1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 26-9-1991, whereby the appeal filed by the respondents, Muhammad Malik and others, was accepted whereas the cross-appeal filed by the appellants, herein, was dismissed.
2. ' The breif facts necessary for the disposal of the case are that Haji Ghulam Hussain, predecessor- in-interest of the present appellants, alongwith some others, filed a suit seeking declaration against the respondents-defendants in the Court of Sub-Judge, Dudyal, that the suit land situated in village Thara, Tehsil Dudyal, measuring 14 Kanals 12 Marlas was in the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs and pro forma defendants and defendant No,2, Muhammad Zaman, executed a gift-deed in favour of Muhammad Malik, defendant No,1, his son, on 12-2-1974 without any title to the land. They sought a declaration to the effect that the gift-deed may be declared as null and void against their interests; in alternative they pleaded that their possession over the suit land had ripened into ownership; during the pendency of the suit Haji Ghulam Hussain died and his legal representatives had been brought on record. Meanwhile, a cross-suit was filed by Muhammad Malik, donee, against Ghulam Hussain and others alleging that the suit land was gifted to him by his father and he was in possession of the same as an owner but Ghulam Hussain and others managed fictitious entries regarding possession in the revenue record and are after his forcible dispossession. He sought perpetual injunction against Ghulam Hussain and others, appellants herein, restraining them from interfering in his possession. Both the suits were consolidated by the trial Court and after the trial the suit filed by Mst. Rehmat Jan etc., appellants herein, was dismissed while that of Muhammad Malik, donee-respondent, was decreed. Two cross appeals were filed before the District Judge who accepted the appeal filed by Mst. Rehmat Jan and others to the extent that the suit filed by Muhammad Malik, respondent, for perpetual injunction was dismissed on the ground that he could not prove his possession over the suit land while the appeal filed by the appellants, herein, was also dismissed. Consequently two appeals were preferred to the High Court. The appeal filed by Mst. Rehmat Jan and others, appellants herein, was dismissed while that of Muhammad Malik, respondent, was accepted and a decree for perpetual injunction was passed in his favour. It is against the aforesaid judgment and decree of the High Court that the present appeal is submitted.
3. ' It has been argued by Raja Muhammad Siddique Khan, Advocate, appearing for the appellants, that the High Court has -committed an error in holding that Muhammad Malik, respondent, proved his possession and that of his predecessor-in-interest over the suit land. The learned counsel has argued that the possession of Muhammad Malik, respondent, or his predecessor-ininterest has not been proved. The learned counsel has argued that the High Court has misread the evidence and arrived' at an incorrect conclusion that the possession of the suit land was with Muhammad Malik and not with the appellants, herein. The learned counsel has maintained that in copy of Jamabandi', Exh. CB produced in the High Court, Sattara son of Gulab, the grandfather of Muhammad Malik, respondent, was entered as vendee while the possession is recorded that of Nasar Din and Ghulam Din, sons of Muhammad Bakhsh, as nonoccupancy tenants. In column 9 they are recorded as {{URDU TEXT}} and words {{URDU TEXT}} are also written in the said column.According to the learned counsel, in the copies of lamabandis' pertaining to the years 1951- 52 and 1963-64, the possession of none of the parties is recorded in the Revenue Record. The learned counsel has also argued that neither Muhammad Zaman, the father of Muhammad Malik, nor Muhammad Malik, donee, appeared as witness. Thus an adverse presumption will be taken against them.
4. ' Coming to the question of adverse possession, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the entry in the copy of `Jamabandi' pertaining to year 1999-2000 Bk. As {{URDU TEXT}} shows that the respondents were occupying the land as owners and, thus, their possession over the suit land would be deemed adverse to the owneRs, He has also submitted that as none of the parties has been recorded in possession in `Jamabandis' pertaining to years 1951-52 and 1963-64, it would be assumed that the entry of possession in favour of Nasar Din and Ghulam Din continued after the year 2000 Bk. Because, according to the learned counsel, it has not been shown that how in subsequent{{URDU TEXT}} and words {{URDU TEXT}} were deleted from the revenue record. The learned counsel has referred following authorities in support of his contention:-- ' In West Punjab Province v. Siraj Din PLD 1951 Lah. 459, it was held that the presumption of truth under section 44 of the Land Revenue Act would be raised only if the entry is made under proper authority.
5. ' In Allah Dad v. Muhammad All PLD 1956 Lah. 245 it was observed that if the entry recorded in the revenue record is proved illegal, the entry previous to illegal entry would be deemed to be the correct entry and shall be deemed to continue in the subsequent record.
6. ' Thus, according to the learned counsel, it will be assumed that Nasar Din and Ghulam Din continued to occupy the land as {{URDU TEXT}} even after the year 1999-2000 Bk. Similarly, in the copy of `Jamabandi' 197576 marked as Exh.CF, Muhammad Zaman and others have been recorded as owners while Ghulam Hussain and -others have been recorded as nonoccupancy tenants {{URDU TEXT}} but there are no words in column 9 as the learned counsel for the respondents, Raja Hassan Akhtar, has controverted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants and has contended that it is proved on the record, both by the documentary as well as the oral evidence, that the possession after the year 1999-2000 Bk. Is that of Sattara and after his death that of his heirs and .Not that of the successors-in-interest of Nasar Din and Ghulam Din, the non-occupancy tenants. The learned counsel has maintained that the entry of possession of successors-in-interest of Nasar Din and Ghulam Din which appears in the `Jamabandi' of the year 1975-76 is based on the mutation which was subsequently set aside by the Collector and as such that has no evidentiary value. The learned counsel has also submitted that the entry of the possession of Nasar Din and Ghulam Din is as non-occupancy tenants and the words in column 9 in `Jamabandi" ' pertaining to the year 1999-2000 Bk would not make their possession as adverse to the owneRs, ' We have considered the arguments advanced at the Bar and perused the record. It may be stated that initially the Assistant Collector, through mutation, corrected the entries of the possession of the suit land pertaining to the year `Rabi' 1968, but on appeal the matter was remanded to Assistant Collector Second Grade (Tehsildar) for inquiry who again affirmed the order of correction of entries in favour of the appellants. An appeal was referred by Muhammad Zaman, donor, to the Additional Collector against the order of Assistant Collector, Second Grade, who disposed of the appeal in an ambiguous manner. The operating part of the order of the Additional Collector is as under:-- {{URDU TEXT}} ' It is obvious from the above extract of the judgment that on the one hand the Additional Collector accepted the appeal and on the other hand observed that there was no need to correct the entries according to the order of the Assistant Collector because after the year 1974, the respondents, i,e,, the appellants herein, had been in continuous possession. Thus, it cannot be said that the order passed by Tehsildar (Assistant Collector) dated 18-8-1977 has been set at naught by the Additional Collector in clear terms. It has not been recorded by the Additional Collector that the order of the Assistant Collector, Second Grade, was against the facts but according to him, as the entries in the revenue record subsequent to the year 1974 are already in favour of Ghulam Hussain and others, the appellants herein, there was no need to act upon the order of Assistant Collector, i,e,, Tehsildar.
7. Instead the learned Additional Collector expressed the view that the parties should be left to get the matter decided by the Civil Court. In the copy of 'Khasra Girdawari' Exh.PC, which pertains to the years 1964 to 1976, the poi-session is recorded that of Nasar Din and Ghulam Din, the predecessors-in-interest of Ghulam Hussain and otheRs, It is in the year `Rabi' 1968 that the correction in the entries was ordered in favour of Ghulam Hussain, Muhammad Hussain sons of Nasar Din, Mst. Samani, widow, Fazal Hussain, Walayat Hussain, Noor Hussain, sons, Mst. Said Begum and Mst. Noor Begum, daughters of Ghulam Din. In other words, irrespective of the order of remand and the subsequently the order passed by the Assistant Collector which was appealed before the Additional Collector, the fact remains that the entries of possession from the year 1964 onwards are either in favour of the appellants or their predecessors-in-interest. The order of the Additional Collector, Exh.DB, passed on appeal of Muhammad Zaman, does not detra, from the value of the entries of 'Khasra Girdawari' pertaining to years 1964 to 1976, as has been seen above.
8. Therefore, there is nothing on the record in support of the finding that from the year 1964 onwards the possession of the suit land was not of the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants or the appellants.
9. ' So far as the nature of the possession is concerned, Fazal Hussain, one of the appellants, has stated as a witness that Muhammad Zaman, the donor, was the owner of the suit land. Even otherwise, the entries incorporated in `Khasra Girdawari' pertaining to the years 1951-52, 1963-64 and 1967-68 show that the appellants and their predecessors-in-interest as tenants-at-will under Muhammad Zaman and his predecessors and after the execution of the gift-deed in favour of Muhammad Malik, they would be deemed to be tenants-atwill under Muhammad Malik and not in adverse possession of the suit land. The learned counsel has relied upon the copy of `Jamabandi' pertaining 'to year 1999-2000 Bk. Where although the predecessors-in-interest of the appellants are entered as tenants-at-will on payment of rent yet in column 9 it has also been recorded as {{URDU TEXT}} That would not change the nature of their possession as adverse. The words {{URDU TEXT}} coupled with other entries in the Jamabandi do not change the nature of the possession of the appellants or their predecessors-in-interest, especially so when in the subsequent record, beginning right from the year 1951 till now, they or their predecessors-in-interest are recorded as tenants-at-will on payment of rent and expression {{URDU TEXT}} has not been incorporated in the revenue record.
10. ' In the light of what has been stated above, we partly accept the appeal filed by appellants, herein, and set aside the judgment and decree passed by the High Court in favour of Muhammad Malik, respondent. Consequently, the suit filed by Muhammad Malik would be deemed to have been dismissed. The appeal filed by the appellants claiming the title of the suit land or the adverse possession over the same is also dismissed. In the circumstances of the case no order is made as to the costs.