\The applicant in this case, who is admittedly a Juvenile, was found guilty of an offence punishable under section 304-A of the Pakistan Penal Code by the learned President of the Juvenile Court who directed that he be detained for a period of one year in the Juvenile Jail, Landhi.
2. The facts of the case are fairly simple; on the 23rd of September 1970 at about 8-15 p.m. The Nazimabed Police Station was informed that one Hashim A.I son of Miran Bux, who was over 70 years of age had been brought to the Hospital in an injured state having been knocked down by a scooter which was driven by the applicant who had been brought to the police station. Several witnesses were examined by the prosecution includ--ing the eye-witnesses Muhammad Zaman, Muhammad Yaqoob, Muhammad Ibrahim and they have all stated that on the date in question at about 6-30 p.m. The scooter was coming from Anarkali side and knocked down the old man who was then crossing the road carrying a child in his arms. One of the witnesses namely, Muhammad Zamin has said that the scooter was being driven fast while another, Muhammad Ibrahim, has said that it was being driven at a moderate speed. It is an admitted position that the locality is a crowded one and the essence of criminal negligence does not lie in the speed of the vehicle; a fairly high speed may be reasonable where the road is not crowded and a much low speed may still be evidence of negligence in a crowded locality. What matters is that the old man was crossing the street and the scooter has suddenly come on him and knocked him down and I entirely agree with the learned President of the Juvenile Court that negligence was established. Before me it was not even seriously argued that negligence had not been committed by the applicant although in the Juvenile Court some defence evidence had been produced for the purpose of showing that the old man had a green cloth patched on one of his eyes and this had not been believed by the learned President.
3. There was one other witness also, namely, a constable called Abdul Sattar, but he does not claim to have actually witnessed the accident but merely came there on seeing a crowd and being informed that the incident had taken place, he took the applicant to the police station alongwith his scooter and it was found that the applicant had no driving licence.
4. No serious attempt was made before me to argue that the finding is incorrect and indeed from the record I am not persuaded that it was incorrect. It was simply argued that the injuries on the deceased show that it must have been the rear of the scooter which struck him but this is hardly plausible and I am quite unable to see how the injuries make this out. The injuries are as follows: "(1) Lacerated wound left parietal region with two stitches on 1' long with swelling around it 4' x 3".
(2) Cont. Abrasions two on left elbow joint posteriorly --' apart -- x --' each."
This has resulted in extensive internal damage including the fracture of the left parietal bone and intracranial haemorrhage.
5. The serious question, however, that was argued before me was that under section 27 of the Bombay Children---s Act it was not incumbent upon the learned Magistrate to send the applicant to the Juvenile Jail and indeed, contrarily, it was her duty to consider the various ways in which the applicant could be dealt with. Section 27 of Bombay Children's Act reads as follows: "(27) Methods of dealing with children charged with offences. (1) Where a child charged with any offence is tried by any Court, and the Court is satisfied of his guilt, the Court shall take into considera--petition the manner in which, under the provisions of this or any other Act enabling the Court to deal with the case, the case should be dealt with, namely, whether;
(a) by discharging the offender after due admonition; or
(b) by committing the offender to the care of his parent, guardian, other adult relative, or other fit person on such parent, guardian relative or person executing a bond to be responsible for his good behaviour; or
(c) by so discharging the offender and placing him under the supervi--sion of a person named by the Court; or
(cc) by releasing the offender on probation of good conduct; or
(d) by sending the offender to a certified school; or
(e) Omitted.
(ee) by sentencing the offender to caning in cases where the conduct of the offender has been such as to lead the Court to believe the no other punishment would be effective; or
(f) by ordering the offender to pay a fine; or
(g) by ordering the parent or guardian of the offender to pay a fine; or
(h) where the offender is a child of fourteen years of age or upwards, by sentencing him to imprisonment; or
(i) by dealing with the case in any other manner in which it may legally be dealt with; Provided that nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the Court to deal with any case in any manner in which it could not deal with the case from this section.
(2) Where a child is charged with an offence punishable with fine only, and is dealt with under clause (f ) of subsection (1), the Court may, if it thinks fit, add a sentence of caning in default of paying of fine, if it is satisfied that the offender is able to pay the fine.
(3) If in any such case as is described in subsection (2), the offender has previously undergone a sentence of caning passed under that subsection he may, in default of payment of fine, be sent to a certified school for a period not exceeding three years."
Reliance was also placed upon the decision in Usman v. State (PLD 1961 Kar. 303) where a learned Single Judge of this Court did substitute for an order of detention an order that the applicant be committed to the care of a parent or guardian or any other adult relative. I agree with that case and I think it was the duty of the learned President to consider whether it was not proper to deal with him in some other manner permitted by law. Upon the material before me I am in no position to judge how otherwise the applicant could or should have been treated and I, therefore, allowing this revision application, set aside the order passed and remand the case back to the Juvenile Court and direct that the President, Juvenile Court, shall apply his mind to the circumstances of the case and consider what the proper order should be. This is not to be construed as meaning that he may not eventually come to the conclusion that the order which the late President passed was in fact the proper order; all I am directing is that the President apply his mind and decide what ought to be the order.