' This judgment will also dispose of Civil Revision No,1331 of 1990 as both the revision petitions have arisen from the same judgment passed by the icarned lower appellate Court..
2. The land in dispute was sold through registered sale-deed dated 4-4-1981 for an amount of Rs,78,000 by Ghulam Sarwar to Ghulam Rasool Shah. On 10-5-1981 the present petitioner namely Mst. Iffat Chaudhry filed a suit to pre-empt the said sale. The right of pre-emption was claimed on the ground of co-sharership in the Khata as also collateralshipi On 15-11-1981 the petitioner and Ghulam Rasool vendee entered into compromise. The vendee Ghulam Rasool made statement before the learned trial Court that he had received an amount of Rs,62,400 from Mst. Iffat and the amount of Zar-e Panjum i.e. Rs,15,600 deposited in the Court would be withdrawn by him. He conceded the suit by admitting the right of pre-emption of the plaintiff. The learned trial Court adjourned the case to 21-11-1981 for passing order. However, before the said date i.e. on 17-11-1981 Muhammad Khan petitioner in the connected revision petition filed a suit to pre-empt the same sale. He claimed right of pre-emption on the ground of collateralship being brother of the vendor and co-sharership. He made an application before the learned trial Court in the suit filed by Mst.
Iffat that he be also made a party being the rival pre-emptor. Both the suits were tried and on 4-1- 1988 suit of Muhammad Khan rival pre-emptor was decreed in the first instance because he was held to have right of pre-emption on the ground of collateralship which was superior to Mst. Iffat because he was related to the vendor in a nearer degree being his brother, as such, was a residuary whereas Mst. Iffat was held to be a distinct kindred, therefore, her right of pre-emption was inferior to Muhammad Khan. It was, however, ordered that in case Muhammad Khan failed to deposit the price of the land/pre-emption money the suit in that case filed by him would stand dismissed and the suit of Mst. Iffat would .be deemed to have been decreed.
3. Mst. Iffat filed appeal before the learned lower appellate Court against the said judgment and decree in which Muhammad Khan as also the vendee were impleaded as respondents. It may be observed that the vendee himself did not file any appeal against the said judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. The learned lower appellate Court held that on 4-1-1988 Punjab Pre-emption Act ceased to be the law having been declared repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam w.e.f. 31-7-1986, therefore, in none of the two suits a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff, as such, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court was set aside and both the suits dismissed.
4. Learned counsel for Mst. Iffat submitted that no appeal was filed against the decree passed in favour of Mst. Iffat in the event of Muhammad Khan failure to deposit pre-emption money, therefore, so far as she was concerned decree in her favour could not have been set aside.
5. I am afraid the argument is devoid of any force. The decree in favour of Mst. Iffat was conditional and was to take effect and rather could be deemed to have been based only if Muhammad Khan had failed to deposit the pre emption money. Even otherwise under Order 41, Rule 33, C.P.C. an Appellate Court was vested with wide jurisdiction to pass any judgment or decree other than that passed by the learned trial Court in favour of or against any party who might not have filed appeal which in the circumstances of the case should have been passed. The view taken by the learned lower appellate Court is unexceptionable because on the date the decree was passed by the learned trial Court in favour of Muhammad Khan and Mst. Iffat it could not be passed as there was no law on the basis of which the collateral could pre-empt the sale on the said date.
6. Both the revision petitions have no force because the learned lower appellate Court has not committed any material irregularity and illegality in exercise of jurisdiction vested in it under the law.
7. Learned counsel for both the pre-emptors namely Muhammad Khan and Mst. Iffat submitted that in the plaint they had also claimed right of pre emption on the ground that they were co- sharers in the Khata on which ground the right of pre-emption is available under the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991. The remedy of both the plaintiffs is to make an application before the learned trial Court for revival of the suit if any provisions of the said Act provides to them such a remedy which application if made shall be decided on its own merits according to the provisions of the said Punjab Pre-emption Act. In case the learned trial Court holds that the suits could be revived and the same are revived, then Mst. Iffat may raise the plea before the learned trial Court that so far as her suit was concerned the same should proceed from the stage at which the same was i.e. the compromise entered into between the parties on 15-11-1981 be given effect to which matter shall also be decided in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.