' FAZAL KARIM, J.---The house in suit was owned by Sh. Inayat Ullah who died in the year 1970. He had married two wives Mst. Iqbal Begum plaintiff and the second defendant Mst. Farida. Both survived Sh. Inayat Ullah, The latter had also a son Farooq Inayat who is the first defendant in the suit. The first and the second defendants sold 15/16 share in the house to the defendants, Muhammad Saeed, Muhammad Naseem and Muhammad Naeem (to be referred to as the vendees) by means of a deed of sale dated 3-1-1985 for an ostensible sale price Rs,3,50,000.00.
Mst. Iqbal Begum brought this suit on 5-12-1985. Shortly stated her case was that Sh. Inayat Ullah had divorced the second defendant Mst. Farida in 1966 and therefore she was not entitled to any share in his estate. Her case also was that there was a family settlement between her and the first defendant, Farooq Inayat; that family settlement was evidenced by a deed dated 23-1-1971. By it the plaintiff became owner of 36/100 share and the first defendant became owner of 64/100 share in the house.
2. The plaintiff therefore sued for a declaration that the sale of the house in question in excess of 64/100 share was void and ineffective as against her rights. She also sued for the possession of the house by way of pre-emption.
3. The defendants contested the suit by filing written statements and eight issues reflecting the questions of fact raised in the parties' pleadings were formulated; it is sufficient to say for the purposes of this appeal that two of them were whether Sh. Inayat Ullah deceased had divorced the second defendant in the year 1966 and whether there was a family settlement between the plaintiff and the first defendant and the plaintiff had become owner of 36/100 share in the house. Indeed the defendants had denied the plaintiff's right of pre-emption; according to them, the house in suit was situate in an Abadi where there was no custom of pre-emption. This, it should be clear, was based upon the fact that under section 16 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, which was the law on the subject at that time a plaintiff could not succeed to pre-empt a sale in an urban area unless he could prove the existence of the custom of pre-emption in the locality where the property was situated.
4. As is well known, the provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, including sections 15 and 16 thereof were declared to be repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam in Malik Said Kamal Shah's case (PLD 1986 Supreme Court 360). Taking advantage of the law so enunciated, the defendants made an application under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C. Praying that the plaint of the plaintiff's suit be rejected, for no decree for possession by pre-emption had been passed in her favour before the specified date viz. 31-7-1986 and no decree could now be passed in her favour. The learned trial Judge accepted the application and held that "no Talabs have been made in the case and no decree was passed in favour of the plaintiff prior to 1986 therefore, the plaintiff's suit for pre-emption is barred by law." No doubt, so observed the learned trial Judge, the plaintiff had also pleaded "in the plaint another cause of action" yet the plaint had to be rejected, "in total and not in parts in view of judgment of Hon'ble High Court (reference in 1979 CLC 742 (Lahore). It was thus that learned trial Judge was led, or if we may say so misled, into rejecting the plaint as a whole.
5. Learned counsel for the plaintiff, appellant herein, agreed that the law-is now well settled that the plaintiff could not enforce her right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act 1913 and that the suit could not, as regards her right of pre-emption based on the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 proceed. The only question therefore is whether the learned trial Judge was right in rejecting the plaint in its entirety.
6. Under Order 7, Rule 11, C.P.C., the plaint of a suit shall be rejected in the following cases:
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) ..
(c) .
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.
7. It has been seen that in rejecting the plaint the learned trial Judge was of the opinion that in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court in Malik Said Kamal Shah's case, "the plaintiff's suit for pre-emption is barred by law". In other words, the plaint was in the view of the learned trial Judge liable to be rejected under clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII, C.P.C. Although we have our doubts that in the facts of the case clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII, C.P.C. Applied, for it is plain that at the date of the suit, the plaintiff had a right of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and the suit as regards the right of pre-emption did not appear from any statement in the plaint to be barred by law, yet as the case was argued before us on the assumption that the matter fell to be dealt with under clause (d) of that rule, we also propose to proceed accordingly.
8. From the cases cited at the bar of this Court, it appears that there has been cleavage of judicial opinion on the point whether a plaint can be rejected in part or it must be rejected as a whole or not at all. In Rao Bahadur and others v. Secretary of State and others (AIR 1935 Mad. 389) there were two plaintiffs. They sued for a declaration that defendant No,1, Secretary of State for India, "han no right to enfranchise these Inams and also for the recovery of possession of the lands ejecting the defendants therefrom". The Courts below had rejected the plaint under Order VII, Rule 11 C.P.C., on the ground that notice under section 80, C.P.C. Was not given by plaintiff 2 to the Secretary of State for India. One of the questions raised was that although with regard to plaintiff 2, there had been a non-compliance by him with section 80, C.P.C., in that he had not given the statutory notice, nevertheless the plaintiff who had complied with the requisites of section 80 could proceed with the suit. It was held that the plaint was rejected under clause (d) of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. And that "that provision rejects the whole plaint and not any particular part of the plaint". In Muddada Chayanna v. Veerabhadrao and others (AIR 1979 Andhra Pradesh 253) the plaintiff sued for the recovery of Rs,98,355.36 on account of damages "for irregularities in conducting the sale of immovable property". The first defendant in the suit was a Subordinate Judge, the second defendant was the Receiver appointed by him; the third defendant was the Executive Officer who had filed the execution petition and the 4th defendant was an Advocate who had appeared for the third defendant. The plaintiff alleged that the receiver inflated the expenses and minimised the income by his several acts and omissions. Relying upon the provisions of section 1-A of the Judicial Officers Protection Act, 1850, it was held that the plaint was liable to be rejected respect of the Subordinate Judge. The question then was whether the trial Court should have rejected the plaint in respect of the other defendants also. It was held that "the plaintiff has no cause of action against the first defendant alone. The whole cause of action was because of the acts done by all the defendants". In that connection reliance was placed upon a case reported as (AIR 1931 Madras 175) where it had been held that "the plain meaning of the rule amounts to this that if any of the defects mentioned therein is found to exist in any case, the plaint shall be rejected as a whole. It does not imply any reservation in the matter of rejection of the plaint".
9. It should be mentioned here that the case (AIR 1931 Madras 175) was decided by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court. Against his decision there was a Letters Patent Appeal which was decided by a Bench of two learned Judges, and that is reported as (AIR 1935 Madras 389). The case (AIR 1935 Madras 389) has been noticed above. It seems that the view of the learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Letters Patent Bench.
10. Feroze Din and another v. Master Muhammad Sher Khan (1979 CLC 742) was a case decided by a learned Single Bench of this Court. There the plaintiff had instituted a suit for a declaration that an order of the Rent Controller passed against him and in favour of the defendants was illegal and void. It was found that the case fell under Order VII, Rule 11, clause (d), C.P.C., that section 15, subsection (5) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance barred the suit, and that "provision of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. Does not admit of any ambiguity and clearly lays down that if any d6fect is found in a plaint from amongst those defects which are enumerated in the said rule, the plaint shall be rejected meaning thereby that the plaint as a whole has to be rejected. It in no manner leaves any reservation in the matter of rejection of the plaint". It was held also that if the plaintiff chows in one suit to combine several causes of action against a defendant which even the law may allow him it still remains one plaint and therefore rejection of the plaint if a part of it is barred by law must be as 'a whole and not as to part only. The appellants-plaintiffs having themselves chosen to combine in the plaint in question a part, rather a material part, as one which is barred by law manifestly cannot be permitted to say in the absence of any step having been taken to withdraw that part of the plaint which is barred by law to reject the plaint only to the extent it is barred by law.
11. The Full Bench case, Balvant Singh v. State Bank of India (AIR 1976 Punjab, Haryana 316) represents the contrary view point. There the suit was brought by the State Bank of India for the recovery of a sum of money from nine defendants. The trial Court found that the plaint did not disclose any cause of 'action against defendant No,4; that the plaint also disclosed no cause of action against defendant No,5 and that there being no allegation in the plaint that any notice under section 79 of the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act had been served on defendants Nos.6 and 7, the plaint also disclosed no cause of action against them. As the plaint was to be rejected not as a whole but only against defendants Nos.6 and 7, the trial Court directed their names to be struck off from the plaint. The question that required determination therefore was whether, "the plaint which does not disclose a cause of action in respect of a part of the claim against some of the defendants is liable to be rejected in its entirety".
12. It was plain that that case fell under clause (a) of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. The learned Judges of the Full Bench held that that clause applies "only in a case where a plaint does not disclose any cause of action". They read the word "a" in this clause to mean "any" and it was in their view clear that: "The intention of the Legislature was to empower the Courts to reject a plaint only where it did not disclose any cause of action."
' If the intention of the Legislature had been to give power to the Courts to reject the plaint, where it did not disclose a cause of action in respect of the part of the claim against some of the defendants, then, so observed the learned Judges, this clause would have been differently worded..
"In a case where there is a joinder of parties and causes of action and a decree is bound to be passed in respect of one or more of the causes of action and against some of the defendants, the provisions of Rule 11 (a) of Order VII, C.P.C. Cannot legally be invoked".
' After considering a large number of cues including AIR 1931 Madras . 175 and AIR 1935 Madras 389, it was held that "the contrary view Is neither sound nor just and is not warranted by the language of the statute" and that the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11, (a) of the C.P.C. "would be attracted only in a case where by reason of the plea that a plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the plaintiff is to be wholly non-suited, but this rule would have no applicability to cases where a plaint discloses a cause of action in respect of the part of the claim against some of the defendants, as in that event the names of the defendants against whom there is no cause of action or the suit is barred by law, have to be struck off and the suit has to proceed against the remaining defendants".
13. To start with, it must be kept in mind, first, that the ,provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 are procedural provisions. And secondly that on the principle that the first and the best source from which to ascertain the meaning of any statute is the statute itself, the Code of Civil Procedure must be read as a whole, that is to say, those provisions must not be read in isolation, and if intrinsic aid is afforded in their interpretation by other provisions of the Code, that aid must be made use of.
14. It is well settled that rules of procedure, because they are remedial in character, should receive a liberal (or if we may say so, generous) construction in order to promote justice and to carry out their purpose and especially so as to secure a more effective and a speedier, a simpler and a less expensive administration of the law. (Crawford on the Constructioneof Statutes, at p.496). As has been wisely said, such rules are not masters; they are servants, their purpose being to serve and advance the cause of justice.
15. Under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code, a plaint shall be rejected, among other .On the grounds that it does not disclose a cause of action and where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. Order II, Rule 1 of the Code enacts that "every suit shall...Be so framed so as to afford ground for final decision upon the subjects in dispute and to prevent further litigation concerning them. Obviously, this rule is aimed at preventing multiplicity of suits. Rule 2 of Order II requires that every suit must include the whole of the claim in respect of the cause of action and if a plaintiff fails or omits to sue in respect of a claim or a relief arising out of that cause of action, he shall not afterwards sue for such claim or relief. Rule 3 of Order II permits the joinder of several causes of action in the same suit but there is power in the Court under Rule 6 of Order II, to order separate trials or to make such other order as may be expedient where it appears to it that any causes of action cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together. Rule 7 of Order II requires that all objections on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action shall be taken at the earliest opportunity and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, unless the ground of objection has subsequently arisen, and goes on to say that "any such objection not so taken shall be deemed to have been waived". The combined effect of Rules 6 and 7 of Order II seems to be that a suit will not be defeated by reason of misjoinder of causes of action, for unless the objection was taken at the earliest opportunity, it will be deemed to have been waived and in any event, there is power in the Court to order separate trials or to make such order as may be expedient. Such order may be an order under Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code, which empowers the Court, at any stage of the proceedings, to order "to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading which may be unnecessary or scandalous or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit".
16. The expression "cause of action" as it occurs in these provisions means the cause of action for which the suit was brought; it refers to the facts which give occasion to and form the foundation of the suit. (See Abdul Hakim and 2 others v. Saadullah Khan and 2 others PLD 1970 SC 63 and Muhammad Hafiz v. Mirza Muhammad Zakariya (AIR 1922 PC 23, 26). On the well known rule that the singular includes the plural, and also because Order II, Rule 3 of the Code expressly permits a plaintiff to unite several causes of action in his suit, the expression "a cause of action" in Rule 11 of Order VII, must be read as causes of action where several causes of action have been united in one suit. Therefore, to entitle the Court to reject a plaint, in a case which includes several causes of action, it must be found that the plaint does not disclose any of the causes of action on which it is founded. We would, therefore, respectfully adopt the view taken in Balvant Singh's case and hold that unless the plaint does not disclose any of the causes of action joined in the suit, it cannot be rejected as a whole and that if the plaint does disclose one or more of the causes of action, the suit shall proceed in respect thereof. And, as a suit may include more than one cause of action, and the plaintiff may have more than one claim or may be entitled to more than one relief, in respect of a cause of action, the word 'suit' in clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII, of the Code, must mean the suit as a whole, that is to say, unless the whole suit is barred by any law, the plaint will not be rejected as a whole.
17. We are, therefore, led, and led ineluctably, to the conclusion that whether the case falls under clause (a) or clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order VII, of the Code, the Court has power to reject a plaint only where the suit is based on one cause of action and the plaint does not disclose that cause of action or the suit, as regards that cause of action, is barred by any law; also where the plaintiff claims several reliefs, in respect of the same cause of action, but his claim to one of the reliefs is barred by any law, the plaint will be rejected in respect of that relief only. We are encouraged to take that view of Order VII, Rule 11, also because of the very healthy growth, in recent years, of the tendency to ignore technicalities when they tend to hamper substantial justice.
18. A word about the ratio in Feroze Din v. Master Muhammad Sher (1979 CLC 742). The classical statement on the doctrine of ratio decidendi was the one made by Lord Halsbury LC in Quiun v.
Leathern (1901) AC 495, 506; ... One is... ... ... That every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.... .. ..." We have seen that the suit in Feroze Din case challenged an order of the Rent Controller and that was the cause of action for the suit. As by section 15(5) of the Rent Ordinance, the suit was barred, the plaint had to be rejected as a whole. That case must, therefore, be taken to have been decided on and' to be authority for, its own facts.
19. In the present case, the plaintiff had based herself at least on three causes of action, namely, inheritance to the estate of Sh. Inayatullah to the exclusion of the second defendant, the alleged family settlement and the sale of 15/16 share of the house by the first and the second defendants.
As regards the sale, the plaintiff claimed two reliefs, namely, the declaration that the sale of 15/16 share was not binding upon her and she was entitled to pre-empt the sale. Learned counsel for the defendants, respondents herein, who contended for the view, and did so with great ability and his usual fairness, that the plaint was liable to rejection, and was rightly rejected, as a whole, did not dispute her right to unite these causes and to claim the relief of pre-emption in respect of the third cause of action at the date of the suit in 1985. It was later, after the decision in Said Kamal Shah's case had been handed down, that she ceased to be entitled to the relief of pre-emption. In other words, even in respect of the cause of action arising out of the sale, her right to continue the suit regarding the relief of declaration remained intact. For this reason, and also on the view of the provisions of Order VII, Rule 11 that we propose to take, the learned Civil Judge was wrong to reject the plaint in its entirety.
20. We, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the order in question and holding that the suit shall proceed as regards the causes of action and the relief other than the relief of pre-emption, send the case back to the trial Court for its disposal in accordance with law. The parties are left to bear their own costs.