Kanals 7/1-2 Marlas situated in Village Hill Srung, Tehsil Bagh was sold by Mir Akbar Khan, respondent No,2, to Abdul Qayyum Khan respondent No,1, on 20th of June 1953 through a sale-deed. On 12th of August 1958 another legal instrument, which is described as an `Iqrarnama' but the parties are at variance about its true nature, was executed in which Mir Akbar Khan stated that he had already sold half share through a sale-deed executed on 20th of June 1953 to Abdul Qayyum Khan and that vendee had made improvements including the construction of a house; now he had received Rs,250 from said Abdul Qayyum Khan and in lieu thereof was giving remaining half share of the land mentioned above by way of mortgage till April, 1960; in case of his failure to pay the amount and take back the possession of the land from the mortgagee, the land shall be deemed to have been sold to the mortgagee and after April 1960 the mortgagee will be at liberty to treat the land as his ownership and he may get the necessary entries made in the record. This document forms part of the record but has not been duly exhibited. However, the contents of the documents have been admitted during the evidence produced by the parties. The contents of the document are duly mentioned in the plaint in the present case.
3. ' On 3rd of May 1973 Abdul Qayyum Khan obtained a consent decree from the Court of Sub-Judge, Bagh on a suit instituted on 22nd of April 1973 against Mir Akbar Khan. The decree is to the effect that the plaintiff had been in adverse possession of land measuring 7 Kanals 7/1-2 Marlas under Survey No, 1772/1513 inclusive of a house and that the possession has matured into title.
4. ' On 2nd of May 1974 Mst. Shero Begum, wife of Mir Akbar Khan respondent, filed a suit alleging therein that the decree passed on 3rd of May 1973 was in fact a sale in the garb of a decree and that by treating the decree as a sale decree of possession on the basis of right of prior purchase on the payment of Rs,250 may be passed in her favour. She stated that she was entitled to the decree on the grounds that she was Mir Akbar's wife and a co-sharer. Another suit of similar nature was filed by one Abdul Aziz. Both the suits were consolidated and decided together on 31st of March 1979. After trial both the suits were dismissed. The learned Sub-Judge held that it had not been proved that the consent decree was in fact a sale. Abdul Aziz did not file appeal and the matter has come to an end so far Abdul Aziz is concerned. An appeal filed by Mst. Shero Begum was dismissed by the Additional District Judge on 20th of August 1979. Then there were, as mentioned above, two judgments of the High Court which were vacated by this Court and remand orders were passed.
5. The third judgment passed by the High Court is now the subject matter of this appeal. It was pronounced on 22nd of January 1992. The High Court has affirmed the findings recorded by the Courts below and has held that the consent decree challenged by Mst. Shero Begum has not been proved to be in fact a sale and therefore was not pre-emptible.
6. ' We have heard Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal in support of the appeal and Sardar Muhammad Yasin Khan, who appeared for respondents. Sardar Muhammad Yasin Khan has submitted an application that he may be allowed to file a certified copy of the complaint filed by Mir Akbar respondent No,2 on 18th of July 1960 against respondent Abdul Qayyum Khan and others in which it was alleged that Abdul Qayyum Khan and others trespassed into his land on 16th of July, 1960 when he was working in the fields and attempted to inflict injuries on him but he made good his escape. It was alleged, however, that Abdul Qayyum Khan and others caused damage to the harvest etc. The certified copy of the complaint filed by Mir Akbar Khan is a piece of evidence and it can only be adduced as additional evidence if a proper case is made out but no such prayer has been made in the application. The only prayer is that this copy may be permitted to be filed before hearing. It is explained in the application that the file was missing but has now been "discovered" from Rawalakot. There is proper procedure for adducing additional evidence and it is only in exceptional cases that such a prayer is accepted. The application is not for additional evidence and is dismissed. We may also point out that there is no description of land incorporated in the aforesaid complaint.
7. ' The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, contended that in the compromise filed in the Court it is stated that the plaintiff had received costs of the suit, According to the learned counsel this amount was in fact the price of the land and this significant fact read with other factors went to prove that the decree obtained from the Court was in fact a sale. He contended that this aspect has not been considered by the High Court and the Courts below with the result that wrong conclusions were drawn. On the other hand Sardar Muhammad Yasin Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents, rightly pointed out that a proper reading the record shows that this is not factually correct that defendant Mir Akbar had received any money from plaintiff Abdul Qayyum Khan. In the first paragraph of the compromise filed before the Sub-Judge it is stated that the plaintiff had foregone the costs of the suit and not that he had received the costs.
8. The Urdu word used in the compromise deed is "Faroguzasht" which means "to forego". The matter becomes further clear on reading the statement of plaintiff Abdul Qayyum recorded by the Sub- Judge on 3rd of May 1973 wherein he stated that he had "given up" the costs of the suit. In the decree drawn up by the Court it is also clearly incorporated that the parties were themselves to bear their respective costs: Thus the argument stands repelled.
9. ' The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that there has been any misreading of evidence in the case. The trial Court evaluated the evidence in the case and while doing so brought under consideration each and every piece of evidence on the record. On appeal the first appellate Court also affirmed the findings of fact. The case was twice decided by the High Court and has been decided by that Court for the third time. Although some varying views were expressed at the two previous occasions as to nature of transaction which took place between Abdul Qayyum and Mir Akbar and its effects, no doubts were expressed about the findings of fact.
10. The findings have been examined by the High Court in the judgment under appeal and have been found unexceptionable. If a decree for possession is passed on the basis of a compromise between the parties but, when challenged, nothing tangible is brought on the record to satisfy the Court in support of the factum of adverse possession there may be strong inference that a sale has been dressed up as a decree. However, in the present case the consent decree is not a decree in vacuum. So far as possession is concerned it has been with respondent Abdul Qayyum because Mst. Shero Begum prayed for possession in her suit. It was averred by her in the plaint that Mir Akbar was owner of the land in dispute and that he had transferred it to Abdul Qayyum through an "Iqrarnama" executed on 12th of May, 1958. A reading of the plaint shows that by necessary implication she admitted that the possession of the suit land had remained with Abdul Qayyum from 1958 while the consent decree was passed on 3rd of May 1973. From the evidence produced in the case this fact stands fully proved. Then Abdul Qayyum stated in his statement in the Court that according to the "Iqrarnama" executed in 1958 he was to become owner of the land in dispute on failure of Mir Akbar to repay Rs,250 within two yeaRs, He further stated that in 1960 Mir Akbar demanded the possession of the land whereupon he (Abdul Qayyum) demanded from Mir Akbar to return Rs,250 and also price of the house which he had constructed. He stated that Mir Akbar gave him Rs,250 and the "Iqrarnama" was returned to him. It was claimed by Abdul Qayyum in his statement that he subsequently ploughed the land in dispute and Mir Akbar got a case of trespass registered against him under section 447 of the Penal Code but he continued to keep the possession of the land. The "Iqrarnama" was produced in the Court by Mit Akbar which fact lends support to the statement of Abdul Qayyum. In these circumstances the statement of Abdul Qayyum was given weight by the trial Court and the first appellate Court. Subsequently the High Court has also agreed with the Courts below:-- ' The burden of proving that the consent decree was in fact a sale was on Mst. Shero Begum. Other plaintiff, namely, Abdul Aziz, produced Muhammad Ajab Khan, Muhammad Sadiq, Muhammad Yaqoob and Aseel Khan and also appeared as his own witness. Mst. Shero Begum produced Mir Akbar and Abdul Rashid as her witnesses and also appeared as her own witness. The defendant produced Hassan Din, Muhammad Nazir, Nawab Khan and Inayatullah and appeared as his own witness. The testimony of these witnesses has been properly evaluated and the evaluation does not suffer from any misreading or non-reading of evidence. The witnesses did not depose that there was a transaction between Abdul Qayyum and Mir Akbar in respect of the land in dispute. All of them admitted that Abdul Qayyum had the possession of the suit land. A perusal of the statements of these witnesses Shows that they did not have any knowledge about the allegation that there was a transaction in the nature of sale between Abdul Qayyum and Mir Akbar Khan.
11. ' We, therefore, do not find any ground for interference with the result that the appeal stands dismissed with costs.